IRLF 


tmm 


of 


No  ......  .... 

Division  _______  . 

Range 
Slielf....  ......... 


* 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA, 


GIFT  OF 


DANIEL    C.     OILMAN. 


REV.  JEREMIAH  DAY,  S  .T.D.LL.D. 

JRESIDKNT     OF  YALE  COLIJIOE. 


(      6t-/t 


AN 

I  N  d  U  I  R  Y 

RESPECTING   THE 


SELF-DETERMINING 

POWER   OF  THE   WILL; 


OR 


CONTINGENT  VOLITION. 

SECOND      EDITION, 

WITH   ADDITIONS   AND   ALTERATIONS 


BY   JEREMIAH    DAY, 

LATE     PRESIDENT     OF    YALE     COLLEGE. 


"  I  think  that  the  notion  of  liberty,  consisting  in  a  contingent  self-determination 
of  the  will,  as  necessary  to  the  morality  of  men's  dispositions  and  actions,  is  almost 
inconceivably  pernicious ;  and  that  the  contrary  truth  is  one  of  the  most  important 
truths  of  moral  philosophy  that  ever  was  discussed,  and  most  necessary  to  be  known." 

President  Edwards. 


NEW   HAVEN: 
DAY    &    FITCH. 

1849. 


- 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1849, 

by  JEREMIAH  DAY, 
in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  Connecticut. 


PRINTED     BY     B.     L.      HAMLEN, 

Printer  to  Yale  College. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTORY     OBSERVATIONS. 


Page. 

Review  of  Cousin, 13 

President  Edwards  on  self-determination,    ......  14 

Moral  government  of  God, 14 

Testimony  of  Scripture, 15 

Ambiguous  phraseology, 17 

Figurative  language, 19 

Acrimonious  controversy,         .........  20 


SECTION    I. 

POWERS     OF     THE     MIND. 

Cause  and  effect, 22 

Dependence, 23 

Efficacy  of  a  cause, 24 

Complex  cause, 25 

Efficient  causes, 26 

Physical  and  Moral  causes, 26 


IV  CONTENTS. 

Page. 

Negative  causes, 27 

Every  change  has  a  cause, 27 

Contingence, 28 

Popular  meaning  of  contingence, 29 

Absolute  contingence, 29 

Power, 31 

Most  extensive  meaning  of  the  word, 32 

Mental  powers, 33 

Classification  of  mental  powers,       .        .        •        .        .        .        .        .34 

The  will,  volition, 35 

The  will,  according  to  Edwards,  includes  emotions,        ....  36 


SECTION    II. 


SELF-DETERMINATION. 

What  is  the  point  of  our  inquiry  ? .39 

The  cause  of  volition  is  the  cause  of  its  direction,        ....  39 

It  is  the  mind  itself  that  wills, 40 

What  determines  a  man  to  will  as  he  does  ? 41 

One  act  of  the  will  determining  another,         ...*..  42 

Is  any  thing  exterior  to  the  mind  concerned  in  volition  ?  43 

Are  volitions  determined  by  the  substance  and  nature  of  the  mind  ?        .  43 

Is  the  power  of  willing  the  cause  of  volition  ? 44 

Contingent  determination  of  volition, 46 

To  what  part  of  the  series  of  mental  acts,  does  contingence  belong  ?  .  47 

Forming  of  purposes,         .        . 47 

Desires  and  appetites, 48 

Spontaneous  volition, 49 

Personality, 49 

Originating  volitions, 50 

Is  the  mind  the  efficient  cause  of  its  volitions  ? 51 

Causing  choice  by  the  act  of  choosing,    .                        ....  52 


CONTENTS.  V 

Page. 

Meaning  of  cause, 53 

Cause  antecedent  to  volition,      .........  54 

Are  volitions  the  only  causes  ? 54 

Is  the  mind  the  sole  cause  of  its  volitions  ? 55 

Definitions  are  not  arguments, 56 

Limited  definition  of  cause, 56 

Wo  change  without  a  prior  cause, 57 

We  are  conscious  of  willing  from  motives, 58 

Bledsoe's  Examination  of  Edwards, 59 

Concessions  of  Edwards'  opponents,        ...        .^       ...  59 

Self-determining  power,         .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .  60 

Is  volition  an  effect? 61 

Has  it  any  cause  ? 62 

Has  it  an  efficient  cause  ? 63 

Volition  comes  to  pass, 64 

Has  it,  in  any  sense,  a  cause  ? 64 

Do  motives  induce  the  mind  to  will  ? 65 

Bledsoe's  originality, 67 

The  main  point  at  issue, 68 


SECTION   III. 


INFLUENCE     OF     MOTIVES. 

Nature  of  motives, 70 

Internal  and  external  motives, 71 

Are  motives  mere  objects  of  choice  ? 71 

The  strongest  motive, 72 

Are  motives  the  cause  of  volition  ? 73 

Conditions  and  occasions  of  volition, 74 

Conditions  which  give  no  direction  to  choice, 75 

Quotation  from  Mill's  Logic 76 

Are  motives  the  efficient  cause  of  volition  ? 77 


VI  CONTENTS. 

Page. 

The  same  external  motives  excite  different  volitions  in  different  minds,  77 

la  the  efficacy  of  motives  from  the  mind  ? 78 

Willing  against  motives, 79 

Are  volitions  determined  by  the  understanding  ? 79 

Do  they  always  conform  to  the  strongest  motive  ?  80 


SECTION   IV. 


LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY. 

Common  notion  of  liberty, '     .  82 

Internal  freedom,                            ; 83 

Willing  as  we  please,       ..........  83 

Liberty  of  contingence, 84 

Moral  freedom, 84 

Contrary  meanings  of  liberty, 85 

Power  of  contrary  choice, 86 

Cousin's  view  of  this, 86 

His  analysis  of  the  will,    .                                 89 

The  faculty  of  willing, 89 

The  influence  which  gives  direction  to  choice, 90 

In  what  sense,  have  we  the  power  of  contrary  choice,          .        .        .  91 

Decision  of  consciousness, 93 

In  what  sense,  do  we  know  that  we  have  power  to  the  contrary,         .  94 

Is  there  no  impossibility  of  a  contrary  choice  ?          .....  94 

Dr.  Edwards  on  natural  power  to  the  contrary, 95 

Do.      do.       on  natural  and  moral  inability, 96 

Power  to  contrary  emotions, 98 

Difference  between  external  and  internal  liberty, 99 

Liberty  considered  a  privilege, .        .  IQO 

Necessity  is  the  opposite  of  liberty, 100 

Philosophical  necessity, 101 

Various  meanings  of  both  liberty  and  necessity, 102 


.  CONTENTS.  Vll 

Page. 
Natural  and  moral  necessity,        ....  ...        102 

Is  certainty  necessity  ? 103 

Edwards  on  moral  necessity, 104 


SECTION    V. 


ABILITY     AND     INABILITY. 

Inability  in  relation  to  external  conduct, .  106 

Natural  and  moral  inability, 107 

Opposition  to  the  will  belongs  to  natural  inability, 107 

Inability  in  relation  to  acts  of  the  will, 108 

President  Edwards'  definition  of  moral  inability, 109 

Moral  inability  of  willing  right, 109 

Different  meanings  of  ability,  inability,  &c., 110 

Is  obligation  commensurate  with  ability  ? Ill 

Controversies  respecting  inability, Ill 

Practical  application  of  the  doctrine  of  inability,         .        .        .        .  113 
Natural  and  moral  inability,      .        .        .        .        .        ..       .        .        .115 


SECTION   VI. 

CONSCIOUSNESS     AND    ACCOUNTABILITY. 

Consciousness  of  power,  .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .117 

Are  we  conscious  of  self-determination  ? 118 

Liberty  to  either  side,         .        . 120 

Accountability, 121 

Power  to  will  the  contrary, 122 

Does  liberty  to  either  side  lie  in  the  affections  ? 123 


Vlll  CONTENTS. 

Page. 
Is  contingence  essential  to  accountability  ? 123 

Originating  volitions, 124 

Can  a  man  avoid  willing  as  he  does  ? 124 


SECTION   VII. 

COMMON     SENSE. 

Customary  use  of  the  phrase,   .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .  126 

Philosophical  use, 126 

Application  to  philosophical  speculations, •     .  127 

Remarks  of  President  Edwards, 127 

Decisions  of  common  sense  respecting  volition, 128 

do.  do.         respecting  motives,  ....          129,  130 

do.  do.         respecting  accountable  agency,  .        .        .130 

SECTION    VIII. 

MECHANICAL     AND     PHYSICAL     AGENCY. 

Is  the  will  a  mere  machine  ? 132 

Does  it  resemble  a  machine  ? 132 

Several  meanings  of  the  term  physical, .  132 

Is  the  will  subject  to  physical  laws  ? •       .  134 

Is  it  subject  to  the  laws  of  cause  and  effect  ?      .    • 135 

Motives  are  not  the  sole  cause  of  volition,    .        .        .        .        .        .  136 

Is  certain  connection  physical  causation  ? 136 

What  is  meant  by  moral  certainty  ? 137 

Certainty  of  knowledge, 137 

President  Edwards'  opinion, 138 

Dr.  Edwards  on  moral  necessity, 138 

Physical  necessity, 139 


CONTENTS.  IX 


SECTION   IX. 


MORAL     GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD. 

Page. 

Has  the  divine  government  any  influence  on  the  will  ?    .  140 

Can  his  providence  influence  volition  ? 142 

Influence  of  commands,  threatenings,  &c., 142 

God's  foreknowledge  of  human  volition,       .        .        .     '  .        .        »  143 

Has  the  Spirit  of  God  any  influence  on  the  will, 144 

Is  God  the  author  of  sin  ? 145 

Prevention  of  ein, 147 

Could  He  prevent  all  sin,  without  destroying  moral  agency  ?      .        .  148 

Is  sin  the  means  of  the  greatest  good  ? 148 

Can  the  greatest  good  be  obtained  without  means  ?       .         ...  150 

Are  there  any  limits  to  the  power  of  God  ? 150 

Is  the  highest  supposable  good  attainable  ? 151 

Happiness  of  God, 152 

Three  different  theories  of  the  origin  of  evil, 153 

Agreement  of  the  three  suppositions, 153 

Their  difference, 155 


SECTION   X. 

ACTIVITY    AND     DEPENDENCE. 

Ambiguity  of  the  terms  active  and  passive, 158 

Can  any  thing  be  both  active  and  passive  ? 159* 

Mental  activity, .        .159 

Can  volition  be  passive  ? 160 


•a-  CONTENTS. 

Page. 

Can  an  agent  be  passive  ? 160 

Can  that  which  is  merely  passive  be  active  ?         .....  162 

Can  an}'  thing  act,  if  it  be  acted  upon  ? 162 

Mr.  Chubb  on  action  and  passion, 163 

Gratuitous  assumptions,  and  their  consequences,      .....  164 


SECTION   XI. 

FATALISM     AND     PANTHEISM. 

Different  forms  of  Fatalism, 165 

Is  there  no  medium  between  contingent  volition  and  Fatalism  ?.        .        167 
Pantheism, ,    167 

SECTION    XII. 


TESTIMONY     OP     SCRIPTURE. 

Difficulties  of  philosophical  views  of  volition, 170 

Appeal  to  scripture  testimony, x .        .  171 

How  are  the  scriptures  to  be  interpreted,         ......  171 

Must  they  be  made  to  conform  to  our  previous  opinions  ?    .        .        .  172 

Does  scripture  ever  contradict  reason  ? 173 

Literal  and  figurative  language, 175 

Has  God  any  control  over  the  will  ? 176 

He  causes  his  people  to  do  His  will, 176 

He  inclines  their  hearts  to  obey  him, 177 

He  turns  the  hearts  of  men,          .  177 

His  purposes  extend  to  the  heart,       ........  178 

He  changes  the  hearts  of  men,       .        .        .        .        .        .        .    '     .  179 

They  are  kept  by  the  power  of  God,         ....*..  180 


CONTENTS.  XI 

Page. 

They  incline  their  own  hearts, 180 

They  do  it  in  consequence  of  God's  agency, 181 

The  purposes  of  God  in  relation  to  sin,          ......  182 

Men  harden  their  own  hearts, 184 

Permission  of  sin, 184 

Practical  importance  of  the  subject  under  discussion,      ....  187 

Efficacy  of  the  means  of  holiness,        .                187 

The  doctrine  of  human  depravity, 188 

Influence  of  the  Spirit  of  God,      .                188 

Conversion  of  the  world, 189 

Perpetual  holiness  of  heaven, 190 


AN    INQUIRY, 


INTRODUCTORY     OBSERVATIONS, 

Review  of  Cousin — President  Edwards  on  self-determination — 
Moral  government  of  God — Testimony  of  Scripture — Ambiguous 
phraseology — Figurative  language — Acrimonious  controversy. 

SOON  after  the  publication  of  Henry's  translation  of 
Cousin's  Psychology,  I  undertook  to  write  a  review  of 
the  work,  for  the  Christian  Spectator.  Before  coming  to 
the  chapter  which  treats  of  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  in 
the  latter  part  of  the  book,  the  review  had  already  been 
extended  so  far,  that  there  was  not  room  left  to  do  jus- 
tice, at  that  time,  to  so  difficult  a  subject.  It  was,  there- 
fore, passed  without  notice.  I  have  since  been  appre- 
hensive, that  from  this  omission,  an  inference  might 
perhaps  be  drawn,  that  I  acquiesce  in  the  opinions  there 
presented  by  Cousin.  Long  continued  ill  health,  and 
urgent  official  engagements,  have  prevented  an  earlier 
expression  of  my  own  views  on  the  subject.  In  endeav- 
oring to  give  it  a  fair  examination,  I  have  not  thought  it 
necessary  to  confine  my  observations  to  a  review  of 
Cousin.  The  self-determining  power  of  the  will  is  a 
subject  which  is  intimately  connected  with  many  of  the 
theological  discussions  of  the  present  day.  Yet  there 
are  reasons  for  believing  that  it  is  not,  in  all  points  of 
view,  generally  and  clearly  understood.  President  Ed- 
2 


14      INTRODUCTORY  OBSERVATIONS. 

wards,  in  his  treatise  on  the  Will,  has  given  a  masterly 
exposition  of  the  principal  forms  in  which  it  is  com- 
monly presented.  But  for  some  reason  or  other,  his  view 
of  contingent  self-determination  appears  to  have  attract- 
ed less  attention  of  late,  than  that  particular  mode  of 
statement  which  he  resolves  into  an  infinite  series  of 
volitions.  The  doctrine  of  his  opponents  was  this,  that 
the  free  acts  of  the  will  are  not  determined  to  be  as  they 
are,  by  any  influence  from  without  the  will  itself.  This 
was  considered  by  him  as  involving  the  alternative,  that 
every  volition  is  determined  either  by  a  preceding  voli- 
tion, or  by  nothing  at  all.  The  latter  is  contingent  self- 
determination.  To  the  other  branch  of  the  alternative, 
he  has  done  such  ample  justice,  that  the  question  con- 
cerning it  may  be  considered  as  definitively  settled.  This 
may  be  one  reason  why  the  advocates  of  a  self-deter- 
mining power  in  the  will,  adhere  so  tenaciously  to  that 
form  of  the  doctrine  which  implies  contingence,  as  being 
the  only  ground  left,  on  which  they  can  hope  to  main- 
tain their  position. 

The  momentous  interest  which  belongs  to  this  sub- 
ject, lies  in  its  relation  to  the  moral  government  of  God. 
If  nothing  from  without  the  will  of  the  agent  can  have 
any  influence  in  determining  what  his  volitions  shall  be, 
then  it  must  be  beyond  the  power  of  even  the  Father 
of  our  spirits  to  give  direction  to  the  acts  of  the  will, 
without  interfering  with  the  prerogative  of  accountable 
agency.  Omnipotence  itself  can  not  work  contradic- 
tions. When  that  inexplicable  power,  the  human  will, 
has  once  been  set  a  going,  it  must,  according  to  the 
doctrine  of  some,  be  suffered  to  run  on  forever,  throw- 
ing off  its  volitions  by  contingent  efficiency,  uncontrolled 


INTRODUCTORY     OBSERVATIONS. 


and  uncontrollable,  by  any  thing  from  without  itself. 
If  the  Creator  has  filled  this  and  other  worlds  with  liv- 
ing agents,  whose  acts  of  will  are  entirely  independent 
of  himself;  he  can  only  look  on,  and  observe  the  opera- 
tion of  their  voluntary  powers  j  accommodating  the 
course  of  his  external  providence  to  what  they  may 
happen  to  determine.  On  this  supposition,  he  can  pun- 
ish iniquity,  but  can  do  nothing  to  prevent  it,  without 
impairing  the  independence  of  moral  agency.  He  can 
render  a  reward  to  virtue,  but  can  take  no  effectual 
measures  to  promote  it,  except  by  such  a  determining 
influence,  as  is  supposed  to  be  inconsistent  with  the 
very  nature  of  virtue.  He  can  rule  the  worlds  of  mat- 
ter, which  roll  in  harmony  and  brightness  through  the 
heavens,  but  can  not  control  the  heart  of  man.  The 
rewards  and  punishments  which  he  distributes  to  the 
subjects  of  his  moral  kingdom,  can  have  no  efficacy  in 
favor  of  obedience.  Human  means  also  for  the  pre- 
vention of  vice,  and  the  promotion  of  holiness  in  oth- 
ers, must  be  entirely  unavailing,  if  they  can  have  no 
influence  in  determining  the  acts  of  the  will.  To  what 
purpose  are  the  restraints  of  education,  the  injunctions 
of  parental  authority,  the  admonitions  of  friendship,  the 
sanctions  of  law,  and  the  solemn  ministrations  of  the 
house  of  God ;  if  the  purposes  of  the  heart  are  wholly 
independent  of  them  all ;  if  contingence  is  the  supreme 
law  of  voluntary  agency. 

On  a  subject  so  momentous,  and  so  difficult  to  be 
thoroughly  comprehended  in  all  its  relations,  it  might  be 
expected,  that  we  should  almost  instinctively  turn  to 
the  records  of  inspired  truth  for  instruction.  He  who 
gave  to  the  human  soul  its  being,  and  all  its  powers  of 


16 


INTRODUCTORY     OBSERVATIONS 


thought  and  volition,  must  surely  know,  whether  any 
efficacious  influence  from  without,  is  inconsistent  with 
accountable  agency. 

But  here  we  are  met  with  an  assumption  which  pre- 
cludes a  reference  to  the  decision  of  scripture.  It  is 
claimed,  that  reason,  and  consciousness,  and  common 
sense,  have  already  decided  the  point  f  and  that  God 
can  not  contradict,  in  his  word,  what  he  has  distinctly 
made  known  to  us,  by  the  faculties  which  he  himself 
has  implanted  in  the  soul.  Whatever  passages,  there- 
fore, which  seem  to  favor  a  particular  doctrine,  may  be 
found  in  the  scriptures ;  they  are  to  be  so  interpreted, 
as  not  to  signify  any  thing  which  reason  pronounces  to 
be  absurd.  We  are  called  upon,  then,  to  inquire,  wheth- 
er the  position,  that  nothing  but  the  will  itself  has  any 
influence  in  determining  what  its  acts  shall  be,  is  so  in- 
tuitively and  demonstrable  certain,  as  to  preclude  all 
possibility  of  finding  the  contrary  declared  in  the  word 
of  God.  So  long  as  this  position  is  adhered  to,  it  is  in 
vain  to  think  of  appealing  to  the  authority  of  the  scrip- 
tures, on  the  question  respecting  a  self-determining  power 
of  the  will.  They  will,  of  course,  be  so  explained,  as 
to  express  a  meaning  in  conformity  with  the  principles 
assumed.  This  is  my  apology  for  making  an  applica- 
tion of  dry  metaphysics  to  a  subject  so  nearly  connected 
with  one  of  the  most  important  departments  of  scriptu- 
ral theology.  Those  who  are  prepared  to  receive  im- 
plicitly the  divine  testimony,  just  as  they  find  it  on  the 
sacred  page,  may  pass  over  this  part  of  the  subject,  as 
being  unnecessary  for  them :  and  proceed  to  the  section 
in  which  the  evidence  from  scripture  is  presented.  I  do 
not  propose  to  establish  certain  theological  points,  by 


INTRODUCTORY     OBSERVATIONS.  17 

metaphysical  reasoning,  and  then  call  in  the  aid  of  rev- 
elation, merely  to  confirm  the  results  of  philosophical 
discussion.  I  would  only  aim  at  removing  some  of  the 
objections  which  may  lie  in  the  way  of  a  ready  admis- 
sion of  the  testimony  of  scripture,  on  the  subject  under 
consideration. 

In  attempting  to  express  my  views,  on  a  point  of  some 
difficulty,  it  has  been  a  question  with  me,  what  chance 
I  have  of  making  myself  well  understood.  I  have  no 
expectation  of  being  able  to  write  in  such  a  manner,  as 
to  avoid  all  danger  of  being  misapprehended  ;  especially 
if  quotations  should  be  made  of  single  sentences  or  short 
paragraphs,  cut  out  from  the  passages  which  explain 
and  qualify  their  meaning.  A  composition  must  be  in- 
sufferably tedious,  which  is  so  elaborately  wrought,  that 
each  sentence  can  be  as  clearly  and  fully  understood, 
when  taken  by  itself,  as  when  read  in  connection  with 
what  precedes  and  what  follows.  An  intricate  subject 
can  not  be  thoroughly  discussed,  in  a  way  to  be  compre- 
hended at  once,  by  hasty  and  superficial  readers. 

The  main  source  of  the  misapprehensions  which  are 
so  common,  in  metaphysical  investigations,  is  the  great 
ambiguity  of  the  language  of  mental  philosophy.  It 
forms  a  striking  contrast  to  the  uniform  distinctness  of 
the  terms  in  mathematical  science.  The  value  of  a  dis- 
cussion upon  any  point  connected  with  the  freedom  of 
the  will,  must  depend,  in  a  great  measure,  upon  the 
skill  with  which  the  writer  disengages  the  subject  from 
the  ambiguities  of  language  which  meet  him  at  every 
turn.  This  is  not  to  be  done,  by  avoiding  the  use  of 
such  terms  as  have  various  meanings.  For  he  will  find 
no  others  belonging  to  this  department  of  knowledge. 

2* 


18 


INTRODUCTORY     OBSERVATIONS. 


The  art  of  rightly  using  ambiguous  terms,  consists  in 
so  introducing  and  placing  them,  that,  with  suitable 
definitions  and  explanations,  when  necessary,  the  con- 
nection will  show  which  of  their  several  meanings  is  to 
be  given  them  at  the  time.  The  writer  need  not  go 
upon  the  supposition,  as  is  too  often  the  case,  that  a 
word  which  he  uses  has  only  one  proper  signification. 
He  may  even  be  allowed  to  use  it  in  different  senses  him- 
self, if  he  will  enable  the  reader  to  distinguish  the  vari- 
ous meanings  given  to  it  in  different  places.  And  while 
he  makes  his  own  selection  among  the  authorized  sig- 
nifications of  a  term ;  he  ought  readily  to  concede  to 
others  the  privilege  of  making  a  different  choice,  upon 
the  condition  of  rendering  the  meaning  distinct  to  the 
reader.  A  large  portion  of  the  agitating  controversies 
which  bring  such  reproach  upon  the  Christian  church, 
at  the  present  day,  would  be  put  at  rest,  if  each  contend- 
ing party  would  no  longer  insist  that  others  should  not 
only  agree  with  them  in  opinion,  but  should  express 
their  belief  in  the  same  words.  Doctrinal  differences 
among  Christians  are  often  greatly  magnified,  by  the 
diversity  in  the  phraseology  to  which  the  opposing  par- 
ties are  severally  accustomed.  They  frequently  agree 
in  their  opinions,  while  they  differ  in  the  language  which 
they  use  to  express  them.  Jealousy,  and  alienation, 
and  division  may  be  removed,  by  explaining  the  ambi- 
guity of  theological  terms.  On  the  other  hand,  there 
may  be  important  differences  of  opinion,  among  those 
who  agree  in  the  use  of  the  same  form  of  words.  A 
man  who  is  deviating  from  scriptural  truth,  may  avail 
himself  of  long  established  and  approved  phraseology, 
for  the  purpose  of  concealing  erroneous  views,  which, 


INTRODUCTORY     OBSERVATIONS. 

if  prematurely  disclosed,  might  excite  suspicion  and 
alarm.  There  is  a  wide  difference  between  using  am- 
biguous language  from  necessity,  and  using  it  of  choice. 
In  the  one  case,  the  writer  endeavors  to  guard,  as  much 
as  possible,  against  misapprehension.  In  the  other,  to 
render  the  meaning  dubious,  is  the  very  purpose  for 
which  the  ambiguous  terms  are  chosen.  Even  those 
who  are  sound  in  their  doctrinal  views,  may  uninten- 
tionally propagate  error,  by  an  unguarded  use  of  ex- 
pressions, which  may  convey  to  many  minds,  a  mean- 
ing very  different  from  what  was  intended.  I  am  far  from 
supposing,  that  all  the  differences  of  opinion  among 
professing  Christians  are  merely  verbal.  There  is  surely 
an  immeasurable  distance  between  a  system  of  doctrines 
which  considers  the  volitions  of  creatures  as  all  fortui- 
tous, and  one  which  views  them  as  under  the  direction 
of  the  divine  will. 

One  very  fruitful  source  of  the  misapprehensions 
which  are  so  frequent  in  metaphysical  investigations,  is 
the  use  of  figurative  language.  To  avoid  this  wholly, 
is  almost  impossible.  It  is  true,  that  metaphorical  ex- 
pressions may  be  without  ambiguity.  But  the  figures 
in  mental  philosophy,  are  almost  exclusively  drawn 
from  material  objects ;  and  the  properties  and  laws  of 
the  mind,  differ  so  widely  from  those  of  matter,  that  the 
analogies  which  are  drawn  between  them,  are  often  cal- 
culated to  mislead.  Even  the  most  cautious  metaphy- 
sician will  find  it  difficult  to  avoid  altogether  this  source 
of  error ;  for  the  most  familiar  and  well  established 
terms  in  mental  science,  have  been  borrowed  from  lan- 
guage originally  appropriated  to  material  phenomena. 


20  INTRODUCTORY     OBSERVATIONS. 

But  the  liabilities  to  uncertainty  of  meaning  are 
greatly  multiplied,  by  the  ardor  of  theological  contro- 
versy. The  language  of  excited  feeling  is  almost  always 
figurative.  And  in  the  glow  of  party  contention,  a  man 
does  not  always  stop  to  consider,  whether  the  figures 
which  he  uses  have  all  the  precision  that  is  requisite  to 
secure  them  from  misinterpretation.  He  regards  more 
the  keen  edge  of  his  weapons,  than  the  unerring  aim 
with  which  they  might  be  directed.  £<rLogic  set  on 
fire,"  is  better  fitted  to  make  a  popular  application  of 
principles  already  established,  than  to  disengage  an  in- 
tricate subject  from  the  mazes  by  which  the  truth  is  con- 
cealed ; — to  bring  it  forth  into  clear  and  open  day.  Lan- 
guage the  most  suitable  for  the  latter  purpose  is  simple 
and  unadorned. 

But  how  can  one  expect  to  gain  a  hearing  on  a  sub- 
ject uninviting  in  itself,  if  he  does  not  throw  around  it 
the  attractions  of  imagery,  and  the  refinements  of  ele- 
gant composition  ?  To  what  purpose  does  he  anxiously 
guard  himself  against  being  misunderstood,  when  he  is 
in  greater  danger  of  not  being  read  ?  In  this  day  of  clamor, 
and  strife,  and  hot  contention,  how  can  a  man  hope  to 
be  noticed  at  all,  if  he  does  not  take  a  hostile  position, 
and  brandish  the  fiery  tempered  weapons  of  a  combat- 
ant ?  Who,  now  a  days,  cares  to  read  a  book  which  has 
in  it  none  of  the  envenomed  shafts  of  controversy  ? 
Who  subscribes  for  even  a  religious  periodical,  if  he 
finds  it  free  from  the  bitterness  of  party  animosity  ? 
Notwithstanding  these  discouraging  considerations,  I 
shall  endeavor  to  avoid  the  acrimony  and  personalities 
of  theological  controversy ;  and  shall  incur  the  hazard 
of  attempting  to  make  myself  understood,  though  it 


INTRODUCTORY     OBSERVATIONS.  4>L 

may  be  with  a  sacrifice  of  some  of  the  ornaments  of 
style. 

The  subject  of  our  inquiry  has  important  relations  to 
almost  every  part  of  doctrinal  and  practical  theology. 
But  in  attempting  to  examine  a  single  point,  I  have  not 
thought  it  necessary  to  write  a  whole  system  of  divinity. 
Though  it  will  be  requisite  to  refer,  occasionally,  to  sev- 
eral kindred  subjects,  for  the  purpose  of  illustration,  and 
to  obviate  objections  ;  yet  it  is  desirable  to  avoid  render- 
ing the  investigation  needlessly  complicated,  by  the  in- 
troduction of  superfluous  matter. 


SECTION   I. 

POWERS      OF      THE      MIND. 

Cause  and  effect — Dependence — Efficacy  of  a  cause— Complex 
cause — Efficient  causes — Physical  and  Moral  causes — Negative 
causes — Every  change  has  a  cause — Contingence — Dependent 
contingence — -Absolute  contingence — Power — Mental  powers — 
Classification  of  Mental  powers — The  will — Volition — Emotions. 

THE  point  proposed  for  our  examination  is  the  self- 
determining  power  of  the  will.  But  here  we  are  met, 
at  the  threshold,  by  a  very  ambiguous  term.  What  is 
power  ?  Before  we  proceed,  it  will  be  necessary  to  stop 
and  inquire  what  it  means.  In  all  the  significations  of 
the  term,  it  probably  has  relation  to  a  cause.  The 
meaning  of  one  of  the  words  is  explained,  by  referring 
to  the  other.  What,  then,  is  a  cause  ? 

A  CAUSE,  in  the  more  extended  signification  of  the 
term,  is  an  ANTECEDENT  on  which  something  DEPENDS. 

An  EFFECT  is  a  CONSEQUENT  of  something  upon  which 
it  DEPENDS. 

Between  a  cause  and  its  effect,  there  is  always  the 
relation  of  antecedent  and  consequent.  But  antece- 
dence is  not  the  only  element,  in  the  notion  of  a  cause. 
There  must  also  be  dependence.  The  darkness  of  the 
night  precedes  the  light  of  the  day.  But  the  darkness 
is  not  the  cause  of  the  light.  The  one  does  not  de- 
pend on  the  other.  Every  change  in  the  universe,  at 
any  one  moment  of  time,  is  the  immediate  antecedent 
of  every  change  which  takes  place  in  the  succeeding 


POWERS     OF     THE     MIND. 


23 


moment.     But  every  one  of  the  former  changes,  is  not 
the  cause  of  every  one  of  the  latter. 

One  thing  depends  on  another,   when  the  one  exists 
on  account  of  the  other,  and  when,  without  the  other 
or  something  equivalent,  it  would  not  exist.     This  im- 
plies, that  there  is  that,  in  the  nature  and  relations  of 
the  antecedent,  which  secures  the  existence  of  the  con- 
sequent.    It  is  what  is  called  efficacy,  in  reference  to  the 
cause  ;  and  dependence,  in  reference  to  the  effect.     An 
event,  or  change,  or  action,  depends  on  a  particular  ante- 
cedent or  antecedents,  when  it  takes  place  on  account 
of  such  antecedents,  but  would  not  take  place  without 
them.     One  thing  depends  on  another  for  the  mode  of 
its  existence,   when  any  difference  in    the  antecedent 
makes  a  difference  in  the  consequent.     Thus  the  waves 
of  the  sea  vary,  according  to  the  changes  in  the  force 
of  the  wind.     The  ground  of  dependence  may  be  very 
different,    in  different  cases.      In  many  instances,   the 
relation  is  not  that  of  antecedent  and  consequent,  of 
cause  and  effect ;  thus,  the  quantity  of  surface  on  a 
globe,  depends  on  the  length  of  the  diameter.     Any 
change  in  the  diameter  would  make  a  difference  in  the 
surface.     The  ground  of  dependence,  here,  is  the  geo- 
metrical relation  of  the  parts  of  the  globe.     The  veloci- 
ty of  a  given  body,  moving  without  resistance,  depends 
on  the  force  with  which   it  has  been  impelled.      Any 
change  in  the  impelling  force  would  make  a  change  in 
the  velocity.     This  is  dependence  of  an  effect  upon  its 
cause.     A  mathematical  theorem  depends  on  the  defini- 
tions and  axioms  by  which  it  is  demonstrated.     This  is 
a  logical  dependence  of  a  conclusion  upon  premises,  not 
of  an  effect  upon  its  causes.     In  all  these  cases,  the  de- 


24  POWERS     OF     THE     MIND. 

pendence  is  certain,  though  the  grounds  of  it  may  be 
very  different.  One  thing  depends  upon  several  others 
taken  together,  when  it  is  the  consequence  of  these, 
but  without  the  united  influence  of  them  all,  it  would 
not  be  what  it  is.  One  thing  depends  in  part  on 
another,  when  this  is  one  of  two  or  more  antecedents, 
upon  which,  taken  collectively,  the  consequent  depends. 
The  tides  of  the  ocean  depend  partly  on  the  position  of 
the  moon,  and  partly  on  the  place  of  the  sun  in  the 
heavens.  That  on  which  something  in  part  depends, 
may  be  what  is  called  causa  sine  qua  non,  a  condition 
without  which  it  can  not  be ;  and  with  which  it  may, 
or  may  not  be.  A  man's  existence  is  a  condition,  with- 
out which  he  can  not  be  a  scholar,  and  with  which  he 
may  be  either  learned  or  ignorant.  One  event  is  mde- 
pendent  of  another,  when  the  one  neither  promotes  or 
hinders  the  taking  place  of  the  other. 

A  cause  is  that  which  not  only  is  followed  by  its 
effect,  but  which  renders  the  effect  certain.  It  is  not 
only  an  antecedent,  but  an  efficacious  antecedent.  Pres- 
ident Edwards  says,  "  I  sometimes  use  the  word  cause, 
in  this  Inquiry,  to  signify  any  antecedent,  either  natural 
or  moral,  positive  or  negative,  on  which  an  event,  either 
a  thing,  or  the  manner  or  circumstance  of  a  thing,  so 
depends,  that  it  is  the  ground  and  reason,  either  in 
whole  or  in  part,  why  it  is  rather  than  not ;  or  why  it  is 
as  it  is,  rather  than  otherwise."*  "  Dependence  on  the 
influence  of  a  cause  is  the  very  notion  of  an  effect,  "f 

Even  Dr.  Thomas  Brown,  who  has  written  largely 
on  this  subject,  though  he  asserts,  that  the  only  essen- 

*  Edwards  on  the  Will,  Part  II,  Sec.  3.       f  Ibid.  Part  II,  Sec.  8. 


POWERS     OF    THE     MIND.  25 

tial  circumstance  of  causation  is  invariableness  of  ante- 
cedence and  consequence;  yet  uses  language  which 
implies,  that  in  this  expression,  he  includes  what  is 
commonly  meant  by  dependence,  efficacy,  influence,  &c. 
He  employs  the  very  terms  efficacy  and  efficiency,  as 
synonymous  with  power.  He  says,  that  "to  be  that 
which  can  not  exist,  without  being  instantly  followed 
by  a  certain  event,  is  to  be  the  cause  of  the  event,  as  a 
correlative  term."  He  evidently  does  not  intend  to 
exclude  dependence,  efficacy,  &c.,  from  our  notion  of 
causation ;  but  seems  to  suppose,  that  they  are,  of  course, 
implied  in  "  a  sequence  so  invariable,  that  it  forever  has 
been,  forever  will  be,  and  forever  must  be."  The  two 
elements  of  dependence  and  invariable  antecedence,  he 
appears  to  blend  into  one.  If  they  are  distinct,  as,  by 
most  minds,  they  will  probably  be  thought  to  be  ;  both 
are  certainly  to  be  included  in  our  notion  of  causation.* 
An  effect  may,  in  many  cases,  be  produced,  not  by  any 
single  antecedent ;  but  by  the  combined  influence  of  sev- 
eral. All  the  circumstances  upon  which  the  effect  de- 
pends may  be  considered  as  a  complex  cause.  If  any  one 
of  the  antecedents  be  wanting,  the  effect  may  fail.  If 
either  the  soil  upon  which  grain  is  sown,  or  the  rain,  or 
the  sunshine  be  deficient,  an  abundant  harvest  will  not 
be  gathered.  The  influence  of  the  several  parts  of  a 
complex  cause  may  be  very  various.  In  the  formation 
of  the  rainbow,  the  sun  has  an  agency  widely  different 
from  that  of  the  cloud.  If  external  motives  are,  in  any 
proper  sense,  the  cause  of  a  man's  volitions ;  they  are  so, 

*  Brown's  Cause  and  Effect;  third  Edinburgh  edition,  pp.  39, 
108, 113,  114, 120,  124,  135,  136,  389,  466,  468,  482. 
3 


26 


POWERS     OF     THE     MIND. 


in  a  very  different  way  from  that  in  which  the  agent 
himself  is  the  cause  of  them.  Motives  do  not  resolve 
and  choose ;  though  they  may  have  an  important  influ- 
ence, in  determining  a  man  how  to  choose.  The  mo- 
tives and  the  agent  are  both  causes,  in  this  sense,  that 
they  are  antecedents  on  which  the  volitions  depend. 
In  the  case  of  a  complex  cause,  some  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal antecedents  may  be  spoken  of  as  the  cause  ;  though 
the  effect  is  not  supposed  to  follow  from  that  alone, 
without  the  concurrence  of  others. 

Some  writers  speak  of  efficient  causes,  as  being  a  dis- 
tinct class.  But  all  real  causes  are  so  far  efficient,  or 
efficacious,  that  they  are  antecedents  on  which,  in  part 
at  least,  effects  depend.  That  on  which  nothing  de- 
pends is  no  cause.  Dugald  Stewart  makes  a  distinction 
between  efficient  and  physical  causes ;  meaning  by  the 
former  real  causes,  and  by  the  latter,  those  phenomena 
in  the  material  world  which  appear  to  be  causes  ; 
though  it  is  possible,  that  they  are  not  truly  so.  Others 
appear  to  intend  by  an  efficient  cause,  an  immediate  an- 
tecedent, in  distinction  from  one  which  is  remote,  and 
which  produces  effects  by  the  intervention  of  other 
causes.  Some  consider  an  efficient  cause  to  be  that 
which  gives  existence  to  a  substance,  either  matter  or 
mind ;  or  which  produces  some  change  in  the  nature 
of  a  substance.  Others  apply  the  term  to  an  agent,  to 
one  who  gives  existence  to  volitions.  Some  distinguish 
between  physical  and  moral  causes.  But  they  do  not 
always  give  us  to  understand  whether,  by  a  moral  cause, 
they  mean  a  cause  of  moral  effects,  or  a  cause  which  is 
itself  moral;  that  is,  which  is  either  holiness  or  sin. 
The  cause  of  all  sin  can  not  be  a  moral  cause,  in  the 


POWERS     OF     THE     MIND. 


sense  of  being  itself  sin.  By  some,  the  term  physical 
appears  to  be  applied  to  those  causes,  between  which 
and  their  effects,  the  connection  is  admitted  to  be  cer- 
tain ;  while  they  consider  the  connection  between  moral 
causes  and  their  effects  as  being  only  probable.  These 
and  other  distinctions  upon  this  subject,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  dwell  upon  at  present. 

President  Edwards  speaks  of  a  negative  cause.  But 
absolute  nothing  can  only  be  the  cause  of  a  negative 
effect,  that  is  of  nothing.  It  is  very  true,  that  the  dis- 
continuance of  a  positive  agency  may  result  in  a  dis- 
continuance of  its  appropriate  effects.  It  may  leave  the 
subject  to  the  influence  of  other  causes.  In  the  exam- 
ple which  Edwards  gives,  the  presence  of  the  sun  is 
the  cause  of  the  fluidity  of  the  waters.  The  withdraw- 
ing of  his  beams,  in  the  winter,  is  followed  by  the 
freezing  of  the  waters :  because  they  are  then  left  to 
the  uncontrolled  agency  of  the  positive  causes  of  con- 
gelation. 

The  axiom,  that  every  change  implies  an  adequate 
cause,  is  a  primary  element  of  human  thought.  It  has 
all  the  characteristics  of  a  fundamental  truth.  It  is  in- 
tuitive, requiring  no  course  of  reasoning  to  prove  it.  It 
is  irresistible ;  no  power  of  argument  can  overthrow  it. 
It  is  universal ;  compelling  the  belief  of  all  classes,  in 
all  ages  of  the  world.  A  few  skeptical  philosophers 
have  professed  to  call  it  in  question.  But  they  have 
plainly  shown,  by  their  writings  and  their  conduct,  that 
they  were  as  truly  under  its  influence  as  others. 

We  sometimes  hear  it  stated,  very  incorrectly,  that 
every  thing  which  exists  requires  a  cause  of  its  being. 
This  is  a  proposition  widely  different  from  the  axiom, 


28 


POWERS     QF     THE     MINI*. 


which  has  now  been  mentioned.  That  which  has  ex- 
isted from*  eternity  does  not  sorely  require  an  antecedent. 
But  that  which  begins  to  exist,  or  which  is  subject  to 
any  change  in  the  mode  of  its  existence,  requires  a 
cause  of  that  change  ;  some  antecedent,  on  which  it 
depends  for  being  what  it  is.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  say, 
that  there  is  no  effect  without  a  cause.  This  may  be 
admitted  by  those  who  affirm,  that  there  may  be  chan- 
ges which  are  not  effects,  and  which  therefore  have  nc 
cause. 

CONTINGENCY, 

However  preposterous  is  the  position,  that  any  change 
can  take  place  without  a  cause,  yet  for  argument's  sake, 
there  is  sometimes  occasion  to  make  the  supposition : 
and  to  look  for  some  convenient  word  or  phrase  to  ex- 
press it.  As  the  absolute  negation  of  a  cause,  in  any 
case,  is  not  a  doctrine  of  common  sense  ;  the  language 
of  common  life  does  not  supply  us  with  terms  which, 
according  to  customary  usage,  have  this  signification. 
The  term  contingence,  is  sometimes  employed  for  this 
purpose.  But  when  this  is  done,  it  ought  to  be  with 
the  distinct  understanding,  that  the  denial  of  causation 
and  dependence,  is  not  the  only  meaning  which  the 
word  is  used  to  express.  Some  writers  speak  of  all 
created  existences  as  being  contingent,  in  distinction 
from  the  necessary  existence  of  the  Creator.  The  for- 
mer are  said  to  be  contingent,  because  God  might,  at 
his  pleasure,  have  made  them  different,  or  not  made 
them  at  all.  In  this  sense,  contingence,  is  so  far  from 
being  opposed  to  causation,  that  dependence  on  the  will 
of  the  Creator,  is  the  very  relation  which  the  word  is 
employed  to  express. 


POWERS     0  £     THE     MIND.  29 

But  in  popular  use,  it  is  most  commonly  applied  to 
cases  in  which  something  takes  place,  the  immediate 
cause  of  which  is  unknown  or  unobserved.  Yet  even 
in  this  application  of  the  term  contingence,  there  is  no 
intention  of  denying  the  dependence  of  events  upon 
some  cause.  Thus  the  Assembly  of  Divines  at  West- 
minster, in  their  Confession  of  Faith,  speak  of  the 
"  contingency  of  second  causes ;"  and  to  illustrate  their 
meaning,  adduce  the  proof  text,  u  The  lot  is  cast  into 
the  lap,  but  the  whole  disposing  thereof  is  of  the  Lord" 
The  common  meaning  of  chance,  contingence,  &c., 
may  be  considered  a  negative  idea,  implying  the  absence 
of  a  known  cause  ;  but  neither  affirming  or  denying  an 
unknown  cause. 

But  philosophers  frequently  use  the  term  contingence 
to  signify,  that  some  change  takes  place,  which  is  abso- 
lutely without  any  cause  ;  which  has  no  dependence  on 
any  thing  preceding.  There  is  occasion  to  use  it  in  this 
sense,  when  examining  the  various  theories  respecting 
acts  of  the  will.  In  the  present  inquiry,  it  will  com- 
monly be  used  to  signify  the  exclusion  of  causation  or 
dependence,  in  the  case  of  volition ;  the  denial  that 
there  is  any  thing  preceding  which  determines  the  act 
of  the  will  to  be  what  it  is.  According  to  this  signifi- 
cation, the  opposite  of  contingence  is  dependence.  So 
far  as  any  thing  is  contingent,  in  this  absolute  sense  ;  so 
far  it  is  dependent  on  nothing  ;  and  so  far  as  it  is  depen- 
dent, it  is  not  contingent.  The  very  definition  of  this 
kind  of  contingence,  renders  it  wholly  incompatible 
with  dependence.  There  can  be  no  medium  between 
the  two  conditions,  unless  it  be,  that  a  thing  may  be 
partly  dependent,  and  partly  contingent.  If  human 


30  POWERS     OF     THE     MIND. 

volitions  are  dependent  on  nothing  preceding,  for  being 
what  they  are,  then  they  come  to  pass  by  perfect  ac- 
cident. 

It  is  very  important,  that  the  difference  between  the 
popular  and  the  philosophical  meaning  of  contingence, 
should  be  kept  clearly  in  view,  in  the  discussions  con- 
cerning the  attributes  and  prerogatives  of  the  will. 
President  Edwards  was  careful  to  mark  this  distinction. 
"  As  the  words  necessary,  impossible,  unable,  &c.  are 
used  by  polemic  writers  in  a  sense  diverse  from  their 
common  signification,  the  like  has  happened  to  the  term 
contingent.  Any  thing  is  said  to  be  contingent,  or  to 
come  to  pass  by  chance  or  accident,  in  the  original 
meaning  of  such  words,  when  its  connection  with  its 
causes  or  antecedents,  according  to  the  established 
course  of  things,  is  not  discerned ;  and  so  is  what  we 
have  no  means  of  foresight  of.  And  especially  is  any 
thing  said  to  be  contingent  or  accidental  with  regard  to 
us,  when  any  thing  comes  to  pass  that  we  are  concern- 
ed in,  as  occasions  or  subjects,  without  our  foreknowl- 
edge, and  beside  our  design  and  scope.  But  the  word 
contingent  is  abundantly  used  in  a  very  different  sense  ; 
not  for  that  whose  connection  with  the  series  of  things 
we  can  not  discern,  so  as  to  foresee  the  event ;  but  for 
something  which  has  absolutely  no  previous  ground  or 
reason,  with  which  its  existence  has  any  fixed  and  cer- 
tain connexion."*  A  similar  distinction  is  applicable 
to  the  corresponding  terms  accident,  chance,  fortui- 
tous, &c. 

*  Freedom  of  the  Will,  Part  I,  Sec.  3. 


POWERS     OF     THE     MIND.  31 


POWER. 

A  cause  always  implies  an  effect.  By  observing  the 
relation  between  these,  we  have  the  idea  of  power. 
The  efficacy  of  the  cause,  its  being  of  such  a  nature  as 
to.  produce  effects,  is  its  power.  In  other  words,  power 
is  that,  belonging  to  a  cause,  upon  which  the  effects  de- 
pend. Though  the  term  is  primarily  used  to  express 
the  relation  between  the  cause  and  its  effects,  yet  it  is 
frequently  applied  in  such  a  way,  as  to  appear  to  stand 
for  the  cause  itself,  or  some  part  of  the  cause.  The 
power  of  a  substance  to  produce  certain  effects,  may 
depend  upon  a  portion  only  of  the  substance,  or  upon 
some  one  of  its  qualities.  The  magnetic  power  of  the 
loadstone  is  owing  to  the  particles  of  iron  which  it  con- 
tains. This,  may  be  spoken  of,  as  constituting  the  at- 
tractive power  of  the  stone.  Frequently  also,  power  is 
considered  as  something  intervening  between  the  cause 
and  the  effect ;  a  connecting  link  which  is  supposed  to 
give  efficacy  to  the  cause.  The  harpsichord  produces 
impressions  on  the  ear,  by  means  of  vibrations  in  the 
air.  The  power  of  the  instrument  to  affect  the  ear,  de- 
pends upon  these  vibrations.  But  in  this  case,  there 
arc,  properly  speaking,  two  causes,  one  immediate,  the 
other  remote.  The  motion  in  the  air  is  the  effect  of  the 
motion  in  the  instrument,  and  the  cause  of  the  impres- 
sion on  the  ear.  Between  an  effect  and  its  immediate 
cause,  we  know  of  nothing  intervening. 

Power  is  sometimes  ascribed  to  effects,  as  well  as  to 
causes.  The  liability  of  a  thing  to  be  influenced  by  a 
cause,  is  called  passive  power,  or  more  properly,  suscep- 


32  POWERS     OF     THE     MIND. 

tibility  ;  while  the  efficacy  of  the  cause  is  called  active 
power.  Heat  has  the  power  of  melting  ice ;  and,  in 
the  language  of  some,  ice  has  the  power  of  being 
melted. 

In  the  most  extensive  use  of  the  term,  the  power  to  do 
any  thing,  includes  the  influence  of  all  the  antecedents, 
the  whole  aggregate  of  circumstances,  upon  which  the 
effect  depends.  These,  in  many  cases,  may  be  very 
numerous.  Yet  the  effect  may  fail,  from  the  absence  of 
any  one  of  them.  In  this  comprehensive,  though  rather 
unusual  sense  of  the  word,  a  man  has  not  power  to  do 
any  thing  which  he  does  not  actually  do.  For  if  all  the 
antecedents  upon  which  the  effect  depends  are  united  in 
the  cause,  the  effect  must  certainly  follow.  If  it  fails, 
its  failure  must  be  owing  to  the  fact,  that  some  one,  at 
least,  of  the  elements  in  the  complex  cause  is  wanting. 
We  rarely  have  occasion,  however,  to  speak  of  power  in 
this  absolute  sense.  When  a  thing  is  done,  there  is  no 
need  of  inquiring,  whether  there  was  power  to  do  it. 
We  more  commonly  ascribe  power  to  a  cause,  when  it 
possesses  all  the  requisites  for  producing  a  particular 
effect,  except  something  which  may  be  easily  added.  We 
say  that  gunpowder  has  the  power  of  exploding ;  meaning 
that  it  has  this  power  when  touched  by  a  spark  of  fire. 
The  fire  is  the  additional  element,  which  must  form  a 
part  of  the  complex  cause,  before  the  effect  will  be  pro- 
duced. In  speaking  of  human  agency,  we  are  accus- 
tomed to  say,  that  a  man  has  power  to  do  any  thing, 
which  he  does  whenever  he  will.  The  willing  mind  is 
all  that  is  wanting  to  complete  the  list  of  antecedents 
on  which  the  effect  depends.  When  this  is  added,  the 
thing  will  be  done.  The  common  phraseology  relating 


POWERS     OF     THE    MIND. 


33 


to  such  cases  is ;  "  The  man  can  do  the  thing,  if  he 
ivill;"  that  is,  he  has  all  the  requisite  power,  except  a 
willing  mind ;  and  when  that  is  added,  the  effect  will 
take  place  :  he  has  already  that  which  is  most  commonly 
called  power :  and  when  there  is  added  the  consenting 
will,  he  will  have  full  power ; — power  in  the  broadest 
sense  of  the  term,  including  every  antecedent  on  which 
the  effect  depends.  This  was  evidently  the  meaning  of 
the  leper,  when  he  came  to  Christ  with  the  cry  ;  "  Lord, 
ifthou  wilt,  thou  canst  make  me  clean." 

MENTAL      POWERS. 

The  powers  of  the  mind  are  known,  by  what  the 
mind  does.  Our-  own  mental  acts,  our  thoughts,  our 
emotions,  our  purposes,  are  the  objects  of  our  conscious- 
ness. But  every  act  implies  an  adequate  cause.  What- 
ever the  mind  does,  it  must  have  power  to  do.  It  is 
sometimes  said,  that  we  are  conscious  of  our  own  men- 
tal powers.  But  according  to  the  definitions  of  modern 
philosophers,  the  direct  objects  of  consciousness  are  the 
operations  of  the  mind  ;  not  its  substance,  or  its  facul- 
ties. Still  it  must  be  true,  that  our  own  existence  is 
implied,  in  every  act  of  consciousness.  A  man  is  con- 
scious not  only  that  he  has  thoughts ;  but  that  they  are 
his  own  thoughts,  and  not  another  man's.  Every  men- 
tal operation  of  which  we  are  conscious,  implies  not  only 
our  own  existence,  but  a  mental  power  adequate  to  the 
effect.  But  at  any  one  time,  a  man  is  not  conscious  of 
powers  which  are  not  then  in  exercise.  He  can  not 
have  an  intuitive  view  of  the  substance  of  his  mind, 
when  it  is  wholly  inactive ;  or  of  any  faculty  of  the 


34 


POWERS     OF     THE     MIND. 


mind ;  when  it  is  not  in  operation  :  though  he  may 
know,  from  what'was  implied  in  previous  consciousness, 
that  he  possesses  powers  which  are  now  called  into 
exercise. 

The  classification  of  our  intellectual  and  moral  pow- 
ers, is  a  subject  of  importance  ;  yet  not  easily  settled,  if 
we  may  judge  from  the  clashing  representations  of  dif- 
ferent philosophers.  One  principal  difficulty  arises  from 
the  fact,  that  each  considers  his  own  method  as  the  only 
one  which  is  admissible.  Now  the  truth  is,  that  there 
is  no  one  scheme  of  classifying  the  powers  of  the  mind 
which  is  essential,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others.  Clas- 
sification is  a  matter  of  convenient  arrangement ;  and 
may  be  varied,  according  to  the  purposes  to  which,  in 
different  cases,  it  is  to  be  applied.  The  practical  farmer 
has  no  occasion  to  classify  his  cattle,  his  grasses,  and  his 
grains,  according  to  principles  laid  down  in  works  on 
natural  history.  The  architect  does  not  find  it  neces- 
sary to  arrange  the  materials  of  his  masonry,  according 
to  mineraiogical  and  geological  distinctions.  No  partic- 
ular mode  of  classification,  is  rendered  necessary,  by  the 
laws  of  nature.  It  is  true  indeed,  that  in  all  attempts  at 
classifying,  the  nature  of  things  is  to  be  regarded,  so  far 
as  this,  that  all  correct  arrangement  in  classes,  must  be 
founded  on  resemblance.  In  the  same  class,  are  to  be 
put  those  objects  only,  between  which  there  is  some  real 
or  supposed  resemblance.  Things  are  to  be  arranged  in 
distinct  classes,  according  to  some  difference  between 
them.  But  as  resemblances  and  differences  may  be  end- 
lessly varied,  there  may  be  different  classifications  of  the 
same  objects ;  and  though  one  may  be  more  convenient 
than  another,  all  may  be  consistent  with  the  nature  of 
things. 


POWERS     OF     THE     MIND. 


35 


In  classifying  the  powers  of  the  mind,  we  have  no 
other  guide,  than  the  operations  or  mental  states  of  which 
we  are  conscious.  As  we  can  not  look  directly  into  the 
faculties  of  the  mind,  when  not  in  exercise,  we  can  dis- 
cover the  resemblances  and  differences  upon  which  a 
correct  classification  is  to  be  founded,  only  by  observing 
what  the  mind  does,  and  from  this,  inferring  the  corres- 
ponding powers.  Strictly  speaking,  these  powers  are  as 
numerous,  as  the  varieties  in  our  mental  operations.  In 
classifying  them,  we  can  regard  only  the  more  prominent 
resemblances  and  differences. 

THE      WILL. 

There  has  been  no  settled  agreement  with  respect  to 
that  most  important  faculty  called  the  will.  European 
writers  generally  confine  the  term  to  the  power  of  order- 
ing some  bodily  or  mental  act.  Volition,  according  to 
them,  is  determining  to  do  something.  A  man  wills  to 
move  his  hand,  or  to  think  on  a  particular  subject.  In 
such  cases,  the  act  which  is  willed,  immediately  follows 
the  volition.  A  man  determines  to  speak,  and  he  speaks; 
he  wills  to  walk,  and  he  walks.  We  frequently  resolve 
to  enter  on  a  course  of  conduct,  for  the  sake  of  obtaining 
some  distant  good.  A  man  determines  to  devote  him- 
self to  the  acquisition  of  property,  to  gaining  applause, 
to  sensual  gratification,  or  to  a  life  of  benevolent  effort. 
Such  a  resolution  is  called  a  commanding  purpose  of 
life,  predominant  inclination,  governing  state  of  the  will, 
dominant  preference,  generic  volition,  &c.,  to  distinguish 
it  from  those  particular  acts  by  which  these  general  de- 
terminations are  carried  into  execution. 


36  POWERS     OF     THE     MIND. 

In  addition  to  both  these  classes  of  volitions,  the  New 
England  divines,  since  the  days  of  Edwards,  at  least, 
have  very  commonly  considered  emotions  or  affections 
as  acts  of  the  will.  The  elder  Edwards  says,  "  I  humbly 
conceive,  that  the  affections  of  the  soul  are  not  properly 
distinguished  from  the  will ;  as  though  they  were  two 
faculties  in  the  soul."*  "The  affections  are  no  other 
than  the  more  vigorous  and  sensible  exercises  of  the  in- 
clination and  will  of  the  soul."f  "  The  affections  are 
only  certain  modes  of  the  exercise  of  the  will."f  But 
although  emotions,  purposes,  and  executive  volitions  are, 
in  some  respects,  similar ;  yet,  in  other  respects,  they  are 
different.  Emotion  is  directed  to  an  object ;  a  purpose 
fixes  on  an  end ;  an  executive  volition  orders  an  act. 
Executive  acts  may  depend  on  a  predominant  purpose ; 
and  the  purpose  may  depend  on  antecedent  emotions. 
A  general  purpose  may  look  to  some  distant  end ;  an 
executive  volition  relates  to  something  which  is  imme- 
diately to  follow.  President  Edwards  himself  has  fre- 
quent occasion  to  make  a  subdivision  of  the  acts  of  the 
will,  into  those  which  are  immanent  and  those  which 
are  imperative. 

Whatever  classification  of  the  mental  powers  we  may 
think  proper  to  adopt,  it  is  of  the  first  importance  to  bear 
steadily  in  mind,  that  distinct  faculties  are  not  distinct 
agents.  They  are  different  powers  of  one  and  the  same 
agent.  It  is  the  man  that  perceives,  and  loves,  and 
hates,  and  acts ;  not  his  understanding,  or  his  heart,  or 
his  will,  distinct  from  himself. 

*  Revival  of  Religion  in  New  England,  Part  I. 
f  Treatise  on  Religious  Affections,  Part  I. 
Treatise  on  the  Will. 


POWERS     OF     THE     MIND. 


37 


Some  writers  speak  of  the  power  of  the  will.  If  by 
this  be  meant  the  power  of  the  mind  to  will,  to  put  forth 
volitions ;  this  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  will 
itself.  Bat  acts  of  the  will  may  have  a  command  over 
the  motions  of  the  body,  and  over  certain  operations  of 
the  mind.  When  a  man  wills  to  move  his  hand,  it  com- 
monly obeys.  When  he  wills  to  fix  his  attention  on  a 
particular  subject,  the  current  of  thought  may  be  turned 
into  that  channel.  This  appears  to  be  what  some  intend 
by  the  expression  the  power  of  the  will. 


38 


SECTION    II. 

SELF-DETERMINATION. 

Point  of  inquiry — Particular  determination  of  the  will — It  is  the 
mind  itself  that  wills — One  act  of  the  will  determining  another — 
Are  volitions  determined  solely  by  the  nature  or  state  of  the  mind  ? 
— or  by  the  power  of  willing — Contingent  determination — Spon- 
taneous volition — Personality  of  the  will — Originating  volition — 
Is  the  mind  the  efficient  cause  of  its  volitions? — Causing  choice  by 
the  act  of  choosing — Meaning  of  cause — Edwards  on  the  Will — 
Volitions  alone  said  to  be  causes — Meaning  of  cause — A  definition 
not  an  argument — Limited  definition  of  cause — No  change  without 
a  cause — Evidence  of  consciousness — Bledsoe's  Examination  of 
Edwards — Concessions  of  Edwards's  opponents — Self-determin- 
ing power — Is  volition  an  effect  ? — Has  volition  any  cause  ? — 
Has  volition  an  efficient  cause? — Volition  comes  to  pass — In 
what  sense  has  volition  a  cause  ? — Do  motives  induce  the  mind  to 
will  ? — Originality  of  Bledsoe's  view — The  main  point  at  issue. 

THUS  far,  we  have  been  mainly  occupied,  in  explain- 
ing some  of  the  ambiguities  in  mental  philosophy,  to 
prepare  the  way  for  the  principal  point  of  our  inquiry, 
the  self-determining  power  of  the  mind.  The  obstruc- 
tions arising  from  indefinite  language  are  not,  even  now, 
so  far  removed,  as  to  render  further  explanation  unneces- 
sary. We  shall  still  find  occasion  for  it,  in  almost  every 
step  of  our  progress.  Such  is  the  unsettled  condition  of 
metaphysical  phraseology,  that  we  can  scarcely  make 
any  advance  in  an  argument,  on  the  subject  before  us, 
without  stopping  continually,  to  explain  the  meaning  of 
ambiguous  terms. 


SELF-DETERMINATION. 


39 


The  object  of  our  inquiry,  is  not  to  learn  whether  the 
mind  wills  at  all.  This  no  one  can  doubt.  INor  is  it  to 
determine  ivhy  we  will  at  all.  The  very  nature  of  the 
faculty  of  will  implies,  that  we  put  forth  acts  of  will. 
But  the  real  point  of  our  inquiry  is,  why  we  will  one 
way  rather  than  another ;  why  we  choose  one  thing 
rather  than  its  opposite ;  why  one  man  wills  to  obey 
God,  and  another  chooses  to  disobey  him :  why  one  pre- 
fers to  go  to  the  gaming  table,  while  another  goes  to  the 
house  of  prayer.  What  is  it  that  determines  not  merely 
that  there  shall  be  volitions,  but  what  they  shall  be  ? 

It  is  true,  indeed,  that  whatever  determines  us  to  will, 
determines  us  to  will  in  some  particular  way.  Every 
volition  is  a  particular  act,  choosing  or  rejecting  some 
particular  object ;  and  whatever  determines  volitions  to 
be,  determines  what  they  will  be.  The  force  which 
gives  motion  to  a  body,  gives  direction  to  the  motion. 
So  whatever  agencies,  causes,  or  influences  there  may 
be,  which  give  rise  to  acts  of  choice,  these  also,  taken 
together,  determine  of  what  kind  the  choices  shall  be. 
There  is  riot  one  cause  of  volition  in  the  abstract,  and  a 
different  cause  of  its  direction.  But  the  inquiry  why 
we  will  at  all,  may  be  different  from  the  inquiry  why 
we  will  one  way  rather  than  another.  To  answer  the 
former,  it  may  be  sufficient  to  say,  that  the  human  mind 
is  so  constituted,  as  to  have  the  power  and  inclination  to 
will,  and  that  there  are  objects  of  choice  presented  be- 
fore it.  But  a  satisfactory  answer  to  the  latter  requires 
an  investigation  of  the  particular  state,  feelings,  suscep- 
tibilities, &c.  of  the  mind,  and  the  nature  of  the  objects 
presented  to  its  choice.  We  may  answer  the  one,  by 
saying  that  there  is  some  cause  of  volition  ;  and  the  other, 


40 


SELF-DETERMINATION. 


by  shewing  what  is  the  cause.  In  giving  a  reason  why 
the  wind  blows,  it  is  sufficient  to  prove  that  there  are 
forces  in  the  atmosphere  adequate  to  its  production.  To 
explain  why  it  blows  East  or  West,  rather  than  North 
or  South,  we  must  point  out  the  particular  nature  and 
direction  of  these  forces.  The  latter  explanation  in- 
cludes the  former ;  but  the  former  does  not  necessarily 
include  the  latter.  A  man  may  ride  often,  because  he  is 
fond  of  riding ;  but  this  is  not  all  the  reason  why  he 
rides  in  one  direction  rather  than  another.  To  account 
for  a  man's  willing  at  all,  it  is  sufficient  to  state  the  re- 
quisites which  are  common  to  all  cases  of  willing.  To 
explain  the  ground  of  his  willing  in  a  particular  way,  it 
is  necessary  to  add  the  considerations  which  give  to  his 
choice  this  special  direction.  On  the  question  why  does 
a  man  will  at  all,  the  parties  in  a  philosophical  contro- 
versy may  be  agreed,  while  they  are  altogether  at  vari- 
ance, in  giving  the  reasons  for  his  choosing  one  thing 
rather  than  another.  The  latter  may  be  the  main  point, 
if  not  the  only  point,  in  the  discussion  between  them. 
With  some,  indeed,  there  appears  to  be  a  farther  ques- 
tion, whether  any  thing  antecedent  to  an  act  of  choice 
is  at  all  concerned,  in  giving  it  a  particular  direction. 
With  those  who  deny  this,  the  inquiry  respecting  the 
direction  of  choice,  must  be  distinct  from  that  relating 
to  the  prerequisites  of  every  volition. 

1.  If  the  question  be,  whether  the  man  himself  de- 
cides between  the  objects  of  choice  presented  before  him, 
there  surely  can  be  no  doubt  on  this  point,  if  it  be  ad- 
mitted, that  he  wills  at  all.  For  to  will,  is  nothing 
more  nor  less,  than  to  decide  in  favor  of  an  object  of 
choice.  If  a  man  wills  to  walk,  he  determines  to  walk. 


SELF-DETERMINATION.  41 

And  it  is  he  himself  that  determines.  Motives  may 
influence  him  to  walk  or  ride,  to  lie  and  steal.  But  mo- 
tives do  not  lie  and  steal.  Nor  do  they  will  to  lie  and 
steal.  A  man  may  be  persuaded,  by  others,  to  will  in  a 
certain  way.  Their  influence  may  give  a  direction  to 
his  choice.  But  his  act  is  not  their  act.  He  himself 
chooses.  He  is  the  author  of  his  own  volitions.  This, 
according  to  one  signification  of  the  term,  is  self-deter- 
mination. And  a  power  of  choosing  is,  in  this  sense,  a 
self-determining  power. 

2.  But  this  is  not  all  that  is  ever  meant,  by  the  advo- 
cates of  a  self-determining  power  in  the  will.  The  in- 
quiry still  recurs,  what  determines  the  man  to  will  as 
he  does  ?  What  determines  him  to  determine  thus  ?  Is 
it  a  preceding-  act  of  the  will  ?  This  is  undoubtedly 
the  case,  in  many  instances.  Taking  the  will  in  its 
most  enlarged  acceptation,  as  including  not  only  execu.- 
tive  acts,  but  purposes  and  emotions,  acts  of  one  class 
may  be  determined,  by  those  of  another.  A  man  pur- 
poses to  go  to  the  post-office  :  every  step  he  takes,  on  his 
way,  is  determined  by  this  purpose.  And  the  purpose 
may  have  been  determined,  by  some  strong  emotion  • 
an  eager  desire,  perhaps,  to  receive  intelligence  of  the 
recovery  of  a  friend  from  sickness,  or  the  safe  arrival  of 
a  richly  freighted  ship.  Farther,  the  emotions  them- 
selves are  commonly  excited,  either  by  perceptions  of 
external  realities,  or  by  the  internal  imaginings  of  our 
own  minds.  Imperative  acts  of  the  will,  then,  may  be 
preceded  by  purposes,  the  purposes  by  emotions,  the 
emotions  by  perceptions,  or  the  workings  of  imagination. 
But  all  these  belong  to  the  mind.  They  do  not  reach 
4* 


42  SELF-DETERMINATION. 

beyond  ourselves.     So  that,  thus  far,,  our  emotions  and 
volitions  may  be  truly  said  to  be  self-determined. 

Again,  present  acts  may  have  an  influence,  in  deter- 
mining future  volitions,  by  placing  us  in  circumstances 
fitted  to  excite  certain  classes  of  emotions.  The  man  of 
gaiety  and  mirth,  banishes  serious  reflection,  by  throw- 
ing himself  into  a  circle  of  jovial  companions.  The 
pious  man  rouses  himself  to  charitable  effort,  by  bring- 
ing into  view  the  various  plans  of  Christian  benevolence. 
The  man  who  has  been  heretofore  intemperate,  but  has 
now  taken  a  firm  resolution  to  reform,  guards  himself 
against  a  violation  of  his  vows,  by  giving  his  name  to  a 
temperance  pledge,  and  avoiding  the  occasions  which 
might  inflame  his  appetite.  In  tracing  back  a  series  of 
acts,  we  may  often  find  several  successive  steps  within 
the  mind,  and  therefore  self-determined,  as  those  which 
follow  are  dependent  on  those  which  precede.  But  every 
step  can  not  be  dependent  on  another  within  the  mind. 
For  this  would  involve  the  absurdity  of  at  least  one  step 
before  the  first,  or  else,  of  an  infinite  series  of  steps. 
The  first  act,  then,  must  proceed  from  something  within 
the  mind  which  is  not  an  act,  or  from  something  without^ 
or  from  both  together,  or  from  nothing.  The  last  sup- 
position implies  absolute  contingence,  which  we  are  soon 
to  consider.  If  the  first  act  of  the  series  proceeds  from 
some  mental  state,  which  is  neither  an  act  nor  the  sub- 
stance of  the  mind  :  that  state  must  have  had  an  origin, 
either  from  without,  or  from  something  within,  which, 
if  we  trace  back  the  chain  of  dependencies,  and  do  not 
admit  contingence,  any  where,  to  break  the  series,  will 
bring  us  to  something  without  the  mind. 


SELF-DETERMINATION.  43 


We  are  not  inquiring  whether  a  man  has  any  thing 
to  do,  in  determining  the  nature  of  his  own  acts  of  will  j 
but  whether  they  are  wholly  independent  of  every  thing 
else ;  whether  any  other  being,  or  event,  or  thing,  can 
have  any  share  of  influence,  in  connection  with  his  o\vn 
agency,  to  render  his  volitions  different  from  what  they 
would  otherwise  be.  The  inquiry,  whether  any  thing 
exterior  to  the  mind  is  concerned  in  determining  the 
mind  itself  to  will  in  a  particular  way,  is  very  different 
from  the  inquiry,  whether  exterior  influence  determines 
the  volition,  without  the  agency  of  the  mind.  If  it  be 
said,  that  our  mental  exercises  are  dependent  on  our  pro- 
pensities, which  are  a  part  of  ourselves ;  still  it  is  to  be 
considered,  that  our  propensities  are  either  acquired,  in 
consequence  of  previous  states  of  mind,  in  connection 
with  external  circumstances ;  or  are  a  part  of  the  original 
constitution  of  the  mind,  received  from  its  Creator.  Or 
if  it  be  supposed,  that  a  man  practices  iniquity  or  virtue, 
because  he  has  formed  a  sinful  or  holy  purpose ;  or  be- 
cause, by  his  own  acts,  he  has  contracted  a  sinful  or  vir- 
tuous habit ;  yet  his  first  sinful  or  virtuous  act,  on  which 
the  others  are  considered  as  dependent,  did  not  proceed 
from  a  purpose  or  habit  of  his. 

3.  Is  the  kind  of  volitions  which  a  man  puts  forth, 
determined  by  the  substance  and  nature  of  his  mind,  in- 
dependently of  motives,  external  influences,  &c.  ?  This 
might  be  supposed  to  be  the  ease,  if  the  volitions  of  the 
same  individual  were  all  perfectly  uniform.  But  they 
are  very  multifarious.  One  hour,  he  chooses  to  be  ac- 
tive ;  another,  to  remain  at  rest.  At  one  time,  he  is 
struggling  against  calamity ;  at  another,  exulting  in  the 
success  of  his  plans  and  efforts.  Why  such  frequent 


44  SELF-DETERMINATION. 

changes,  if  external  circumstances  have  no  influence  on 
his  actions  ? 

The  present  nature  of  the  mind  is  either  original  or 
acquired,  or  has  been  given  by  the  Spirit  of  God.  In 
either  case,  it  is  dependent  on  something  preceding.  If 
it  is  acquired,  it  is  dependent  on  the  man's  original  na- 
ture, together  with  the  circumstances  in  which  he  has 
been  placed.  If  the  kind  of  volition  depends  immediately 
and  solely  on  the  original  nature  of  the  mind,  it  depends 
on  that  which  was  given  by  the  Creator.  This  is  what 
some  would  call  physical  causation,  producing  physical 
depravity  or  physical  virtue.  The  advocates  of  inde- 
pendent self-determination,  however,  do  not  go  so  far,  as 
to  deny  all  dependence  of  volitions  upon  the  nature  of 
the  mind.  They  will  admit  as  much,  at  least,  as  this, 
that  it  is  the  mind  which  wills.  Without  agents,  there 
can  be  no  volitions.  But  to  suppose  that  the  character 
of  volitions,  as  being  right  or  wrong,  sinful  or  holy, 
should  depend  on  the  substance  of  the  mind,  would  im- 
ply, that,  they  are  dependent,  for  being  as  they  are,  on  a 
nature  which  is  created,  and  therefore  not  self-originated. 

4.  Some  writers  speak  of  the  power  of  willing,  as  be- 
ing the  sole  and  sufficient  cause,  why  the  mind  wills 
one  way  rather  than  another.  But  it  is  evident,  that  the 
mere  power  of  willing  is  not,  of  itself  alone,  even  the 
reason  why  a  man  wills  at  all ;  unless  the  term  power 
be  used  in  the  broad  and  unusual  sense,  which  includes 
every  antecedent  on  which  his  willing  depends.  Is  a 
man's  power  to  walk,  the  only  reason  why  he  actually 
walks  ?  Does  a  man  always  speak,  when  he  has  power 
to  speak  ?  It  would  be  nearer  the  truth  to  say,  that  he 
wills,  because  he  has  not  the  power  to  avoid  willing,  in 


SEL.F-DETERMIW  ATION.  45 


some  way  or  other.  But  whatever  may  be  assigned  as 
the  reason  why  he  wills  at  all,  the  main  inquiry  will  still 
return  upon  us :  Why  does  the  mind  will  one  way  rather 
than  another ;  why  does  it  choose  one  object  rather  than 
its  opposite  ?  Is  the  simple  power  of  willing  the  only 
cause  of  this  ?  Does  a  man  choose  to  walk  to  church 
for  no  other  reason  than  because  he  has  power  to  walk 
in  any  one  of  a  thousand  different  directions  ?  Does  he 
speak  the  truth  for  no  other  reason,  than  because  truth 
and  falsehood  are  equally  in  his  power  ?  The  mere 
power  of  willing  is  no  more  concerned  in  giving  direc- 
tion to  the  acts  of  the  will,  or  in  preventing  them  from 
being  directed  by  influence,  than  is  the  equal  weight  of 
the  arms  of  a  balance  in  directing  their  motion,  when 
unequal  bodies  are  placed  in  the  opposite  scales.  If  the 
mind  wills  contingently,  that  is,  without  any  direction 
from  any  thing  preceding  ;  it  undoubtedly  has  the  power 
to  will  thus.  But  an  equal  power  to  will  any  way  indif- 
ferently, is  not  surely  the  only  ground  of  willing  one  way 
rather  than  another.  That  which  renders  it  certain, 
that  the  saints  and  angels  in  heaven  will  be  uniformly 
and  forever  holy,  is  not  merely  the  fact,  that  they  have 
the  same  power  to  revolt,  as  to  praise  and  adore.  The 
only  reason  why  fallen  spirits  invariably  sin  is  not,  that 
they  have  equal  power  to  obey  God  and  to  rebel.  Lib- 
erty to  either  side,  does  not  turn  the  will  uniformly  to 
one  side.  Power  to  the  contrary,  does  not  bind  the  soul 
in  unwavering  devotedness  to  its  Maker.  An  equal 
chance  of  doing  right  and  doing  wrong,  does  not  secure 
a  course  of  uniform  rectitude.  If  it  be  said,  that  there 
is  really  no  cause  or  reason,  why  the  will  turns  one  way 
rather  than  the  contrary ;  this  brings  us  to  contingent 
self-determination, 


46 


SELF-DETERMINATION. 


5.  Shall  we  then,  to  avoid  admitting  any  dependence 
of  volitions,  either  immediate  or  remote,  upon  external 
influence,  say  that  they  are  dependent  on  nothing  ;  that 
the  mind  throws  them  off  at  random ;  that  they  happen 
to  take  place,  without  any  ground  or  reason  whatever, 
why  they  are  as  they  are,  rather  than  otherwise  ?  This 
is  the  doctrine  of  contingence  ;  of  contingence  in  the  ab- 
solute sense  ;  not  that  which  signifies,  that  the  cause  or 
reason  is  unknoivn  or  unobserved  ;  but  that  which  ex- 
cludes every  thing  on  which  volitions  may  be  supposed 
to  depend,  for  being  as  they  are ;  which  implies  that  it 
is  a  matter  of  mere  accident,  that  they  take  place  as  they 
do.  According  to  this  view  of  the  case,  a  man's  voli- 
tions are  determined,  not  by  the  man  himself,  but  by 
the  volitions  themselves ;  that  is,  they  are  determined 
only  by  the  event,  by  their  happening  to  be  what  they 
are.  They  are  dependent,  for  their  character,  on  noth- 
ing preceding.  The  question,  then,  for  our  considera- 
tion is  whether  the  volitions  of  accountable  beings  are 
contingent,  or  dependent ;  not  whether  they  are  depend- 
ent on  the  mind,  objects  of  choice,  &c.,  for  coming  into 
existence  merely ;  but  for  being  such  volitions  as  they 
are,  right  or  wrong,  sinful  or  holy.  The  mind,  it  is  ad- 
mitted, puts  forth  volitions ;  but  does  it  determine  of  what 
sort  they  shall  be  ?  Does  any  thing  else  determine  this  ? 
Does  any  thing  else  make  any  difference  in  the  volitions? 
Or  is  it  a  mere  matter  of  accident,  that  they  are  as  they 
are  ?  If  they  are  not  dependent,  they  must  be  contin- 
gent, in  the  absolute  sense  in  which  we  are  now  using 
the  term.  If  they  are  not  contingent,  they  must  be  de- 
pendent. For,  from  the  very  definition  of  the  terms, 
one  is  the  opposite  of  the  other,  There  can  be  no  in- 


SELF-DETERMINATION.  47 

tcrmediate  supposition,  unless  it  be  that  they  are  partly 
contingent  and  partly  dependent.  If  dependence  is  in- 
consistent with  liberty,  then  so  far  as  there  is  depend- 
ence, liberty  is  impaired ;  it  is  enjoyed  only  so  far  as 
volitions  are  contingent. 

If  the  kind  of  volitions  which  a  man  puts  forth,  is  to 
be  ascribed  to  accident,  in  ivhat  part  of  the  series  of 
mental  acts,  does  this  prolific  contingence,  this  wonder- 
working nonentity,  "  this  effectual  no  cause,"  do  its 
work  ?  Where  does  it  break  the  connection,  between 
volition  and  all  preceding  influence  ?  Are  executive  acts 
of  the  will,  independent  of  purposes,  and  emotions,  and 
appetites  ?  Do  hunger  and  thirst  never  incline  a  man 
to  partake  of  refreshments  set  before  him  ?  Does  the 
tippler  resort  to  the  dram  shop  without  any  induce- 
ment ?  Or  if,  at  any  time,  he  denies  himself  his  ac- 
customed indulgence,  has  he  no  motive  for  his  absti- 
nence ?  Is  it  from  mere  chance,  that  the  demagogue 
courts  the  favor  of  his  fellow  citizens  ?  When  he  shifts 
his  plans  and  measures,  as  the  popular  breeze  turns  to 
different  points  of  the  compass,  has  he  no  purpose  to 
answer  by  this  ?  Is  it  as  probable,  that  a-man  will  act 
against  all  motives,  as  that  he  will  yield  to  the  influence 
of  any  ?  If  an  expert  metaphysician,  when  occasion 
requires,  can  put  himself  into  the  posture  of  resisting 
all  common  inducements,  is  it  certain,  that  he  is  not 
prompted  to  this,  by  the  motive  of  just  showing  how 
the  will  can  work  without  motive  ? 

Is  the  forming  of  purposes,  the  place  where  the 
dependence  upon  preceding  influence  is  broken  off? 
When  a  man  resolves  to  devote  his  powers  and  labors 
to  the  calls  of  ambition,  is  it  done  independently  of  any 


48  SELF-DETERMINATION. 

love  of  distinction  ?  When  the  Christian  abandons  his 
former  pursuits,  and  forms  the  purpose  of  devoting  his 
life  to  the  service  of  God,  does  he  do  it  without  a  rea- 
son; a  reason  of  sufficient  efficacy  to  control  his  decis- 
ion ?  Do  men  form  resolutions,  for  the  sake  of  obtain- 
ing those  objects  to  which  they  are  perfectly  indifferent  ? 
Is  not  every  purpose  made  to  obtain  some  object  which 
was  previously  an  object  of  affection  ? 

If  it  be  admitted,  that  our  imperative  volitions  are  in- 
fluenced by  our  purposes,  and  our  purposes  by  our  de- 
sires arid  appetites ;  shall  we  find  in  the  latter  the  inde- 
pendence which  contingent  self-determination  implies  ? 
When  objects  are  brought  before  our  minds,  is  it  alto- 
gether a  matter  of  accident  whether  we  shall  be  pleased 
with  them  or  not  ?  Is  it  as  easy  for  us  to  be  gratified 
with  contemptuous  treatment,  as  with  applause  ?  Is  it 
an  even  chance,  whether  a  miser  will  be  most  pleased 
with  a  guinea  or  a  sixpence  ?  In  the  case  of  the  bodily 
appetites,  the  gratification  depends  on  the  correspon- 
dence between  the  external  object  and  that  part  of  the 
body  which  is  affected  by  the  object.  So  in  the  case 
of  intellectual  and  moral  enjoyment,  there  must  be  a 
correspondence  between  the  subjects  before  the  mind, 
and  the  state  of  the  intellect  and  heart.  But  this  men- 
tal state  is  not  the  product  of  chance.  If  volitions  are 
not  dependent  on  any  thing  preceding,  for  being  as  they 
are  ;  if  they  are  determined  neither  by  the  mind  and 
its  acts,  nor  by  any  thing  without  the  mind,  nor  by 
both  together ;  then  they  are  not  determined  at  all,  un- 
less it  be  in  this  sense,  that  each  volition  is  determined 
by  itself;  that  is,  it  is  determined,  merely  by  taking 
place. 


SELF-DETERMINATION.  49 

When  the  several  meanings  of  the  expression  self-de- 
termination are  so  definitely  explained,  that  it  no  lon- 
ger answers  the  purposes  of  a  term  designedly  ambigu- 
ous, then  it  is  sometimes  found  convenient  to  substitute 
for  it  some  other  words  the  ambiguity  of  which  is  less 
exposed  to  detection.  Of  this  nature  is  the  term  spon- 
taneous. This,  in  the  more  common  acceptation,  sig- 
nifies the  same  as  voluntary ;  referring  not  to  the  ante- 
cedents of  volition,  but  to  its  consequents ;  to  what  is 
done  in  accordance  with  the  will,  to  the  exclusion  of 
compulsion  and  restraint.  We  are  said  to  act  spontane- 
ously, when  we  do  as  we  choose  ;  when  there  is  noth- 
ing to  prevent  our  imperative  volitions  from  being  car- 
ried into  execution.  Sometimes  also,  our  actions  are 
considered  as  spontaneous,  when  they  proceed  from  the 
impulse  of  the  moment ;  when  we  will  and  act,  with- 
out taking  time  to  deliberate.  This  is  so  far  from  im- 
plying, that  our  emotions  have  no  concern  in  giving  di- 
rection to  our  volitions,  that  the  cases  in  which  we  act 
suddenly,  and  without  reflection,  are  precisely  those  in 
which  the  controlling  influence  of-  our  passions  is  the 
most  manifest,  and  the  most  powerful. 

But  some  writers,  when  they  speak  of  the  human 
mind  as  being  endowed  with  a  principle  of  spontaneity, 
seem  to  consider  this  as  accounting  fully  for  the  partic- 
ular direction  of  our  volitions,  independently  of  the  in- 
fluence of  motives.  This  is  a  summary  mode  of  set- 
tling a  fundamental  principle,  by  merely  giving  it  a 
name,  by  taking  for  granted  the  main  point  in  discus- 
sion. Another  term  which  has,  of  late,  been  applied 
in  a  similar  way,  is  personality.  It  is  first  claimed,  that 
the  will  is  a  person,  is  self,  is  the  me  ;  arid  then  the  as- 
5 


50  SELF-DETERMINATION. 

sumption  is  made,  that  this  can  act  independently  of 
any  influence  distinct  from  itself.  This  affirming  the 
will  to  be  a  person,  a  being,  a  substance,  rather  than  a 
power,  an  attribute  of  a  being,  is  a  wide  departure  from 
the  accustomed  use  of  language.  A  will  may  be  essen- 
tial to  personality;  but  is  not  more  so  than  reason,  or 
consciousness,  or  emotions.  That  which  wills  and  acts 
is  not  the  will ;  but  the  man,  the  mind,  the  living,  con- 
scious being.  An  attribute  is  riot  an  agent.  That 
which  makes  a  choice  is  not  the  mere  power  of  choos- 
ing ;  but  the  being  who  possesses  this  power.  Though 
a  substance  without  a  will  may.not  be  a  person ;  neither 
is  any  thing  which  is  wholly  destitute  of  understanding, 
or  feeling,  or  thought,  as  a  tree  or  a  stone,  a  person. 
But  supposing  it  were  proper  to  denominate  the  will  a  per- 
son, how  would  this  relieve  any  difficulty  respecting  its 
agency  in  choosing  ?  Is  it  easier  to  prove,  that  the  pow- 
er of  choosing  can  act  independently  of  motives,  than  to 
prove,  that  a  being  possessed  of  this  power  can  thus  act  ? 
But,  it  may  be  asked,  does  not  a  man  originate  his 
own  volitions  ?  They  undoubtedly  begin  with  him,  in 
this  sense,  that  they  have  no  existence,  till  he  puts  them 
forth.  They  are  strictly  his  acts,  and  not  the  acts  of 
another.  They  proceed  immediately  from  him.  They 
are  not  produced  beforehand  and  afterwards  put  into  his 
mind.  He  is  truly  their  author.  But  does  this  imply, 
that  dependence,  in  the  case,  can  be  traced  no  farther 
back  than  to  the  agent  ?  From  the  fact,  that  he  causes 
his  own  volitions,  does  it  follow,  that  he  is  himself  un- 
caused ;  that  he  also  is  self-originated?  If  he  is  not, 
his  volitions  are  remotely,  though  not  immediately,  de- 
pendent on  something  besides  himself.  He  has  not 


SELF-DETERMINATION. 


originated  all  the  causes  from  which  his  choices  proceed. 
If  it  be  said,  that  the  nature  of  his  volitions  depends  on 
nothing  but  the  nature  of  the  man  ;  yet  it  is  to  be  con- 
sidered, that  this  nature  of  his  must  have  had  an  origin 
from  some  cause.  Or  if  there  be  a  state  of  the  mind 
which  is  different  from  its  nature  and  its  operations, 
and  which  is  the  cause  of  its  volitions,  that  state  is  not 
the  product  of  chance.  Even  those  who  maintain,  that 
acts  of  the  will  are  independent  of  every  thing  prece- 
ding, for  being  what  they  are,  do  not,  it  is  presumed, 
claim  this  privilege  for  any  thing  else.  If  volitions  are 
thrown  off  contingently,  so  that,  as  far  as  their^  virtuous 
or  vicious  character  is  concerned,  they  depend  neither 
on  the  nature,  nor  the  state,  nor  the  previous  acts,  of 
the  agent  ;  with  what  propriety  can  it  be  said,  that  he 
originates  their  sinfulness  or  holiness?  According  to 
the  supposition,  he  merely  happens  to  choose  as  he 
does. 

Is  a  man  the  efficient  cause  of  his  own  volitions? 
There  surely  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  on  this  point, 
if  by  efficient  cause,  be  meant  the  agent  who  wills. 
To  be  the  cause  of  volitions,  in  this  sense,  is  nothing 
more  nor  less  than  to  will.  If  it  is  the  man  himself 
that  wills,  it  is  he  himself  that  is  the  efficient  cause  of 
his  volitions.  Or  if,  by  the  efficient  cause,  be  meant 
the  immediate  antecedent,  the  man  is,  in  this  sense  also, 
the  efficient  cause  of  his  own  choices.  There  is  nothing 
intervening  between  him  and  his  volitions,  no  connect- 
ing link,  between  the  agent  and  his  own  acts.  But  if 
we  apply  the  term  efficient  cause  to  every  thing  which 
is  in  any  way  concerned,  in  determining  what  a  man's 
volitions  shall  be  ;  we  cannot  say,  that  he  is  the  only 


52  SELF-DETERMINATION. 

efficient  cause  of  them,  without  setting  aside  the  influ- 
ence of  external  motives. 

By  the  cause  of  volition,  some  writers  appear  to  mean 
the  agent  in  the  exercise  of  choice  ;  in  the  very  act  of 
choosing.  This,  it  would  seem,  is  making  the  cause  of 
an  act  of  the  will  to  be  a  part  of  the  act  itself.  Is  this 
a  correct  view  of  the  nature  of  volition?  What  is 
choice  ?  Is  it  not  the  mind  choosing ;  the  mind  in  a 
particular  state  ?  Can  this  be  separated  into  two  distinct 
elements,  the  one  bearing  to  the  other  the  relation  of  .a 
cause  to  its  effect  ?  A  cause  is  antecedent  to  its  effect. 
Is  the  mind,  in  the  very  act  of  choosing,  to  be  consid- 
ered as  something  antecedent  to  its  choice  ?  We  can 
easily  conceive  of  one  state  of  mind  as  being  antecedent 
to  another  ;  and  can  suppose  that  one  may  be  the  cause 
of  the  other.  But  what  propriety  can  there  be  in  speak- 
ing of  the  mind  in  a  particular  state  as  being  the  cause 
of  that  state  ?  When  a  man  sees,  or  feels,  or  thinks,  or 
moves,  or  lives,  we  are  not  accustomed  to  speak  of  him 
as  being  the  cause  of  his  sight,  or  feeling,  or  thought, 
or  motion,  or  life  ;  unless  it  be  by  something  which  he 
has  previously  done.  Is  there  any  more  propriety  in 
speaking  of  a  man  in  the  act  of  choosing,  as  being  the 
cause  of  his  choice  ?  Is  not  his  agency  in  choosing  the 
very  choice  itself?  Does  not  the  attempt  to  separate 
this  into  two  elements,  make  the  act  of  choosing  both 
cause  and  effect?  In  the  language  of  President  Ed- 
wards, "  To  say  that  the  mind  determines  itself  to  exert 
such  an  act  as  it  does,  by  the  very  exertion  itself,  is  to 
make  the  exertion  both  cause  and  effect ;  or,  to  exert 
such  an  act,  to  be  a  cause  of  the  exertion  of  such  an 
act."  Has  not  this  peculiar  phraseology  been  adopted. 


SELF-DETERMINATION.  53 

to  avoid  the  necessity  of  admitting  any  cause  of  voli- 
tion antecedent  to  itself.  It  is  commonly  thought  that 
choice,  as  well  as  every  other  change,  must  have  some 
cause.  But  the  advocates  of  independent  volition  find 
themselves  involved  in  formidable  difficulties,  whenever 
they  venture  to  admit  of  any  cause  of  volition  prior  to 
itself.  Even  if  the  previous  cause  be  supposed  to  be 
some  other  state  of  the  same  mind,  so  as  to  limit  the 
agency  concerned  to  the  man  himself;  yet  to  account 
for  this,  another  antecedent  cause  will  be  needed  ;  run- 
ning into  a  series  which  must  extend  back,  beyond  the 
mind  of  the  choosing  agent. 

If  it  be  conceded,  that  the  writers  now  referred  to 
have  a  real  meaning,  when  they  speak  of  a  man's  caus- 
ing his  volitions  in  the  very  act  of  choosing ;  yet  this 
can  give  them  no  warrant  to  claim  that  every  other  au- 
thor shall  use  the  term  cause,  as  applied  to  the  will,  in 
the  same  sense  ;  and  shall  be  precluded  from  using  it 
with  any  other  meaning.  It  certainly  can  give  them  no 
right  to  charge  an  opponent  with  denying  man's  agency 
in  his  own  volitions,  because  he  does  not  call  it  by  the 
name  which  they  give  it ;  because  he  considers  this 
agency  so  essential  to  choice,  as  to  be  identified  with 
the  very  act  of  choosing.  Nor  can  they  be  justified  in 
assuming,  that  there  can  be  no  proper  application  of  the 
word  cause  to  the  will,  except  their  own  ;  and  in  this 
way,  taking  for  granted  the  whole  subject  in  debate. 
Great  latitude  may  indeed  be  allowed  to  writers  of  con- 
troversy, to  use  their  technical  terms  and  phrases  in  their 
own  way ;  provided  they  will  adhere  to  their  own  defi- 
nitions, so  as  to  give  no  needless  occasion  for  misappre- 
hension ;  and  will  allow  to  others  the  privilege  which 


54  SELF-DETERMINATION. 

they  claim  for  themselves.  Many  writers,  and  among 
them  President  Edwards,  while  they  hold,  in  the  most 
decided  terms,  that  when  a  man  wills,  the  agency  is 
that  of  his  own  mind,  yet  think  they  have  reason  for 
believing,  that  this  event,  whether  it  is  to  be  considered 
simple  or  complex,  whether  it  does  or  does  not  include 
in  itself  both  cause  and  effect ;  that  this  choosing  is  de- 
pendent on  something  preceding,  which  they  call  cause. 
"  In  every  act  of  the  will  whatever,"  according  to  Ed- 
wards, "  the  mind  chooses  one  thing  rather  than  an- 
other." The  very  act  of  volition  itself,  he  says,  "is 
doubtless  a  determination  of  the  mind,  that  is,  it  is  the 
mind's  drawing  up  a  conclusion  ;  or  coming  to  a  choice, 
between  two  things  or  more  proposed  to  it."  "  For  the 
will  to  determine  any  thing,  is  the  same  as  for  the  soul 
to  determine  a  thing  by  willing."  But  back  of  this 
agency  in  willing,  he  seeks  for  an  antecedent  cause. 
"  What  is  the  cause  and  reason,"  he  asks.  "  of  the  souVs 
exerting  such  an  act."*  Here  lies  the  great  point  in 
discussion  between  Edwards  and  his  opponents.  They 
agree  in  the  fact,  that  that  which  chooses  is  the  mind 
of  the  agent.  They  diffei^  in  their  explanations  of  the 
ground  and  reason  of  his  choosing  as  he  does.  Neither 
side  can  settle  the  question,  by  giving  their  own  mean- 
ing to  the  word  cause,  and  taking  it  for  granted,  that 
this  alone  corresponds  with  the  facts  in  the  case. 

A  still  different  view  has  been  taken  of  the  term 
cause,  as  applied  to  volition.  It  is  said  that  volitions 
are  the  only  causes  in  the  universe,  at  least  the  only 
efficient  causes ;  that  while  they  are  themselves  un- 

*  Edwards  on  the  Will,  Part  II,  Sec.  2. 


SELF-DETERMINATION.  55 

caused,  they  are  the  causes  of  all  the  effects  which  are 
produced,  in  either  matter  or  mind  ;  that  nothing  which 
is  a  cause  can  be  an  effect ;  that  in  any  series  of  con- 
secutive and  dependent  changes,  the  first  only  is  a  cause, 
and  that  must  be  a  volition,  the  others  being  merely  ef- 
fects. It  must  be  admitted  that  a  man  has  a  right  to  say 
what  he  means  by  the  word  cause  ;  but  he  has  no  right 
to  insist,  that  the  various  other  meanings  which  have 
been  customarily  given  to  it,  both  by  the  learned  and 
the  unlearned,  in  different  countries  and  ages,  have  all 
been  improper. 

As  motives,  exclusive  of  the  mind  of  the  agent,  are 
not  the  sole  cause  of  volition  ;  on  the  other  hand,  the 
mind  is  not  the  sole  cause,  unless  the  word  cause  be 
used  in  the  very  restricted  sense,  to  signify  either  the 
immediate  antecedent  of  choice,  or  the  agency  of  the 
mind  in  the  very  act  of  choosing.  The  latter  applica- 
tion of  the  term  involves  the  absurdity  of  either  iden- 
tifying volition  with  its  cause,  or  of  resolving  a  simple 
act  of  choice  into  two  different  elements,  the  act  itself 
and  its  cause.  If  it  be  affirmed,  that  the  agency  of  the 
mind  in  choosing  is  the  sole  cause  of  its  choice,  this  is 
making  an  act  its  own  cause  ;  for  the  agency  of  the 
mind  in  choosing  is  the  very  choice  itself.  Restricting 
the  term  cause  to  this  agency,  is  a  measure  wholly  un- 
warranted by  the  customary  use  of  the  word,  in  all  ages, 
and  in  all  languages  in  which  this  or  a  corresponding 
term  is  found.  If  it  be  said,  that  this  limited  significa- 
tion of  the  word  is  claimed  in  its  application  to  volition 
only,  and  that,  in  this  application,  it  can  have  no  differ- 
ent meaning,  whatever  may  be  its  use  as  applied  to  other 
subjects,  this  is  giving  a  definition  by  which  the  whole 


56  SELF'BET/ERMltf  ATlOtf. 


question  under  discussion  is  taken  for  granted.  The 
point  in  controversy  is,  Whether  there  is  any  cause  of 
volition,  other  than  the  agency  of  the  mind  in  willing. 
The  disputant  settles  the  question,  to  his  own  satisfac- 
tion, by  saying  that  nothing  but  this  agency  is  meant 
by  the  term  cause,  when  applied  to  volition.  This  is 
an  easy  and  summary  way  of  terminating  a  discussion, 
however  unsatisfactory  it  may  be  to  those  who  prize 
more  highly  the  means  of  discovering  the  truth,  than 
dexterity  in  evading  the  force  of  an  argument. 

A  man  has,  indeed,  a  right  to  give  his  own  definition 
of  a  term  which  frequently  occurs,  in  a  controversy  in 
which  he  is  engaged  ;  —  to  say  in  what  sense  he  would 
be  understood  when  he  uses  it  j  provided  he  does  not 
offer  his  definition  as  a  substitute  for  evidence,  but  mere- 
ly as  preparing  the  way  for  a  better  understanding  of 
the  nature  and  validity  of  his  proof  when  presented. 
This,  of  itself,  is  no  petitio  principii.  The  advocates 
of  dependent  volition  have  been  accused  of  taking  an 
essential  point  for  granted,  by  defining  a  motive  to  be 
that  which  tends  to  move  or  incline  the  mind  to  a  par- 
ticular choice.  The  charge  is  well  founded,  if  they  rely 
upon  this  to  prove  that  the  mind  is  thus  moved  or  in- 
clined. But  if  the  definition  is  given  merely  for  the 
sake  of  having  it  distinctly  understood  what  it  is  which 
they  propose  to  prove,  and  what  they  think  they  actually 
prove,  this  is  taking  nothing  for  granted,  except  that 
they  understand  their  own  meaning. 

One  way  of  evading  a  full  and  fair  discussion  of  a 
subject  of  controversy,  is  to  give  so  limited  a  definition 
of  a  leading  term,  as  to  cover  no  more  ground  than  that 
in  which  the  parties  are  agreed;  leaving  out  of  ac- 


SELF-DETERMINATION.  57 

count  the  whole  extent  of  that  on  which  they  differ. 
Thus  some  of  the  opponents  of  President  Edwards  de- 
fine the  cause  of  volition  to  be  the  agency  of  the  mind 
in  choosing  ;  and  then  affirm,  what  no  one  denies,  that 
in  this  sense,  the  man  is  the  sole  cause  of  his  volitions, 
neither  motives  nor  any  other  mind  choosing  for  him. 
But  they  fail  to  prove,  that  there  are  not  other  causes  of 
volition,  in  the  sense  in  which  Edwards  has  defined  the 
term.  Their  definition  covers  only  the  ground  on  which 
he  agrees  with  them  •  his  embraces  the  whole  extent  of 
the  difference,  on  the  subject  of  the  cause  of  volition. 
He  holds  that  a  man's  volitions  are  his  own  acts,  not 
only  as  it  is  he  that  chooses,  but  also,  as  his  imperative 
volitions  are  owing  to  his  emotions,  desires,  &c.,  which 
are  themselves  owing  partly  to  the  nature  and  state  of 
his  mind,  and  partly  to  impressions  made  on  it  by  ex- 
ternal objects.  He  differs  from  his  opponents,  in  believ- 
ing that  a  man  is  not  the  only  cause  of  his  acts  of  choice, 
to  the  exclusion  of  all  external  influence. 

The  assumption  that  volition  has  no  cause  but  itself, 
that  is,  the  mind  in  the  exercise  of  choice,  is  in  direct 
contradiction  of  the  fundamental  axiom  universally  re- 
ceived, except  by  a  few  sceptical  philosophers,  that 
every  change  whether  of  substance  or  modes,  every 
thing  which  begins  to  be,  must  have  an  adequate  cause. 
This  indubitable  principle,  broad  as  it  is,  is  never  stretch- 
ed so  far,  by  men  of  common  understanding,  as  to  em- 
brace the  supposition,  that  an  event  may  be  the  cause  of 
itself;  that  a  man's  choosing  a  thing  is  the  only  reason 
why  he  chooses  it.  It  implies  that,  in  every  instance, 
the  cause  is  prior  to  its  effect.  If  for  argument's  sake  it 


58  SELF-DETERMINATION. 

be  admitted,  that  volition  may  be  separated  into  two 
distinct  parts,  one  bearing  to  the  other  the  relation  of  a 
cause  to  its  effect ;  this  cause,  unless  it  be  the  immedi- 
ate agency  of  an  eternal  being,  must  have  had  another 
prior  to  itself.  This,  if  it  be  simply  the  nature  of  the 
mind,  it  did  not  itself  create ;  it  came  from  the  hand  of 
its  Maker.  Or  if  it  be  a  particular  state  of  the  mind, 
consisting  of  emotions,  desires,  &c.,  these  also  must 
have  begun  to  be,  and  must  be  referred  to  something 
still  farther  back,  either  in  the  mind  itself,  or  in  some- 
thing exterior,  or  in  both  together;  so  that  the  first  m 
this  series  of  antecedents  and  consequents,  can  not  be 
the  agency  of  the  man  in  the  act  of  choosing. 

But  the  axiom  that  every  change  must  have  an  ade- 
quate cause,  is  not  the  only  ground  of  argument  on  the 
side  of  dependent  volition.  Its  advocates  appeal  also 
to  their  own  consciousness,  and  to  every  day's  observa- 
tion of  the  conduct  of  others.  They  neither  experience 
in  themselves,  nor  infer  from  the  deportment  of  those 
around  them,  that  acts  of  choice  are  independent  of  all 
directing  influence  of  motives.  We  are  conscious  that 
we  ourselves  choose;  and  we  are  also  conscious  that 
motives  induce  us  to  choose  as  we  do. 

It  is  rarely  the  case  that  the  advocates  of  independent 
volition  have  explicitly  stated,  and  steadily  maintained, 
the  opinion,  that  our  acts  of  choice  are  entirely  free  from 
the  directing  influence  of  motives,  feelings,  desires,  &c. 
If  they  bring  forward  the  principle  at  all,  it  is  in  such 
an  ambiguous  dress,  that  they  can  either  disclaim  it,  or 
invoke  its  aid,  according  as  the  pressure  of  their  oppo- 
nents' arguments  may  require. 


SELF-DETERMINATION.  59 

But  a  late  writer*  has  had  the  magnanimity  distinctly 
to  avow  his  belief  in  it,  and  firmly  to  adhere  to  it, 
through  a  great  portion  of  his  book.  It  is  upon  this 
ground  only,  that  he  hopes  to  demolish  the  pillars  of  Ed- 
wards' work  on  the  Will.  It  is,  as  he  thinks,  for  the 
want  of  adhering  steadily  to  this,  that  the  other  assail- 
ants of  Edwards  have  so  signally  failed,  in  their  efforts 
to  dislodge  him  from  his  strongly  fortified  positions. 
Bledsoe's  sword  is  a  two  edged  weapon,  which  deals  its 
blows,  with  impartial  justice,  to  both  friends  and  foes ; 
against  the  sturdy  logic  of  Edwards,  and  the  incautious 
admissions  of  his  opponents.  To  show  this,  the  fol- 
lowing extracts  from  his  book  may  be  sufficient.  "  If 
his  system  be  false,  why,  it  may  be  asked,  has  the  In- 
quiry so  often  appeared  to  be  unanswerable?" — "His 
system  has  appeared  to  stand  upon  immovable  ground, 
in  so  far  as  logic  is  concerned,  only  because  he  has,  with 
such  irresistible  power  and  skill,  demolished  and  tram- 
pled into  ruins  that  of  his  adversaries.  Reason  has  been 
supposed  to  be  on  his  side,  because  he  has  so  clearly 
shown,  that  it  is  not  on  the  side  of  his  opponents."  p.  10. 
"  It  is  a  deep  and  earnest  conviction,  wrought  into  my 
mind  by  the  meditation  of  years,  that  the  great  and  glo- 
rious cause  of  free  agency  has  been  retarded,  by  some 
of  the  errors  of  its  friends,  more  than  by  all  the  truths 
of  its  enemies."  p.  213. 

What  are  these  concessions,  by  which  the  cause  of 
liberty  of  will  is  so  disastrously  affected?  One  is,  That 
motives  have  a  real  influence,  in  giving  direction  to  acts 


*  An  Examination  of  President  Edwards'  Inquiry  into  the  Free- 
dom of  the  Will,  by  Albert  T.  Bledsoe,  Esq.    Philadelphia,  1845. 


60  SELF-DETERMINATION. 

of  choice.  "  The  true  liberty  of  indifference  does  not 
consist,  as  I  have  endeavored  to  show,  in  a  power  to  re- 
sist the  influence  of  the  appetites  and  passions  strug- 
gling to  produce  volition  ;  because  there  is  no  such  in- 
fluence in  existence."  p.  103.  Quoting  from  Edwards 
the  assertion,  that  the  liberty  of  indifference  consists  in 
this,  that  the  will,  in  choosing,  is  subject  to  no  prevail- 
ing influence  ;  he  adds,  "  Now  this  is  a  fair  statement  of 
the  doctrine  in  question."  p.  109.  "  If  we  suppose  there 
is  a  real  strength  in  motives,  that  they  exert  a  positive 
influence  in  the  production  of  volitions,  then  we  con- 
cede every  thing  to  President  Edwards."  p.  38.  "  In- 
deed, it  seems  to  me,  that  while  the  notion  that  our  de- 
sires possess  a  real  power  and  efficacy,  which  are  exerted 
over  the  will,  maintains  its  hold  upon  the  mind,  the 
great  doctrine  of  liberty  can  never  be  seen  in  the  bright- 
ness of  its  full-orbed  glory."  p.  104.  "  He  does  not, 
however,  claim  a  liberty  of  indifference  for  our  desires 
and  affections"  "  The  liberty  which  we  really  possess, 
then,  does  not  consist  in  an  indifference  of  our  desires 
and  affections,  but  in  that  of  the  will  itself."  p.  105. 

If  Mr.  Bledsoe  thus  sets  aside  all  prevailing  influence 
which  is  antecedent  to  actual  choice,  he  must,  it  may  be 
thought,  hold  to  a  self-determining  poioer  of  the  will. 
By  no  means.  "  I  have  long  been  impressed  with  the 
conviction,"  he  says,  "  that  the  self-determining  power, 
as  it  is  generally  understood,  is  full  of  inconsistencies." 
p.  211.  "  Difficulties  have  always  encumbered  the  cause 
of  free  and  accountable  agency,  just  because  it  has  been 
supposed  to  consist  in  the  self-determining  power  of  the 
will.  We  should  therefore  abandon  this  doctrine. — It  is 
high  time  it  should  be  laid  aside  for  ever."  p.  212. 


SELF-DETERMINATION. 


61 


But  if  the  will  is  determined  neither  by  itself,  nor  by 
the  influence  of  motives,  by  what  is  it  determined,  ac- 
cording to  Bledsoe  ?  By  nothing  at  all.  "It  has  al- 
ways been  taken  for  granted,"  he  says,  "that  the  will  is 
determined.  The  use  of  this  word  clearly  proves  that 
the  will  is  acted  upon,  either  by  the  will  itself,  or  by 
something  else.  It  has  been  conceded,  on  all  sides,  that 
it  is  determined  ;  and  the  only  controversy  has  been,  as 
to  what  is  the  determiner." — "  But  behind  all  this  con- 
troversy, there  is  a  question  which  has  not  been  agita- 
ted ;  and  that  is,  whether  the  will  is  determined  at  all. 
For  my  part,  I  am  firmly  and  fully  persuaded  that  it  is 
not,  but  that  it  simply  determines.  It  is  the  determiner, 
but  not  the  determined.  It  is  never  the  object  of  its 
own  determination.  It  acts,  but  there  is  no  causative  act, 
by  which  it  is  made  to  act."  p.  212. 

To  what,  then,  is  volition  to  be  ascribed?  Is  it  the 
effect  of  any  thing  whatever?  Mr.  Bledsoe  says  it  is 
not.  He  has  a  chapter  to  show  that  volition  is  not  an 
effect,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word.  "  If  our  wills 
are  caused  to  put  forth  volitions,  and  are  turned  to  one 
side  or  the  other,  by  the  controlling  influence  of  motives  ; 
we  have  no  will  at  all"  p.  178.  "  A  caused  volition  is 
no  volition."  p.  177.  "Let  it  be  assumed,  that  volition 
is,  properly  speaking,  an  effect,  and  every  thing  is  con- 
ceded. On  this  vantage  ground,  the  scheme  of  neces- 
sity may  be  erected,  beyond  the  possibility  of  an  over- 
throw." p.  58.  "  From  the  fact  that  Edwards  has  gone 
round  in  a  circle,  it  has  been  concluded  that  he  has  beg- 
ged the  question  ;  but  how  or  wherein  he  has  begged 
it,  is  a  point  which  has  not  been  sufficiently  noticed. 
The  very  authors  who  have  uttered  this  complaint,  have 
6 


62  SELF-DETERMINATION. 


granted  him  the  very  thing  for  which  he  has  begged. 
Admit  that  volition  is  an  effect,  as  so  many  libertarians 
have  done,  and  then  his  definition  of  motive,  which  in- 
cludes every  cause  of  volition,  places  his  doctrine  upon 
an  immutable  foundation.  We  might  as  well  heave  at 
the  everlasting  mountains,  as  try  to  shake  it."  p.  45. 
"  Indeed,  all  that  is  assumed  by  Edwards,  has  been 
conceded  to  him,  by  most  of  his  adversaries."  p.  208. 

Mr.  Bledsoe  does  not,  however;  deny  that  a  volition 
is  something  which  begins  to  be.  "  If  we  mean  by  an 
effect,  every  thing  that  comes  to  pass,  of  course  a  voli- 
tion is  an  effect ;  for  no  one  will  deny  that  it  comes  to 
pass. — All  that  I  deny  is,  that  a  volition  does  proceed 
from  the  mind,  or  from  motive,  or  from  any  thing  else, 
in  the  same  manner  that  an  effect,  properly  so  called, 
proceeds  from  its  efficient  cause."  p.  47. 

If  volition  is  not  an  effect,  has  it  any  cause  1  To 
this  question,  Mr.  Bledsoe  is  cautious  of  giving  an  un- 
qualified answer,  on  account  of  the  great  ambiguity  of 
the  word  cause.  "  It  is  true,"  he  says,  "  that  every 
change  in  nature  must  have  a  cause  ;  that  is  to  say,  it  is 
in  some  sense  of  the  word  an  effect,  and  consequently 
must  have  a  corresponding  cause."  p.  70.  "  No  man 
in  his  right  mind,  ever  ventured  to  deny  that  every 
change  in  nature,  even  the  voluntary  acts  of  the  mind, 
must  have  a  cause."  p.  74.  In  what  sense,  then,  has 
volition  a  cause  ?  It  is  not  the  cause  of  itself.  "  Did 
any  man,  in  his  right  mind,  ever  contend  that  a  volition 
could  produce  itself,  can  arise  out  of  nothing,  and  bring 
itself  into  existence  ?  If  so,  they  were  certainly  be- 
yond the  reach  of  logic. — I  have  never  been  so  unfor- 
tunate, as  to  meet  with  any  advocate  of  free  agency, 


* 

SELF-DETERMINATION.  63 

either  in  actual  life  or  in  history,  who  supposed  that  a 
volition  arose  out  of  nothing,  without  any  cause  of  its 
existence,  or  that  it  produced  itself.  They  have  all 
maintained,  with  one  consent,  that  the  mind  is  the 
cause  of  volition."  p.  71. 

In  what  sense,  is  the  mind  the  cause  of  its  own  acts 
of  choice  ?  It  cannot,  according  to  Bledsoe,  be  the 
efficient  cause.  "  The  philosophers  of  all  ages,"  he 
says,  "  have  sought  for  the  efficient  cause  of  volition  ; 
but  who  has  found  it  ?  It  has  never  been  found,  be- 
cause it  does  not  exist ;  and  it  never  will  be  found,  so 
long  as  an  action  of  the  mind  continues  to  be  what  it 
is."  pp.  218,  219.  An  act  of  the  mind,  according  to 
him,  may  be  the  efficient  cause  of  a  change  in  matter, 
but  not  of  volition.  "  We  can  only  infer,  from  a  change 
or  modification  in  matter,  the  existence  of  an  act  by 
which  it  is  produced.  The  former  is  the  only  idea  we 
have  of  an  effect  •  the  latter  is  the  only  idea  we  have  of 
an  efficient  cause.  Hence,  in  reasoning  from  effect  to 
cause,  we  can  only  reason  from  a  change  or  modifica- 
tion in  matter,  or  in  that  which  is  passive,  to  the  act  of 
some  active  power." — "  But  the  case  is  very  different, 
when  we  turn  from  the  contemplation  of  a.  passive  re- 
sult, to  consider  an  efficient  cause — when  we  turn  from 
the  motion  of  body,  to  consider  the  activity  of  mind. 
In  such  a  case,  the  consequent  ceases  to  be  the  same ; 
and  hence  we  have  no  right  to  infer  that  the  ante- 
cedent is  the  same."  p.  80.  "  We  have  no  experience 
that  an  act  of  the  mind  is  produced  by  a  preceding  act 
of  the  mind,  or  by  the  prior  action  of  any  tiling  else" 
"  A  change  in  body  necessarily  implies  the  prior  action 
by  which  it  is  produced  ;  an  act  of  mind  only  implies 


64  SELF-DETERMINATION. 

the  existence  of  an  agent  that  is  capable  of  acting." 
"  A  change  in  that  which  is  by  nature  passive,  necessa- 
rily implies  an  act  by  which  it  is  produced.  But  an  act 
of  the  mind  itself,  which  is  not  passive,  does  not  likewise 
imply  a  preceding  act  by  which  it  is  produced."  p.  81. 

But  if  volition  has  no  efficient  cause,  how  is  it  to 
be  accounted  for?  According  to  Bledsoe,  it  comes  to 
pass.  "  If  we  mean  by  an  effect,  every  thing  that 
comes  to  pass  j  of  course  a  volition  is  an  effect,  for  no 
one  can  deny  that  it  comes  to  pass."  p.  47.  It  arises 
in  the  mind.  "  We  are  forced  back  upon  the  conclu- 
sion that  action  may  and  actually  does  arise  in  the  world 
of  mind,  without  any  efficient  or  producing  cause  of 
its  existence,  without  resulting  from  the  prior  action  of 
any  thing  whatever.  Any  other  hypothesis  is  involved 
in  absurdity."  p.  58. 

Is  there,  then,  any  sense  in  which  volition  has  a 
cause  ?  "  There  is,"  says  Bledsoe,  ua  sufficient  ground 
and  reason  for  our  actions ;  but  not  an  efficient  cause  of 
them."  "  No  one  ever  imagined,  that  there  are  no  indis- 
pensable antecedents  to  choice,  without  which  it  could 
not  take  place."  "  Unless  there  were  a  mind  there 
could  be  no  act  of  the  mind  ;  and  unless  the  mind  pos- 
sessed the  power  of  acting,  it  could  not  put  forth  vo- 
litions. The  mind  then,  and  the  power  of  the  mind 
called  will,  constitute  the  ground  of  action  or  volition." 
pp.  215,  216.  There  must  not  only  be  a  mind,  and  a 
power  of  willing ;  but  there  must  also  be  motives,  ob- 
jects of  choice  before  the  mind.  This  Bledsoe  admits. 
"  A  desire  or  affection  is  the  indispensable  condition,  an 
invariable  antecedent  of  an  act  of  the  will."  p.  93. 
"  There  is  not  an  advocate  of  free  agency  in  the  uni- 


SELF-DETERMINATION.  65 

verse,  who  will  contend  that  the  mind  can  choose  a 
thing,  unless  there  is  a  thing  to  be  chosen."  p.  121.  But 
he  denies  that  motives  are  the  efficient  or  producing 
cause  of  volition.  If  by  producing  cause,  he  means 
that  which  chooses,  refuses,  purposes,  &c.,  he  can  prob- 
ably find  no  one  to  differ  from  him  on  this  point.  Mo- 
tives do  not  make  choices,  resolve,  reject,  &c.  It  is  the 
mind,  the  willing  agent,  thai  does  this.  But  does  noth- 
ing incline,  induce,  or  influence  the  mind  to  will  ? 

The  great  point  in  question  is,  whether  motives  have 
any  directing  influence  over  the  will  ;  whether  they  ever 
induce  the  mind  to  will  one  way  rather  than  another. 
That  they  do  not  force  its  choice,  is  agreed  on  all  hands. 
"  A  volition  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  produced  by  any  co- 
ercive force."  p.  188.  But  do  motives  incline  the  mind 
to  choose  one  thing  rather  than  another;  to  choose  a 
particular  object  rather  than  refuse  it  ?  ^  "  If  our  desires, 
affections,  &c.,  operate  to  influence  the  will,  how  can  it 
be  free  in  putting  forth  volitions  ?  How  does  Mr.  Locke 
meet  this  difficulty  ?  He  does  not  place  liberty  on  the 
broad  ground,  that  the  desires  by  which  volition  is 
supposed  to  be  determined,  are  in  reality  nothing  more 
than  the  condition  or  occasions  on  which  the  mind  acts ; 
and  that  they  themselves  can  exert  no  positive  influence 
or  efficiency."  pp.  94,  95.  "  Having  admitted  that  the 
sensitive  part  of  our  nature  always  tends  to  produce  vo- 
lition, and  in  some  cases  irresistibly  produces  it,  the  ad- 
vocates of  free  agency  have  not  been  able  to  maintain 
the  doctrine  of  a  perfect  liberty,  in  regard  to  all  human 
action."  p.  103.  "The  mind  is  endowed  with  various 
appetites,  passions  and  desires, — with  noble  affections, 
and  above  all,  with  a  feeling  of  moral  approbation  and 
6* 


66  SELF-DETERMINATION. 

disapprobation.  These  are  not  the  '  active  principles,' 
or  the  '  motive  powers,'  as  they  have  been  called  ; — 
they  exert  no  influence  on  the  will.  "  We  act  accor- 
ding to  reason,  but  not  from  the  influence  of  reason." 
pp.  216,  217.  "  Reflection  must  show  us,  I  think,  that 
it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  any  desire,  affection,  or  dis- 
position of  mind,  can  really  and  truly  exert  any  positive 
or  productive  influence."  p.  97.  He  admits  that,  in  a 
certain  sense,  motives  may  be  the  reason  why  a  volition 
may  be  one  way  rather  than  another.  "  Although  we 
may  suppose  that  the  activity  of  the  soul  may  be  the 
cause  of  its  acting ;  yet  motive  may  be  the  indispensa- 
ble condition  of  its  acting  ;  and  in  this  sense,  may  be 
the  reason  why  a  volition  is  one  way  rather  than  anoth- 
er." p.  19.  But  he  does  not  tell  us,  whether  this  means 
any  thing  more  than  that  the  mind  chooses  an  object 
which  is  before  it,  rather  than  one  which  is  not  in  its 
view. 

After  all,  he  seems  to  hesitate  to  adopt  the  unqualified 
conclusion,  that  motives  have  no  concern  in  giving 
direction  to  our  acts  of  choice. 

Naturam  expelles  furca,  tamen  usque  recurret. 

The  various  appetites,  passions  and  desires,  with  which 
we  are  endowed,  he  considers  "  the  ends  of  our  act- 
ing. We  simply  act  in  order  to  gratify  them" — "  We 
see  that  certain  means  must  be  used  in  order  to  gratify 
the  passion,  desire,  affection  or  feeling  which  we  intend 
to  gratify;  and  we  act  accordingly."  p.  216.  Now  if  we 
act  in  order  to  gratify  our  desires  and  feelings,  and 
adapt  our  means  to  this  purpose ;  it  is  difficult  to  see 
that  they  have  no  influence  over  our  volitions.  Yet  Mr. 


SELF-DETERMINATION.  67 


: 


Bledsoe  affirms  that  "  they  exert  no  influence  over  the 
will ;" — that  "  we  form  our  designs  or  intentions  free 
from  all  influence  whatever ;" — that  "  we  act  according 
to  reason,  but  not  from  the  influence  of  reason  ;" — "  with 
a  vieiv  to  our  desires,  but  not  from  the  influence  of  our 
desires."  pp.  216,217. 

He  seems  to  claim  this  as  an  original  discovery  of 
his  own.  He  thinks  that  the  assailants  of  Edwards 
have  failed  to  take  the  only  ground  which  could  save 
them  from  inevitable  defeat ;  and  that,  in  doing  this, 
they  have  acted  in  conformity  with  an  erroneous  opin- 
ion universally  received.  "  It  is  a  commonly  received 
opinion,  among  philosophers,  that  the  passions,  desires, 
<fcc.,  do  really  exert  an  influence  to  produce  volition." 
p.  90. — u  If  any  advocate  of  free-agency  had  really  be- 
lieved, that  the  passions,  desires,  affections,  &c.,  exert 
no  influence  over  the  will,  is  it  not  certain,  that  he 
would  have  availed  himself  of  this  principle  ?"  p.  92. — 
"  The  principle  that  our  appetites,  desires,  &c.,  do  ex- 
ert a  real  influence  in  the  production  of  volition,  was 
common  to  Edwards,  Locke  and  Reid :  indeed,  so  far  as 
I  know,  it  has  been  universally  received.  In  the  opinion 
of  Edwards,  this  influence  becomes  so  powerful  at  times, 
as  to  establish  a  moral  necessity  beyond  all  question." — 
"  Is  not  this  inference  well  drawn  ?  It  seems  to  me  that 
it  is  ;  and  this  constitutes  one  reason,  why  I  deny  the 
principle  from  which  it  is  deduced."  p.  97.  "  If  the 
illusion  in  question  has  been  as  general  as  I  have  sup- 
posed, it  is  not  difficult  to  account  for  its  prevalence. 
The  fact  that  a  desire  or  affection  is  the  indispensable 
condition,  the  invariable  antecedent  of  an  act  of  the 
will,  is  of  itself  sufficient  to  account  for  the  prevalence 


68  SELF-DETERMINATION. 

of  such  a  notion."- — "When  such  an  error  or  illusion 
prevails,  its  hold  upon  the  mind  is  confirmed  and  ren- 
dered almost  invincible,  by  the  circumstance,  that  it  is 
interwoven  into  the  structure  of  all  our  language." 
p.  93.  "  There  is  no  wonder  that  it  has  gained  such 
an  ascendency  over  our  thoughts.  Its  dominion  has  be- 
come complete,  just  because  its  truth  has  never  been 
doubted."  p.  94. 

Mr.  Bledsoe  appears  to  have  rendered  a  service  to  the 
cause  of  truth,  by  bringing  the  point  at  issue  between 
the  advocates  and  the  opponents  of  independent  volition, 
to  a  simple  and  definite  statement ; — and  extricating  it, 
to  some  extent,  from  the  mazes  of  ambiguous  phrase- 
ology in  which  it  is  frequently  involved.  The  real 
question  is,  whether  any  thing  antecedent  to  a  volition 
has  any  influence  in  giving  direction  to  the  act  j  in  in- 
ducing the  mind  to  choose  one  way  rather  than  another. 
Mr.  Bledsoe,  if  I  rightly  apprehend  him,  has  the  ingenu- 
ousness and  the  intrepidity  to  avow  that,  in  his  opinion, 
it  has  not.  Whether  this  is,  or  is  not,  a  correct  interpre- 
tation of  the  statements  in  his  book,  it  is  the  funda- 
mental point,  in  discussions  on  the  will.  A  vast  deal  of 
unavailing  contention  might  be  saved,  if  the  parties  on 
both  sides  of  the  controversy  would  agree  to  confine 
their  arguments  to  this  single  question.  The  multiform 
evasions  of  the  simple  principle  upon  which  a  right  de- 
cision of  the  subject  depends,  lead  to  interminable  dis- 
putes, respecting  the  appropriate  meaning  and  applica- 
tion of  certain  technical  words  and  phrases.  It  would 
seem,  that  a  clear  and  definite  statement  of  the  main 
point  in  debate  must,  of  itself,  be  nearly  sufficient  to 
bring  the  discussion  to  a  correct  result.  If  the  great 


SELF-DETERMINATION.  69 

question  is,  whether  the  character  of  our  imperative  vo- 
litions depends  on  any  antecedent  feelings  or  mental 
states ;  so  that  a  difference  in  the  volitions  is  owing  to 
a  difference  in  the  antecedents;  then  we  have  only  to 
appeal  to  our  own  consciousness,  and  our  daily  observa- 
tion of  the  conduct  of  others,  to  determine  whether  our 
dispositions,  propensities,  emotions,  appetites,  passions, 
desires,  regard  to  truth  and  reason,  feelings  of  moral  obli- 
gation, &c.,  have  any  concern  in  giving  direction  to  our 
acts  of  choice.  A  more  particular  examination  of  this 
point  will  lead  to  a  consideration  of  the  nature  and  in- 
fluence of  motives,  which  is  the  subject  of  the  following 
section.* 

*  For  a  more  particular  consideration  of  the  hypothesis  of  a  con- 
tingent cause  of  volition,  see  the  author's  Examination  of  Edwards, 
Section  8. 


70 


SECTION   III. 

INFLUENCE     OF     MOTIVES. 

Nature  of  motives — Internal  and  external  motives — Are  motives 
mere  objtds  of  choice  ? — The  strongest  motive — Are  motives  the 
cause  of  volition  ? — Conditions  and  occasions  of  volition — Con- 
ditions of  volition — Quotation  from  Mill's  Logic — Are  motives 
the  efficient  cause  of  volition  ? — Are  they  the  certain  cause  ? — Is 
the  efficacy  of  motives  from  the  mind  itself? — Willing  against 
motives — Are  volitions  determined  by  the  understanding  ? — Do 
they  obey  the  strongest  motive  ? 

THIS  subject  of  contingent  self-determination,  or 
more  properly,  of  no  determination,  is  nearly  allied  to 
the  inquiry  concerning  the  nature  and  influence  of  mo- 
tives. That  which  moves,  inclines,  induces,  or  influ- 
ences the  mind  to  will,  and  to  will  in  a  particular  way, 
or  which  has  a  tendency  thus  to  move  it,  is  commonly 
called  a  motive.  When  we  ask  a  man,  from  what  mo- 
tive he  acted,  in  a  specified  case,  we  mean  to  inquire, 
what  it  was  which  induced  or  influenced  him  to  act 
in  this  manner.  An  object  which  is  in  view  of  the 
mind,  has  a  tendency  to  move  the  will,  when  it  will  ac- 
tually move  it,  unless  counteracted  by  some  opposing  in- 
fluence. We  say  that  every  portion  of  matter  around 
us  has  a  tendency  to  fall  towards  the  center  of  the  earth, 
because  it  will  in  fact  fall,  unless  prevented  by  some- 
thing which  obstructs  its  motion  in  that  direction.  A 
motive  may  have  a  tendency  to  move  the  will  in  a  par- 
ticular wa^,  at  the  same  time,  that  a  more  powerful  mo- 
tive, may  really  move  it  in  a  different  way. 


INFLUENCE     OF     MOTIVES.  71 

There  is  an  ambiguity  in  the  use  of  the  term  motive, 
corresponding*  to  the  indefinite  signification  of  the  term 
will.  In  the  language  of  some  writers,  a  volition  may 
be  either  an  imperative  act,  a  purpose,  or  an  emotion. 
The  motive  to  an  imperative  act,  may  be  a  wish  to  exe- 
cute some  previous  purpose.  The  motive  to  a  purpose, 
is  the  desire  of  obtaining  some  object  which  is  viewed 
as  eligible.  That  which  immediately  excites  the  voli- 
tion in  this  case,  is  an  affection  of  the  mind,  an  emo- 
tion, an  internal  motive.  But  that  which  excites  the 
emotion  itself,  may  be  an  object  without  the  mind,  an 
external  motive.  A  tree  loaded  with  fair  and  delicious 
fruit,  excites  desire  in  the  beholder.  This  desire  may 
move  him  to  pluck  the  fruit.  The  fruit  itself  is  an  ex- 
ternal motive.  The  desire  which  stimulates  to  the  act 
of  gathering  it,  is  an  internal  motive.  One  act  of  will, 
therefore,  in  the  more  enlarged  acceptation  of  the  term 
will,  may  be  the  motive  to  another  act.  The  affections, 
which,  by  some,  are  considered  as  volitions,  may  be  the 
motives  to  purposes  and  executive  volitions.  A  motive, 
according  to  the  common  use  of  the  term,  must  have 
some  tendency,  at  least,  either  to  excite  desire,  or  to 
stimulate  to  action ;  though  this  tendency  may  often  be 
counteracted  and  overbalanced,  by  motives  of  an  oppo- 
site nature. 

A  mere  object,  which  is  apprehended  by  the  under- 
standing only,  and  which  has  no  influence  upon  the 
will,  is  not  commonly  called  a  motive.  But  the  philos- 
ophy of  some  appears  to  exclude  all  influence  of  mo- 
tives, in  determining  the  will.  Yet  they  continue  the 
use  of  the  term.  To  this  it  would  be  unreasonable  to 
object,  provided  they  always  let  us  know,  that  by  the 


INFLUENCE     OF     MOTIVES. 


word  motive,  they  mean,  a  mere  object  of  choice,  pre- 
sented to  the  understanding ;  and  not  any  thing  which 
has  an  influence  upon  the  will.  An  external  motive,  as 
the  term  is  commonly  understood,  is  also  an  object. 
But  an  object  of  perception  is  not,  in  every  case,  a  mo- 
tive. It  may  be  viewed  with  entire  indifference. 

When  different  motives  are  compared  together,  that 
which  has  the  greatest  tendency  to  move  the  will,  is 
said  to  be  the  strongest.  The  motive  to  effort,  from  a 
reward  of  ten  dollars,  is  greater  than  from  five.  The 
efficacy  of  an  external  motive  must  depend  not  merely 
on  the  object  itself,  but  upon  the  correspondence  be- 
tween that  and  the  state  of  the  mind.  The  same  object 
may  be  viewed,  by  one  man,  with  eager  desire,  by  an- 
other, with  aversion,  by  a  third,  with  indifference.  A 
motive,  as  has  been  already  observed,  is  commonly  un- 
derstood to  be  something  which  excites  the  mind  to 
will,  or  which  has  a  tendency  to  do  this.  But  if  voli- 
tions are  entirely  contingent ;  if  they  are  independent 
of  every  thing  preceding,  for  being  as  they  are  ;  then  it 
is  idle  to  talk  of  motives  at  all,  using  the  term  in  its 
common  acceptation.  In  this  sense,  there  are  no  mo- 
tives ;  though  there  must  be  objects  of  choice  before  the 
mind,  to  give  it  an  opportunity  of  choosing  between 
them.  Without  these,  there  would  not  be  even  a  chance 
for  volition.  But  objects  of  choice,  according  to  the 
supposition,  have  no  tendency  to  turn  the  decision  of 
the  mind  in  favor  of  one  rather  than  another.  They 
may  move  the  will  to  volition  in  the  abstract,  but  not 
to  the  choice  of  any  particular  thing.  If  a  man  prefers 
a  bed  of  down  to  a  bed  of  thorns,  it  is  a  mere  accident ; 
or  because  his  will,  in  the  plenitude  of  its  sovereign 


INFLUENCE     OF     MOTIVES. 


73 


power,  takes  that  direction.  It  is  not  because  the  down 
has  any  influence  on  his  decision.  If  he  prefers  an  am- 
ple fortune  to  bankruptcy,  it  is  not  because  the  one  has 
any  tendency,  more  than  the  other,  to  allure  his  choice. 
But  are  motives  the  causes  of  volition  ?  According 
to  Dr.  Reid,  motives  influence,  but  do  not  cause  acts  of 
the  will.  The  meanings  of  the  term  cause  are  so  vari- 
ous, some  of  them  limited,  and  others  more  extended, 
that  the  assertion,  that  motives  are  the  cause  of  volition, 
ought  not  to  be  made,  without  many  qualifications. 
That  external  motives  are  the  sole  cause  is  certainly  not 
true,  if  the  word  cause  be  used  to  signify  every  antece- 
dent on  which  the  effect  depends.  Motives  do  not  pro- 
duce volitions  without  a  mind.  They  are  not  the  agent. 
They  do  not  love  and  hate,  resolve  and  choose.  Exter- 
nal motives  are  not  of  such  a  nature,  that  volitions  of  a 
certain  character  invariably  proceed  from  them,  indepen- 
dently of  the  nature,  and  state,  and  feelings  of  the 
mind,  which  acts  in  view  of  them.  But  if  a  motive 
has  any  influence  on  the  determination  of  the  will,  it  is 
one  of  the  antecedents  on  which  the  volition  depends. 
Yet  if  it  is  an  external  object,  it  is  not  the  immediate 
antecedent.  An  executive  volition  must  be  preceded  by 
an  emotion.  This  is  an  act  or  state  of  the  mind.  Be- 
fore this  emotion  can  be  felt,  there  must  be  an  appre- 
hension of  the  object.  This  is  also  a  state  of  the  mind. 
Apprehension  and  emotion  must  both  intervene,  be- 
tween the  external  motive  and  the  volition.  The  ob- 
ject, then,  can  have  no  influence  on  the  volition,  except 
by  influencing  the  mind ;  in  other  words,  there  must  be 
not  only  a  motive,  but  an  agent.  The  agent  does  not 
7 


74  INFLUENCE     OF     MOTIVES. 

will  without  motives ;  nor  do  motives  will  without  an 
agent. 

It  is  frequently  said,  that  motives  are  not  the  cause, 
but  the  condition  or  occasion  of  volition.  This  phrase- 
ology may  be  very  proper,  provided  it  be  granted,  that 
volition  is,  in  any  degree,  dependent  on  motives.  It  is 
immaterial,  for  the  purpose  of  our  present  inquiry, 
whether  volitions  are  determined  by  causes,  or  occasions, 
or  conditions,  or  inducements,  or  by  all  these  together  ; 
if  it  be  admitted  that  they  have  any  influence  in  the  de- 
termination ;  if  a  change  in  these  will  make  a  difference 
in  the  volitions.  But  it  may  be  said  that  agents  and 
motives,  causes  and  conditions,  are  really  different ;  and 
ought,  therefore,  to  be  called  by  different  names.  Let 
them,  then,  have  different  names.  But  the  one  class 
may  be  as  really  concerned  in  determining  volition,  as 
the  other,  though  in  a  very  different  way.  Calling  mo- 
tives conditions  or  occasions,  rather  than  causes,  does 
not  prove  that  they  are  void  of  all  influence.  The  de- 
pendence of  volition  on  its  conditions,  may  be  as  abso- 
lute, as  on  its  causes.  If  it,  can  be  shown,  that  motives 
are  mere  objects  of  choice,  and  that  they  never  do  any 
thing  more,  than  give  an  opportunity,  a  chance  of 
willing  ;  then  it  is  improper  to  speak  of  them,  as  having 
any  concern  in  determining  the  consequent  volition  to 
be  one  way  rather  than  another :  without  them,  there 
can  be  no  choice ;  and  where  they  exist,  it  is  a  matter 
of  absolute  contingence,  whether  the  will  complies  with 
them  or  not. 

The  expression  '  conditions  of  volition'  may  be  used, 
and  perhaps  with  propriety,  to  signify  those  qualifica- 
tions, circumstances,  opportunities,  &c.,  without  which 


INFLUENCE     OF     MOTIVES. 


the  agent  could  riot  will  at  all,  or  could  not  will  with 
respect  to  particular  objects ;  but  which  have  no  influ- 
ence in  giving  direction  to  his  choice.  Without  some 

•  j  O 

knowledge  of  an  object,  a  man  can  neither  love  or  hate 
it ;  embrace  or  reject  it.  But  to  say  that  all  motives 
are  mere  conditions  in  this  sense,  is  to  deny  that  they 
ever  have  any  influence  in  inducing  a  man  to  choose 
one  way  rather  than  another.  From  the  examples 
which  some  writers  give  of  conditions  of  volition,  it 
would  seem  that  they  mean  such  as  merely  render  voli- 
tion possible,  without  having  any  influence  in  giving  di- 
rection to  choice.  They  say  truly,  that  if  there  were 
no  objects  of  choice,  there  could  be  no  objects  chosen  ; 
and,  therefore,  that  objects  of  some  kind  or  other  are 
necessary  conditions  of  choice.  In  this  sense,  the  mind, 
as  well  as  motives,  is  a  condition.  But  is  this  all  that 
they  mean  by  their  use  of  the  term.  Or  do  they  admit, 
that  besides  rendering  choice  possible,  motives  have  an 
influence  in  giving  it  a  direction  ;  in  inducing  the  mind 
to  choose,  rather  than  refuse,  a  given  object ;  or,  among 
several  objects  before  it,  to  choose  one  rather  than  an- 
other ?  If  motives  do  nothing  more  than  render  volition 
possible,  then  they  bring  no  influence  to  bear  upon  the 
mind  which  chooses.  But  if  they  have  an  influence 
upon  choice,  this  is  what  is  meant  by  those  who  call 
them  causes;  and  the  question  whether  they  shall  be 
denominated  causes  or  conditions  is  one  merely  verbal, 
of  too  little  consequence  to  be  made  a  subject  of  earnest 
contention.  Is  the  mind  no  cause  of  volition,  because 
it  is  a  condition  without  which  choice  would  be  impos- 
sible ?  It  is  all  important  for  us  to  know  whether  mo- 
tives have  any  influence  over  our  wills.  If  this  is  well 


76  INFLUENCE     OF     MOTIVES. 

understood,  it  is  immaterial  whether  they  are  denomi- 
nated causes  or  conditions,  or  both  one  and  the  other. 
They  may  be  conditions  as  rendering  volitions  possible, 
and  causes  as  having  an  influence  in  giving  direction  to 
choice.  Even  those  who  consider  the  mind  as  the  only 
cause  of  volition  must  admit,  that  according  to  their 
own  definition,  it  is  also  a  condition,  as  being  necessary 
to  render  volition  possible.  Indeed  all  causes  may  be 
considered  as  conditions  in  this  sense,  that  without 
them,  or  something  equivalent,  the  changes  dependent 
on  them  would  not  take  place.  It  does  not  follow, 
however,  that  every  thing  which  is  a  condition  is  of 
course  a  cause.  Space  is  a  condition  of  motion,  but 
not  its  cause.* 


*  "  It  is  seldom,  if  ever,  between  a  consequent  and  one  single  an- 
tecedent, that  invariable  sequence  subsists.  It  is  usually  between 
a  consequent  and  the  sum  of  several  antecedents;  the  concurrence 
of  them  all  being  requisite  to  produce,  that  is,  to  be  certain  of  be- 
ing followed  by,  the  consequent.  In  such  cases,  it  is  very  common 
to  single  out  one  only  of  the  antecedents  under  the  denomination 
of  cause,  calling  the  others  merely  conditions."  "  The  real  cause  is 
the  whole  of  these  antecedents;  and  we  have  philosophically  speak- 
ing, no  right  to  give  the  name  of  cause  to  one  of  them,  exclusively 
of  the  others."  "  If  we  do  not,  when  aiming  at  accuracy,  enumer- 
ate all  the  conditions,  it  is  only  because  some  of  them  will,  in  most 
cases,  be  understood  without  being  expressed,  or  because,  for  the 
purpose  in  view,  they  may  without  detriment  be  overlooked." 
"  Nothing  can  better  show  the  absence  of  any  scientific  ground  for 
the  distinction  between  the  cause  of  a  phenomenon  and  its  condi- 
tions, than  the  capricious  manner  in  which  we  select  from  among 
the  conditions  that  which  we  choose  to  denominate  the  cause. 
However  numerous  the  conditions  may  be,  there  is  hardly  any  of 
them  which  may  riot,  according  to  the  purpose  of  our  immediate 
discourse,  obtain  that  nominal  pre-eminence."  "  Since  mankind  are 


INFLUENCE     OF     MOTIVES.  77 

But  are  motives  the  efficient  cause  of  volition?  If 
by  efficient  cause  be  meant  the  agent,  the  being  who 
wills,  no  one  supposes  that,  in  this  sense,  motives  are 
efficient.  They  do  not  purpose,  and  resolve,  and 
choose.  Or  if  by  efficient  cause  be  meant  the  imme- 
diate antecedent  of  imperative  volition,  this  can  not  be 
an  external  motive.  Between  that  and  the  volition, 
there  must  intervene  an  apprehension  of  the  object,  and 
consequent  feeling  excited  in  the  mind.  Nor  are  mo- 
tives the  certain  cause  of  volition,  in  the  sense,  that  the 
same  volitions  will  invariably  follow  from  the  same  ex- 
ternal motives,  whatever  may  be  the  state  of  the  mind 
to  which  they  are  presented,  or  whatever  other  motives 
may  be  before  it,  at  the  same  time.  Still,  it  may  be  true, 
that  the  same  mind,  or  minds  in  every  respect  alike,  in 
precisely  the  same  state,  in  the  same  circumstances,  and 
under  the  same  influence  of  every  kind,  will  certainly 
choose  in  the  same  way. 

The  concurrence  of  the  mind,  in  giving  efficacy  to 
motives,  is  evident  from  the  fact,  that  the  same  external 
object  will  excite  in  different  minds  very  different  feel- 
ings, and  lead  to  very  different  choices.  The  entrance 


accustomed,  with  acknowledged  propriety,  so  far  as  the  ordinances 
of  language  are  concerned,  to  give  the  name  of  cause  to  almost 
any  one  of  the  conditions  of  a  phenomenon,  or  any  portion  of  the 
whole  number  arbitrarily  selected,  without  excepting  even  those 
conditions  which  are  purely  negative,  and  in  themselves  incapable 
of  causing  any  thing ;  it  will  probably  be  admitted,  without  longer 
discussion,  that  no  one  of  the  conditions  has  more  claim  to  that 
title  than  another,  and  that  the  real  cause  of  the  phenomenon  is 
the  assemblage  of  all  its  conditions." — MilVs  Logic,  I,  399,  400, 
401,  403. 

7* 


78  INFLUENCE     OF     MOTIVES. 

of  an  individual  into  a  social  circle,  may  draw  admira- 
tion from  some  of  the  company,  and  envy  from  others. 
An  event  which  makes  a  very  deep  impression  upon  a 
man  of  acute  sensibility,  may  make  a  very  slight  one, 
upon  a  person  of  cooler  temperament.  An  object  may 
excite  very  different  feelings,  even  in  the  same  mind, 
at  different  times.  The  merry  song,  which  has  been  so 
welcome  to  a  man  in  his  hours  of  gaiety,  may  find  a 
discordant  feeling  in  his  breast,  when  he  is  borne  down 
with  affliction. 

The  diversity  of  effects  produced  upon  different  minds, 
by  the  same  external  object,  is  probably  the  reason  why 
some  writers  ascribe  the  efficacy  of  motives  to  the  mind 
itself.  The  true  state  of  the  case  is,  that  the  efficacy 
belongs  to  both;  or  to  the  relation  between  one  and  the 
other.  The  influence  of  an  external  motive  will  vary, 
with  the  state  of  the  mind  to  which  it  is  presented. 
And  the  feelings  excited  in  the  mind  will  vary,  as  the 
objects  before  it  are  changed.  If  motives  and  the  state 
of  the  mind  are  not  both  concerned,  in  determining  the 
acts  of  the  will,  then  they  must  be  determined  either 
by  the  mind  alone,  so  that  whatever  be  the  motives  pre- 
sented, its  volitions  will  be  the  same ;  or  by  motives 
alone,  so  that  whatever  be  the  state  of  the  mind,  the  vo- 
litions will  be  the  same. 

The  power  of  the  mind  over  the  objects  which  it 
contemplates,  is  not  such,  that  it  can  make  them  all 
agreeable,  and  in  any  degree,  at  its  bidding.  If  this  were 
the  case,  happiness  would  be  of  easy  attainment.  We 
should  merely  have  to  will  that  every  thing  which  we 
hear,  and  see,  and  feel,  should  be  to  us  sources  of  enjoy- 
ment only.  We  could  be  unhappy  in  no  other  way, 


INFLUENCE     OF     MOTIVES.  79 

than  by  choosing  to  be  so.  It  would  be  folly  for  a  man 
to  labor  and  toil  to  be  rich,  when  by  a  mere  act  of  the 
will,  he  could  derive  as  much  gratification  from  poverty 
as  from  wealth.  The  galley  slave,  by  resolving  to  be 
as  well  pleased  with  his  clanking  chains,  as  with  free- 
dom'on  his  native  hills,  might  set  at  defiance  the  malice 
of  his  oppressors.  The  victim  of  the  inquisition  might 
effectually  disarm  the  rage  of  his  persecutors,  by  willing 
to  make  torture  as  welcome  as  repose.  This  would  be 
a  self-determining  power  of  some  value. 

May  not  our  volitions,  however,  be  in  opposition  to 
our  feelings?  We  may  undoubtedly,  oppose  some  of 
our  desires,  for  the  sake  of  gratifying  others.  But  what 
motive  can  a  man  have  to  will  against  all  motives? 
Willing,  at  least  in  the  case  of  imperative  acts,  is  de- 
termining to  do  something ;  and  that,  for  the  sake  of 
obtaining  the  objects  of  our  desire.  When  such  objects 
are  before  the  mind,  can  we  will  to  turn  away  from 
them,  for  the  sake  of  something  which  is  not,  on  any 
account,  desired  ?  If  objects  of  desire  have  no  tendency 
to  move  the  will  in  a  particular  direction,  they  are  not, 
properly  speaking,  motives.  If  they  have  such  a  ten- 
dency, they  must  actually  move  the  will,  provided  there 
is  nothing  which  has  a  tendency  to  move  it  in  a  differ- 
ent direction.  When  on  one  side,  there  is  no  influence, 
any  influence  on  the  opposite  side  must  turn  the  scale. 
Whatever  does  not  do  this,  has  no  influence  in  the  case. 

If  it  be  said,  that  acts  of  the  understanding,  without 
feeling,  may  be  sufficient  to  determine  the  will ;  then 
these  intellectual  acts  become  motives.  They  have  an 
influence  on  volition.  The  will  is  not  left  to  be  the 
sport  of  blind  contingence.  Our  acts  of  choice  are  not 


80  INFLUENCE     OF     MOTIVES. 


always  controlled  by  those  emotions  which  appear  to  be 
the  most  vivid.  We  often  find  a  determined  and  settled 
purpose,  apparently  calm,  but  unyielding,  which  carries 
a  man  steadily  forward,  amid  all  the  solicitations  of  ap- 
petite and  passion.  The  miser's  predominant  inclina- 
tion, brings  all  his  other  feelings  in  subjection  to  this. 
The  inflexible  determination  of  Howard,  gave  law  to 
his  emotions,  and  guided  his  benevolent  movements. 
The  triumphs  of  principle  over  passion  are  frequently 
seen,  in  the  commanding  influence  which  a  settled  pro- 
pensity exercises,  over  feelings  apparently  more  violent. 
A  man's  regard  for  his  own  future  welfare,  or  the  inter- 
ests of  the  divine  kingdom,  may  prevail  against  the  im- 
portunate demands  of  present  gratification.  Principle, 
in  such  cases,  is  really  a  stronger  motive,  than  passion  : 
that  is,  it  has  a  greater  tendency  to  control  the  acts  of 
the  will. 

May  not  weaker  motives  sometimes  prevail  over  those 
which  are  stronger  ?  A  number  of  feeble  motives  by 
their  united  influence,  may  overbalance  a  more  powerful 
single  one.  If  we  have  any  meaning,  when  we  speak 
of  the  comparative  strength  of  motives,  it  must  be  this, 
that  one  has  a  greater  tendency  than  another  to  deter- 
mine the  will.  To  say,  then,  that  a  weaker  motive  pre- 
vails against  a  stronger  one,  is  to  say,  that  that  which 
has  the  least  influence  in  the  case,  has  the  greatest.  If 
it  be  said,  that  something  else  gives  to  the  weaker  mo- 
tive a  superiority  over  the  stronger ;  then  this  something 
else  is  itself  a  motive,  and  the  united  influence  of  the 
two,  is  greater  than  that  of  the  third.  If,  as  some  seem 
to  suppose,  there  is  no  propriety  in  speaking  of  the 
comparative  strength  of  different  motives;  as  this  im- 


INFLUENCE     OF     MOTIVES.  81 

plies  too  near  a  resemblance  between  moral  influence, 
and  physical  energy  ;  then  it  is  improper  to  say,  that  a 
bribe  of  a  thousand  dollars  is  a  stronger  temptation,  than 
one  of  a  shilling ;  or  that  the  dread  of  imprisonment  for 
life,  has  any  greater  influence,  in  deterring  from  the 
commission  of  crimes,  than  the  fear  of  being  subjected 
to  a  trifling  fine.  Motives  must  certainly  have  equal,  or 
unequal  strength,  or  none  at  all.  If  they  have  no 
strength,  they  have  no  tendency  to  give  direction  to  the 
acts  of  the  will ;  that  is,  they  are  not  motives,  in  the 
sense  in  which  the  term  is  commonly  understood. 

If  it  be  still  urged,  that  the  will  may  decide  against  the 
strongest  influence,  without  any  reason  whatever ;  that 
it  will  sometimes  comply  with  motives,  and  sometimes 
resist  them,  and  that,  without  any  motive  for  resisting ; 
then  we  are  brought  back  again  to  all-powerful  contin- 
gence,  to  the  uncontrollable  supremacy  of  nonentity. 
It  is  this  which  determines  whether  motives  shall  have 
any  efficacy  or  not.  Sometimes  our  choices  happen  to 
be  in  accordance  with  them ;  and  sometimes  they  hap- 
pen to  take  the  opposite  direction ;  so  that  chance,  after 
all,  is  the  supreme  law  of  volition.5* 

*  For  a  more  particular  view  of  the  subject  of  motives,  see  Ex- 
amination of  Edwards,  Sec.  X. 


82 


SECTION    IV. 

LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY. 

Common  notion  of  liberty — Internal  freedom — Liberty  of  contin- 
gence — External  liberty — Liberty  to  either  side — Power  to  the 
contrary — Cousin's  view  of  this — Cousin's  analysis  of  the  Will 
— Power  of  contrary  choice — Decision  of  consciousness — No 
impossibility  of  contrary  volition — Dr.  Edwards  on  natural  power 
to  the  contrary,  and  on  natural  and  moral  inability — Power  to 
contrary  emotions — Liberty  a  privilege — Necessity  is  the  opposite 
of  liberty — Philosophical  necessity — Natural  and  moral  necessity 
— Is  certainty  necessity  ? — Edwards  on  moral  necessity. 

IN  the  opinion  of  many,  self-determination  is  essen- 
tial to  liberty.  Before  we  can  decide  this  point,  it  will 
be  necessary  to  ascertain  what  liberty  is.  No  phraseolo- 
gy commonly  applied  to  the  will,  is  more  ambiguous, 
than  the  term  liberty  or  freedom.  As  used  by  meta- 
physical writers,  it  has,  at  least,  half  a  dozen  different 
meanings. 

1.  The  first  is  that  which  is  given  it  in  common  dis- 
course. A  man  is  said  to  have  liberty,  or  to  be  free, 
when  he  does  what  he  chooses  to  do  ;  when  the  acts  of 
his  will  are  carried  into  execution.  This  is  the  only 
meaning  attached  to  the  term,  in  the  familiar  language 
of  common  life.  It  is  called  personal,  or  civil,  or  politi- 
cal, or  natural  liberty,  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
conditions  by  which  it  is  limited  or  modified.  In  all 
these  cases,  however,  it  refers  to  external  conduct.  It 
implies  a  correspondence  between  a  man's  volitions  and 


LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY. 

his  actions.  Tf  he  goes  where  he  chooses,  and  does  what 
he  will,  he  is  said  to  be  free.  His  freedom  consists  in 
exemption  from  restraint  and  compulsion ;  in  not  being, 
prevented  from  doing  that  which  he  wills  to  do,  and  not 
being  compelled  to  do  that  which  he  does  not  will  to  do. 
This  is  what  is  frequently  called  external  liberty.  It  is 
a  freedom  from  every  thing  which  will  interfere  with 
the  fixed  connection  between  volition  and  external  acts. 
2.  But  philosophers  have  had  occasion  to  give  vari- 
ous other  meanings  to  the  term  liberty ;  particularly  to 
that  which  is  called  internal  or  mental  freedom.  It  is 
used,  in  the  second  place,  to  signify  not  our  doing  as 
we  will,  but  willing  as  we  will.  As  freedom  with  res- 
pect to  external  actions,  consists  in  their  being  depen- 
dent on  our  volitions ;  so  it  seems  to  be  thought  by 
some,  that  the  freedom  of  our  volitions  themselves,  con- 
sists in  their  dependence  on  previous  volitions.  As  we 
are  not  accountable  for  an  action  which  did  not  proceed 
from  our  choice ;  so  it  is  supposed,  that  we  are  not  ac- 
countable for  an  act  of  choice,  unless  it  has  proceeded 
from  antecedent  choice  ;  unless  we  have  chosen  to  choose. 

3.  Liberty  of  will,  as  distinguished  from  external  lib- 
erty, is  represented  by  some,  as  consisting  in  the  depen- 
dence of  our  imperative  volitions  upon  our  predominant 
desires ;  so  that  a  man  always  wills  as  he  pleases  or 
wishes;   his  imperative  volitions   invariably  following 
the  strongest  internal  motives. 

4.  The  three  definitions  now  given,   imply  a  depen- 
dence of  an  external  or  a  mental  act  upon  something 
preceding.     But  according  to  some  philosophers,  inter- 
nal freedom  implies,  that  the  will  is  not  subject  to   the 
determining  influence  of  motives,  or  the  nature  or  state 


84 


LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY. 


of  the  mind,  or  any  thing  preceding,  which  is  itself  de- 
pendent on  any  thing  without  the  mind.  It  must  be 
.altogether  self-determined.  This  is  what  is  sometimes 
called  liberty  to  either  side,  liberty  of  indifference,  or 
more  properly  of  equilibrium,  of  equal  tendencies  to  op- 
posite directions.  As  civil  liberty  is  frequently  supposed 
to  be  an  exemption  from  all  regulations  of  law  •  so  men- 
tal liberty  is  thought,  by  some,  to  be  a  freedom  from  all 
determining  influence  of  motives,  or  of  any  thing  from 
without.  This  may  be  called  the  liberty  of  contingence. 
It  is  contingent  self-determination,  expressed  in  differ- 
ent terms. 

5.  A  more  scriptural  meaning  of  freedom,  is  an  ex- 
emption from  the  controlling  influence  and  bondage  of 
evil  propensities  and  passions. 

"  He  is  the  freeman,  whom  the  truth  makes  free ; 
And  all  are  slaves  beside." 

This  may  be  called,  for  distinction's  sake,  moral  free- 
dom. It  is  far  from  implying,  that  the  acts  of  the  will 
are  independent  of  all  antecedent  influence.  They  are 
brought  under  the  guidance  of  right  and  virtuous  prin- 
ciples. "  Being  made  free  from  sin,"  says  the  apostle, 
"  ye  became  the  servants  of  righteousness."* 

6.  Others  still  consider  mental  liberty  as  consisting 
simply  in  the  power  of  willing  ;  that  is,  in  having  a  will. 
According  to  them,  whoever  wills  is  free.f 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  object  to  the  use  of  the  term 
liberty,  in  either  of  these  senses.  An  author  has  a  right 

*  Romans,  vi,  18. 

f  "  To  act,  to  determine,  to  will,  or  to  choose,  is  to  be  free." — 
Dr.  Samuel  West,  p.  15. 


LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY.  85 

to  use  words  and  phrases  in  his  own  way,  and  even  in 
different  senses,  if  by  the  position  which  he  gives  them 
in  connection  with  other  Words,  and  by  proper  explana- 
tions, he  guards  effectually  against  misapprehension. 
But  it  is  highly  important,  that  the  various  and  contrary 
significations  of  the  term  liberty,  be  not  confounded 
with  each  other,  as  they  very  frequently  are,  in  discus- 
sions upon  the  nature  and  powers  of  the  will.  Many 
appear  to  think,  that  when  they  have  proved  that  man 
has  liberty,  according  to  some  particular  meaning,  they 
have  shown  that  he  must  have  it,  in  every  other  sense 
of  the  word.  Whatever  a.  politician  chooses  to  call  lib- 
erty, will  pass  current,  with  the  unreflecting  portion  of 
the  community  :  so  whatever  a  metaphysician  denomi- 
nates liberty,  will  have  its  influence  upon  those  who  are 
governed  by  names,  without  giving  themselves  the 
trouble  to  inquire  into  their  meaning. 

Those  who  plead  for  contingent  self-determination,, or 
adopt  a  theory  which  implies  this,  often  claim  for  them- 
selves the  exclusive  right  to  be  considered  the  advocates 
of  liberty.  If  this  assumption  be  conceded  to  them,  it 
ought  to  be  distinctly  understood,  according  to  which 
of  the  numerous  meanings  of  the  term,  liberty  is  pecu- 
liar to  their  system.  Those  who  believe  in  the  depen- 
dence of  volitions  upon  motives  as  well  as  agents,  are 
also  decided  advocates  of  liberty.  But  they  do  not  en- 
gage to  give  their  sanction  to  every  strange  or  even  ab- 
surd combination  of  ideas,  to  which  any  philosopher 
may  think  proper  to  annex  the  term,  however  contrary 
it  may  be  to  the  signification  of  the  word,  as  sanctioned 
by  common  usage.  Nor  do  they  admit  the  justice  of 
being  treated,  on  this  account,  as  oppose rs  of  liberty. 
8 


86  LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY. 

It  is  agreed  on  all  hands,  that  with  respect  to  external 
actions,  we  are  free,  when  we  do  as  we  will ;  when 
there  is  such  an  established  connection  between  our  vo- 
litions and  our  actions,  that  the  latter  invariably  follow 
from  the  other.  When  we  will  to  walk,  we  walk,  if 
we  are  free ;  when  we  will  to  speak,  we  speak ;  when 
we  will  to  move  the  hand,  it  moves.  Now  is  internal 
liberty,  or  liberty  of  will,  the  direct  opposite  of  this? 
Does  it  imply,  that  there  is  no  dependence  of  our  voli- 
tions on  antecedent  feelings  ;  that  they  are  as  often  con- 
trary to  our  desires,  as  conformable  to  them  ;  that  how- 
ever ardently  a  man  may  love  God  and  seek  to  serve 
him,  this  has  no  controlling  influence  over  his  purposes 
and  executive  acts  ?  If  dependence  of  our  volitions  on 
any  thing  preceding  be  admitted,  must  it  be  antecedent 
volitions  only,  of  the  same  mind,  running  back  into  an 
infinite  series  ? 

.According  to  the  advocates  of  independent  self-deter- 
mination, liberty  of  the  will  implies  a  freedom  to  either 
side;  that  is,  a  freedom  to  one  thing  or  its  opposite. 
This  is  otherwise  expressed,  by  saying  that,  whenever 
a  man  acts  freely,  he  has  power  to  the  contrary.  Cousin 
says,  "  When  I  open  this  book,  am  I  not  conscious  of 
opening  it,  and  conscious  also  of  power  not  to  open  it  ? 
When  I  look,  do  I  not  know,  at  once,  that  I  look,  and 
that  I  am  able  not  to  look  ?" 

"  Now  an  action  performed  with  the  consciousness  of 
power  not  to  do  it,  is  what  men  have  called  a  free  ac- 
tion :  for  there  is  no  longer  in  it  the  characteristic  of 
necessity."  "Liberty  is  the  attribute  neither  of  the 
sensibility,  nor  of  the  intelligence ;  it  belongs  to  the  ac- 
tivity, and  not  to  all  the  facts  which  are  referable  to  that, 


LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY.  87 

but  merely  to  a  certain  number,  marked  by  peculiar 
characteristics,  namely,  acts  which  we  perform,  with 
the  consciousness  of  doing  them,  and  of  being  able  not 
to  do  them."*  In  a  certain  sense,  this  is  undoubtedly 
true.  In  reference  to  external  conduct,  a  man  is  free, 
when  he  does  as  he  wills,  that  is,  when,  if  he  wills  to 
move,  he  moves,  if  he  wills  the  contrary,  he  remains  at 
rest ;  if  he  wills  to  speak,  he  speaks,  if  he  wills  the 
contrary,  he  is  silent.  But  does  liberty  imply,  that 
when  a  man  wills  a  certain  act,  it  is  no  more  likely  to 
follow,  than  the  contrary  act ;  that  his  limbs  will  as  soon 
move  against  his  will,  as  with  it ;  in  other  words,  that 
there  is  no  dependence  of  his  external  actions  upon  his 
choice,  no  established  connection  between  what  he  does, 
and  what  he  wills  to  do ;  that  with  the  same  volitions, 
his  actions  might  be  different  ?  A  man  has  power  to 
move  his  hand  in  opposite  directions.  Does  this  imply, 
that  his  hand  has  power  to  move  in  opposite  directions, 
in  defiance  of  all  influence  of  the  will  ?  If  such  were 
the  fact,  could  he  be  truly  said  to  have  power  over  his 
motions  ?  Are  not  a  man's  bodily  motions  in  his  power 
when  they  infallibly  follow  the  direction  of  his  will  ? 

But  the  advocates  of  a  liberty  to  either  side,  would 
probably  consider  it  as  relating  not  so  much  to  external 
conduct,  as  to  acts  of  the  will.  Cousin  is  sufficiently 
explicit  in  stating,  that  internal  liberty  belongs  neither 
to  the  antecedents  nor  to  the  consequents  of  volition. 
"  When  the  intellect  has  judged  that  this  or  that  is  to 
be  done,  from  such  or  such  motives ;  it  remains  to  pass 
on  to  action,  and  at  once  to  resolve,  to  take  sides,  to  say 

*  Cousin's  Psychology,  pp.  249,  250, 


88  LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY. 

to  ourselves  no  longer,  I  ought  to  do,  but,  I  will  do. 
Now  the  faculty  which  says,  I  ought  to  do  it,  is  not  and 
can  not  be  the  faculty  which  says,  I  will  do  it,  I  take 
the  resolution  to  do  it.  Here  the  action  of  the  intelli- 
gence completely  ceases.  I  ought  to  do  it,  is  a  judg- 
ment ;  I  will  do  it,  is  not  a  judgment,  nor  consequently 
an  intellectual  phenomenon.  In  fact,  the  moment  we 
take  the  resolution  to  do  an  action,  we  take  it  with  a 
consciousness  of  being  able  to  take  a  contrary  resolution. 
See,  then,  a  new  element,  which  must  not  be  confound- 
ed with  the  former.  This  element  is  the  will.  One 
moment  before  we  were  in  a  state  of  judgment  and 
knowledge  ;  now  we  are  in  a  state  of  willing."  "  The 
total  action  which  we  were  to  analyze,  resolves  itself 
into  three  elements  perfectly  distinct :  1.  the  intellectual 
element, — 2.  the  voluntary  element,  which  consists  in 
an  internal  act,  namely,  the  resolution, — 3.  the  physical 
element,  or  external  action." 

"  If  these  three  elements  exhaust  the  action,  that  is 
to  say,  the  phenomenon  in  which  we  have  recognized 
the  character  of  liberty,  in  opposition  to  the  phenomena 
of  intelligence  and  sensation ;  the  question  now  to  be 
decided  is,  precisely  in  which  of  these  three  elements, 
liberty  is  to  be  found,  that  is,  the  power  of  doing,  with 
the  consciousness  of  being  able  not  to  do  ?  Does  this 
power  belong  to  the  first  element,  the  intellectual  ele- 
ment of  the  free  action  ?  It  does  not."  "  Still  less  is  it 
in  the  third  element,  in  the  physical  action."  "It  can, 
then,  only  be  in  the  second,  and  there  we  find  it."  "  Lib- 
erty exists  in  the  pure  power  of  willing,  which  is  always 
accompanied  by  the  consciousness  of  the  power  to  will 


LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY. 


89 


(I  do  not  say  power  to  think,  or  power  to  act,  but  power 
to  will)  the  contrary  of  what  it  wills."* 

The  chapter  in  Cousin  from  which  the  above  extracts 
are  taken  has  been  pronounced  an  "admirable  analysis 
of  the  will."  It  is  indeed  a  lucid  analysis ;  a  perspicu- 
ous statement  of  the  relative  place  of  that  part  of  our 
mental  operations  in  which  imperative  volition,  and 
what  is  termed  internal  liberty,  or  liberty  of  will,  are  to 
be  found.  But  here  the  discussion  terminates.  It  is 
analysis,  and  nothing  more.  The  author  makes  no  at- 
tempt to  prove  what  he  affirms  concerning  liberty  of 
will.  Having  shown  ivhere  it  lies,  he  contents  himself 
with  declaring,  that  "  liberty  exists  in  the  pure  power 
of  willing,  which  is  always  accompanied  by  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  power  to  will  the  contrary  of  what  it 
wills."  Like  many  other  advocates  of  contingent  voli- 
tion, he  takes  for  granted  the  fundamental  point  in  de- 
bate. He  has  undoubtedly  a  right  to  say  what  he 
means  by  liberty  of  will ;  but  whether  such  liberty  be- 
longs to  the  human  mind,  or  is  essential  to  accountable 
agency,  is  to  be  determined  by  evidence,  and  not  by 
gratuitous  assertion. 

In  the  phrase  "a  power  of  contrary  volition,"  there 
is  often  an  express  or  implied  reference  to  two  very  dif- 
ferent mental  states,  which  in  discussions  on  the  will, 
ought  never  to  be  confounded.  One  of  these  is  the 
faculty  of  willing,  the  power  of  choosing ;  in  other 
words,  the  will  itself.  This  faculty  does  not,  of  itself 
alone,  determine  the  direction  which  its  exercises  will 
take.  It  is  not  only  a  power,  but  an  equal  power,  of 

*  Psychology,  pp,  251,  2,  3,  8. 

8* 


90  LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY. 

choosing  one  thing  or  its  opposite.  And  because  it  is 
thus  equally  balanced,  it  can  have  no  part  in  turning 
the  acts  of  choice  one  way  rather  than  another.  The 
faculty  of  choosing  or  refusing  particular  objects  implies 
some  knowledge  of  the  objects.  A  man  can  neither 
accept  or  reject  that  of  which  he  knows  nothing. 

The  other  mental  state  referred  to  above  is  something 
which  influences  the  will ;  which  inclines  it  to  choose 
one  thing  rather  than  another.  Taking  it  at  present  for 
granted  that,  sometimes  at  least,  there  is  such  an  influ- 
ence, it  is  evident  that  this  is  very  distinct  from  the 
mere  faculty  of  willing.  The  latter  is  equally  balanced 
between  opposite  objects ;  while  the  former  turns  the 
scale,  in  favor  of  one  or  the  other.  If  the  expression 
"power  of  contrary  choice"  be  employed  to  denote, 
sometimes  the  faculty,  sometimes  the  directing  influ- 
ence, and  sometimes  both  together,  we  need  to  be  dis- 
tinctly informed  in  which  of  these  senses  it  is  to  be  un- 
derstood. It  is  idle  to  reiterate  the  ambiguous  phrase, 
while  no  explanation  is  given  of  the  meaning  attached 
to  it,  by  the  writer  or  speaker. 

The  distinction  between  the  faculty  of  willing,  and 
the  influence  which  gives  direction  to  choice,  may  be 
illustrated,  by  the  relation  of  the  will  to  external  action. 
Here  volition  becomes  the  directing  power.  The  ani- 
mal frame  is  so  constituted,  that  the  faculty  of  walking 
is  equal  in  all  directions.  But  this  faculty  has  nothing 
to  do  in  determining  whether  a  man  shall  go  east  or 
west ;  to  the  gaming  table  or  to  a  house  of  worship. 
At  the  very  moment  when  he  is  proceeding  earnestly 
towards  one  point  of  the  compass,  he  has,  so  far  as  his 
bodily  frame  is  concerned,  equal  power  to  the  contrary. 


LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY.  91 

But  his  choice,  which  is  here  the  guiding  influence, 
is  not  equal  in  all  directions.  When  we  say  that  he 
has  as  much  power  to  move  one  way  as  another,  this 
does  not  imply,  that  he  is  equally  inclined  ta  opposite 
courses. 

Though  external  action  is  widely  different  from  voli- 
tion, yet  the  relation  between  the  faculty  of  bodily  mo- 
tion and  acts  of  choice,  is  analogous  to  the  relation  be- 
tween the  will  and  the  influence  which  gives  direction 
to  its  acts.  As  the  mere  power  of  walking  does  not  de- 
termine which  way  a  man  will  walk ;  so  the  mere  pow- 
er of  choosing  does  not  decide  what  he  will  choose,  or 
what  he  will  refuse.  As  his  bodily  motions  are  directed 
by  his  choice,  so  the  movements  of  his  will  are  guided 
by  his  feelings,  his  emotions,  his  desires.  As  his  exter- 
nal actions  are  free,  when  they  are  obedient  to' his  voli- 
tions ;  so  his  volitions  are  free,  when  they  follow  the 
inclinations  of  his  heart. 

In  what  sense  then,  is  it  true,  that  a  man  has  power 
to  will  the  contrary  of  what  he  actually  wills  ?  He  has 
such  power  that  with  a  sufficient  inducement,  he  will 
make  an  opposite  choice.  If  he  now  chooses  to  sit  still, 
and  if  you  set  before  him  an  adequate  motive,  he  will 
choose  to  walk  abroad.  But  has  he  not  power,  you  ask, 
to  choose  otherwise  than  he  does,  even  though  it  be 
certain,  that  he  will  never  exercise  that  power,  unless 
there  is  some  change  in  his  feelings,  or  in  the  motives 
before  him?  A  correct  answer  to  this  question,  must 
depend  upon  the  extent  of  meaning  here  given  to  the 
word  power.  A  man  may  have  some  power,  and  not  have 
all  power ;  that  is,  he  may  not  have  all  that  upon  which  the 
result  depends.  There  may  be  something,  either  within 


92  LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY. 

or  without  his  mind,  which  will  render  a  particular  voli- 
tion certain,  notwithstanding  his  power  to  the  contrary. 
If  the  word  power  be  used  in  its  broadest  sense,  as  in- 
cluding not  only  opportunity,  knowledge,  capacity,  &c., 
but  motives  of  all  kinds ;  it  is  not  true,  that  a  man  has 
always  equal  power,  that  is,  equal  inducements,  to  op- 
posite volitions.  Has  an  honest  man  the  same  induce- 
ment to  lie,  which  he  has  to  speak  the  truth  ?  Has  the 
intemperate  man  the  same  inducement  to  keep  sober, 
which  he  has  to  drink  to  excess  ?  When  the  saints  in 
heaven  bow  in  adoration  before  the  throne  of  God  and 
the  Lamb ;  are  they  equally  inclined  to  join  apostate 
spirits  in  their  rebellion?  When  Satan,  "  as  a  roaring 
lion,  goeth  about,  seeking  whom  he  may  devour ;"  is  he 
equally  inclined  to  promote  the  salvation  of  men  ? 

But  if  the  word  power  be  used  here,  according  to  its 
more  common  acceptation,  so  as  not  to  include  motives 
and  the  state  of  feeling,  this  is  not  inconsistent  with 
such  a  strength  of  inclination,  as  will  certainly  prevent 
any  contrary  volition.  A  man  has  as  much  power  to 
speak  the  truth,  if  he  will,  as  he  has  to  utter  falsehood. 
And  he  has  as  much  power  to  will  to  speak  the  truth, 
if  his  feelings  are  so  inclined,  as  he  has  to  will  to  lie. 
But  has  he  a  power  which  will  determine  him  to  will 
one  way,  while  his  feelings  are  wholly  inclined  to  will 
the  contrary  way  ?  In  many  cases  there  may  be  con- 
flicting emotions  in  a  man's  mind,  and  therefore  some 
power  of  motive  in  opposite  directions.  But  when  he 
comes  to  a  decision,  are  the  motives  on  the  opposite 
sides  always  equal  ?  Is  it  not  the  preponderance  of  one 
over  the  other  which  turns  the  scale  ?  In  every  act  of 
choice,  is  the  agent  equally  pleased  with  the  opposite 


LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY.  93 

sides?  If  not,  is  it  a  mere  matter  of  chance,  which  way 
his  volition  will  turn  ?  Tho  man  who  wills  in  a  particu- 
lar way,  under  the  influence  of  certain  feelings,  might 
undoubtedly  will  differently,  under  a  different  influence. 
But  while  the  same  mind  continues  in  precisely  the  same 
state,  in  the  same  circumstances,  and  under  the  same 
influence  of  every  kind,  has  it  power  to  will  in  opposite 
directions,  first  one  way,  and  then  the  other  ;  or  if  it  has 
this  power,  will  it  ever  use  it  ? 

An  appeal  is  made  to  the  decision  of  consciousness,  in 
favor  of  a  power  of  contrary  choice.  It  is  said,  that 
when  a  man  wills  one  way,  he  is  conscious  of  having  a 
full  conviction,  that  he  has  ability  to  will  the  contrary 
way.  And  the  question  is  asked,  Is  this  consciousness 
to  be  relied  upon  as  true ;  or  may  it  be  nothing  more 
than  a  mental  illusion  ;  a  natural  prejudice  ?  Does  our 
consciousness  deceive  us  ? 

In  answering  this  inquiry,  there  are  two  very  distinct 
points  to  be  considered  ;  the  consciousness,  and  the  con- 
viction or  opinion  which  is  the  object  of  the  conscious- 
ness. The  one  may  be  true,  though  the  other  be  erro- 
neous. If  a  man  is  conscious  of  holding  a  certain  opin- 
ion, it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  he  does  hold  that  opinion. 
But  does  it  follow  that  the  opinion  must  also  be  true  ? 
Are  all  the  opinions  which  we  are  conscious  of  enter- 
taining infallibly  correct  ?  The  power  of  contrary  voli- 
tion, even  if  it  be  a  reality,  is  not.  properly  speaking,  an 
object  of  consciousness.  What  we  are  conscious  of,  are 
the  acts  of  our  minds.  But  surely  we  are  not,  at  any 
time,  conscious  of  volitions  directly  contrary  to  those 
which,  at  that  time,  we  actually  put  forth. 


94  LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY. 

It  is  said,  however,  that  we  have  an  irresistible  con- 
viction, that  we  possess  the  power  of  contrary  choice. 
But  in  what  sense,  is  the  term  power  to  be  here  under- 
stood ?  If  it  mean  nothing  more  than  the  faculty  of 
willing,  the  assertion  is  readily  admitted.  When  a  man 
is  moving  his  hand  to  the  right,  he  has,  at  the  same 
moment,  the  physical  capacity  of  moving  it  to  the  left. 
And  when  he  wills  to  move  one  way,  he  does  not  lose 
the  faculty  of  willing  to  move  the  contrary  way,  as 
soon  as  he  has  a  sufficient  motive  for  doing  it. 

But  if  the  signification  of  the  word  is  extended  so 
far,  as  to  include  the  influence  which  gives  direction  to 
choice,  it  changes  essentially  the  meaning  of  the  propo- 
sition. If  some  persons  think  that  they  have  an  irre- 
sistible conviction,  that  they  are  always  under  equal 
influence  to  opposite  volitions ;  others  have  as  strong  a 
conviction  that  this  is  not  the  fact,  at  least  with  respect 
to  themselves.  If  our  consciousness,  in  both  these  cases, 
is  correct,  the  contradictory  opinions  of  which  the  dif- 
ferent individuals  are  conscious  can  not  be  true.  If  any 
are  conscious  that  it  makes  no  difference  in  their  choice 
what  motives  are  before  them  ;  there  are  others  who  are 
not  sensible  that  they  themselves  are  the  subjects  of  any 
such  consciousness. 

If  it  be  said,  that  we  are  conscious  that  there  is  no 
impossibility  in  our  making  a  different  choice,  in  the 
same  circumstances,  and  under  the  same  influence,  this 
is  only  expressing  the  point  just  considered  in  different 
words,  and  without  freeing  it  from  the  ambiguity  with 
which  it  was  before  stated.  The  term  impossibility  has 
the  same  diversity  of  signification  which  is  given  to  the 
words  necessity,  power,  inability,  &c.  Where  there  is 


LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY.  95 

no  natural  impossibility,  in  the  sense  in  which  President 
Edwards  uses  the  expression,  there  may  be  a  moral  im- 
possibility which  will,  as  effectually  and  as  certainly, 
prevent  a  particular  choice,  as  any  want  of  capacity  or 
opportunity.* 

If  in  asserting  a  power  to  contrary  volitions,  nothing 
more  is  meant,  than  that  a  different  influence  might  oc- 
casion an  opposite  decision  of  the  will ;  this  is  not  in- 
consistent with  the  dependence  of  volition  on  the  state 
of  the  heart,  external  motives,  natural  sensibilities,  ac- 
quired propensities,  &c.  The  younger  Edwards,  a 
strenuous  advocate  for  the  certain  connection  between 
volitions  and  their  causes,  admits,  that  the  power  of  act- 
ing implies,  at  the  same  time,  a  power  of  not  acting. 
But  he  takes  special  care  to  guard  this  admission  against 
the  inference,  that  our  volitions  are  independent  of  the 
influence  of  motives.  Quoting,  from  Dr.  West,  the 
assertion,  that  "  by  liberty,  we  mean  a  power  of  acting, 
willing,  or  choosing ;  and  by  a  power  of  acting,  we  mean, 
that  when  all  circumstances  necessary  for  action  have 
taken  place,  the  mind  can  act  or  not  act;"  he  replies: 
"  This  is  not  explicit.  There  is  an  ambiguity  in  the 
words  power,  can,  not  act.  If  by  power  and  can,  he 
means  natural  power,  as  it  has  been  explained  in  the 
preceding  chapter ;  I  agree  that,  in  any  given  case,  we 
have  power  to  act,  or  decline  the  proposed  action."  "  A 
man  possesses  liberty,  when  he  possesses  a  natural  or 
physical  power  to  do  an  action,  and  is  under  no  natural 
inability  with  respect  to  that  action."  "If  this  be  the 
liberty  for  which  Dr.  West  pleads,  he  has  no  ground  of 

*  On  the  power  of  contrary  choice,  see  Examination  of  Edwards, 
Sees.  VIII,  XI,  and  XIII. 


96  LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY. 

controversy  on  this  head,  with  President  Edwards,  or 
with  any  who  embrace  his  system.  There  is  noth- 
ing in  this  inconsistent  with  the  influence  of  motives 
on  the  will  to  produce  volition;  or  with  the  de- 
pendence of  volition  on  some  cause  extrinsic  to  itself, 
extrinsic  to  the  power  of  will,  or  to  the  mind  in  which 
it  exists."  Referring  to  Dr.  West's  illustration  of  the 
power  of  choosing  between  things  which  appear  to  be 
equally  eligible,  he  says  :  "  If  by  power  he  mean  natu- 
ral or  physical  power,  I  grant,  that  we  have  such  a 
power,  to  choose  not  only  one  of  several  things  equally 
eligible,  if  any  such  there  be,  but  one  of  things  ever  so 
unequally  eligible,  and  to  take  the  least  eligible."* 
Again  he  says,  "  it  has  been  inquired  concerning  Presi- 
dent Edwards'  moral  inability,  whether  the  man  who  is 
the  subject  of  it,  can  remove  it  ?  I  answer,  yes,  he  has 
the  same  physical  power  to  remove  it,  and  to  do  the  ac- 
tion, which  he  is  morally  unable  to  do,  which  the  man 
concerning  whom  Dr.  West  supposes  there  is  a  certainty, 
that  he  will  not  do  an  action,  has  to  do  the  action,  and 
so  to  defeat  or  remove  the  said  certainty.  I  agree  with 
Dr.  West,  that  he  has  a  physical  power  so  to  do."f 

What  Dr.  Edwards  intends,  by  saying  that  a  man  has 
natural  or  physical  power  to  do  that  which  he  is  morally 
unable  to  do,  will  be  easily  understood  by  attending  to 
the  view  which  he  has  taken  of  natural  and  moral  ina- 
bility and  necessity,  in  the  chapter  to  which  he  here 
refers.  Though  these  terms,  as  used  by  different  wri- 
ters, are  abundantly  ambiguous,  yet  he  is  sufficiently 
explicit,  in  stating  what  signification  he  means  to  give 

*  Essays  on  Liberty  and  Necessity,  pp.  20,  21, 32.          f  p.  18. 


LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY.  97 

them.  "  Moral  necessity,"  he  says,  "  is  the  certain  or 
necessary  connection  between  moral  causes  and  moral 
effects.  Natural  necessity  is  the  connection  between 
causes  and  effects  which  are  not  of  a  moral  nature." 
"  The  distinction  between  natural  and  moral  inability 
is  analogous  to  this.  Inability  is  the  reverse  of  neces- 
sity ;"*  that  is,  a  man  is  under  an  inability  to  do  a  par- 
ticular thing,  when  he  is  under  a  necessity  of  not  doing 
it.  According  to  Dr.  Edwards,  then,  a  man  may  have 
natural  power  to  do  that,  which  the  want  of  moral 
power  will  infallibly  prevent  him  from  doing.  "  Moral 
necessity,"  he  says,  "  is  the  real  and  certain  connection 
between  some  moral  action  and  its  cause ;  and  there  is 
no  moral  necessity  in  the  case,  unless  the  connection  be 
real  and  absolutely  certain,  so  as  to  ensure  the  existence 
of  the  action."f  And  his  father  says  ;  "  Moral  necessity 
may  be  as  absolute  as  natural  necessity  ;  that  is,  the  effect 
may  be  as  perfectly  connected  with  its  moral  cause,  as 
a  natural  necessary  effect  is,  with  its  natural  cause."  "  As 
it  must  be  allowed,  that  there  may  be  such  a  thing  as  a 
sure  and  perfect  connection  between  moral  causes  and 
their  effects ;  so  this  only  is  what  I  call  by  the  name  of 
moral  necessity.";]:  According  to  these  writers,  then,  a 
man  may  have  a  natural  power  to  make  a  contrary 
choice,  although,  at  the  same  time,  he  is  morally  una- 
ble to  do  it ;  that  is,  he  is  under  the  influence  of  such 
motives,  as  will  infallibly  prevent  him  from  thus  will- 
ing. It  may  be  thought  by  some,  that  by  a  purpose  or 
resolve,  we  have  power  to  give  to  our  volitions  a  con- 
trary direction.  But  do  we  form  purposes,  independ- 

*  Essays  on  Liberty  and  Necessity,  pp.  6,  7.  f  p.  15. 

t  Edwards  on  the  Will,  Part  I,  Sec.  4. 
9 


98  LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY. 

ently  of  all  motives,  from  within  and  from  without  ? 
Will  the  same  influence,  operating  upon  precisely  the 
same  state  of  mind;  lead  to  opposite  purposes  and  voli- 
tions ? 

If  we  pass  from  our  purposes,  to  our  affections  or  emo- 
tions, shall  we  here  find  the  liberty  to  either  side  ?  It  is 
manifest,  that  different  objects  may  produce  different 
feelings  in  the  same  mind  j  and  the  same  objects  will 
produce  different  feelings  in  different  minds.  But  while 
the  same  objects  are  viewed,  in  the  same  manner,  by  a 
mind  continuing  in  precisely  the  same  state  of  suscepti- 
bility, will  the  affections  excited  by  these  objects  be  so 
changed,  as  to  become  of  an  opposite  character  ?  Or 
does  the  state  of  the  mind  itself  become  contrary  to 
what  it  was  before,  without  any  cause  whatever  ?  If  it 
be  admitted,  that  our  emotions  have  any  dependence  on 
any  thing  preceding,  will  it  still  be  urged,  that  the  ante- 
cedents must,  in  every  case,  be  so  exactly  balanced,  that 
the  tendencies  to  a  particular  emotion  and  its  opposite 
shall  be  equal  ? 

Will  it  be  said,  that  our  volitions  are  partly  contin- 
gent, and  partly  dependent  on  something  preceding  ;  that 
there  may  be  some  influence  from  motives,  and  at  the 
same  time,  a  power  of  acting  in  opposition  to  motives  ? 
To  this,  it  may  be  answered,  that  if  the  very  nature  of 
liberty  of  will,  implies  freedom  to  either  side,  then  so 
far  as  this  is  controlled,  and  our  volitions  are  determined 
by  the  influence  of  motives,  by  the  state  of  the  affec- 
tions, or  by  any  thing  else,  liberty  is  impaired.  The 
saint  in  heaven,  who  is  under  the  influence  of  such  mo- 
tives, as  invariably  excite  in  him  holy  volitions,  has  not 
the  liberty  of  which  we  are  now  speaking.  Contin- 


LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY.  99 

gence  and  dependence  are  incompatible  with  each  other. 
So  far  as  one  prevails,  the  other  can  have  no  place.  If 
our  volitions  are  wholly  contingent,  they  are  in  no  de- 
gree, subject  to  the  determining  influence  of  motives. 

Why  have  metaphysicians  given  to  the  terms  liberty 
and  power,  when  applied  to  the  will,  a  meaning  so  dif- 
ferent from  that  which  they  bear  in  customary  use.  and 
in  reference  to  external  conduct  ?  In  common  language, 
a  man  enjoys  liberty,  when  he  does  as  he  wills ;  that  is, 
when  there  is  a.  fixed  connection  between  his  acts  and 
his  volitions.  The  more  invariable  this  dependence, 
the  more  perfect  is  his  liberty.  Whatever  interrupts 
this  connection,  impairs  his  freedom.  But  according 
to  some  philosophers,  liberty  of  will  requires,  that  there 
should  be  no  dependence  of  our  volitions  upon  any 
thing  preceding,  for  being  as  they  are,  rather  than  other- 
wise. External  liberty  consists  in  a  man's  acting  uni- 
formly, in  conformity  with  his  will.  Does  internal  lib- 
erty imply  that  he  frequently  wills  in  opposition  to  his 
supreme  affection  ?  When  we  say  that  a  man  has  power 
to  the  contrary  external  action,  we  mean,  that  if  his 
will  were  different,  the  action  would  be  different.  But 
some  who  speak  of  a  power  to  contrary  volitions,  seem 
to  mean,  that  under  the  same  influence,  and  in  the  same 
state  of  mind,  the  volitions  may  be  different.  It  is  a 
power  of  contingence,  a  capacity  of  being  subject  to 
accident.  Is  not  the  term  power,  as  it  is  frequently 
used,  a  mere  "metaphysical  sound,"  which  is  to  pro- 
duce its  effect,  not  by  any  distinct  signification,  in  the 
connection  in  which  it  is  introduced  ;  but  by  association 
with  feelings  excited  by  the  word,  in  cases  of  a  very 
different  nature  ? 


100 


LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY. 


Liberty  is  commonly  considered  a  privilege.  But 
what  privilege  is  conferred  by  the  liberty  of  contin- 
gence  ;  a  freedom  of  our  volitions  from  all  influence  of 
motives ;  of  argument,  arid  persuasion,  and  affections  ? 
Suppose  a  man  were  to  be  endowed  with  a  will  which 
should  put  forth  volitions  wholly  at  random,  without 
any  regard  to  his  feelings ;  that  if  these  should  urge 
him  ever  so  strongly  to  go  one  way,  his  will  would  de- 
termine he  should  go  in  an  opposite  direction  :  that  how- 
ever much  he  might  be  pleased  with  obeying  God,  his 
volitions  would  lead  him  to  disobey ;  would  this  be  the 
perfection  of  liberty  ?  Or  suppose  his  volitions  should 
spring  up,  without  any  cause,  or  reason,  or  influence 
whatever,  either  from  within  or  from  without ;  would 
this  be  the  most  desirable  condition  of  his  being  ? 

What  greater  freedom  can  a  man  ask  for,  than  to  do 
as  he  will,  and  to  will  as  he  pleases,  that  is,  according  to 
his  strongest  desires  ?  When  this  is  the  case,  his  exter- 
nal liberty  coincides  with  his  internal  liberty.  As  he 
always  wills  as  he  pleases,  his  doing  as  he  wills  is  doing 
as  he  pleases.  His  external  conduct  corresponds  to  his 
imperative  volitions,  and  these  correspond  to  the  state 
and  affections  of  his  heart.  Would  his  liberty  be  more 
valuable,  if  it  were  possible  for  him  not  to  will  as  he 
pleases. 

NECE  SSITY. 

That  which  is  the  opposite  of  liberty,  is  commonly 
called  necessity.  But  as  various  significations  have  been 
given  to  the  term  liberty,  and  each  of  these  may  have 
its  opposite  ;  necessity  also  has  a  corresponding  variety 
of  meanings.  As  liberty  in  familiar  use,  signifies  doing 


LlBERTlf    AND    ft  E  C  fi  S  S  1  T  Y  .  101 

us  we  will;  so  necessity,  as  it  is  most  commonly  under- 
stood, is  something  which  prevents  us  from  doing  as  we 
will.  It  implies  opposition  to  our  choice.  It  is  either 
compulsion,  forcing  us  to  do  that  which  we  will  not  to 
do ;  or  restraint,  withholding  us  from  doing  that  which 
we  will  to  do.  As  liberty  supposes  an  established  connec- 
tion between  our  volitions  and  our  outward  acts  ;  neces- 
sity, on  the  contrary,  implies  an  interruption  of  this  con- 
nection. If  a  man's  limbs,  when  affected  with  convul- 
sions, move  against  his  will,  he  is  necessitated  to  let 
them  move.  If  in  a  palsy,  they  refuse  to  move  at  his 
bidding,  he  is  laid  under  a  necessity  not  to  move  them. 
But  philosophers  have  found  occasion  to  give  very 
different  meanings  to  the  term  necessity.  They  have 
applied  it  where,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  there 
can  be  no  opposition  of  will.  A  man  may  be  compelled 
to  do  that  which  is  contrary  to  his  choice.  But  how 
can  he  be  compelled  to  choose  that  which  is  contrary  to 
his  choice ;  to  will  that  which,  at  the  moment,  he  does 
not  will  ?  He  may,  at  one  time,  choose  that  which  -is 
contrary  to  what  he  had  chosen,  at  another  time ;  and 
it  is  easy  to  see  how  this  change  may  be  effected  by  ex- 
ternal influence.  But  can  he  be  either  induced  or  com- 
pelled to  will  that  which,  at  the  same  time,  is  opposed 
to  his  will  ?  As  some  have  made  the  liberty  of  the  will 
to  consist  in  a  freedom  from  the  determining  influence 
of  motives ;  so  to  be  subject  to  such  motives,  they  have 
called  necessity.  But  if  a  man  can  be  determined,  by 
motives,  to  will  in  a  particular  way,  this  does  not  imply, 
that  he  is  induced  to  will  against  his  will.  The  use  of 
a  term  in  so  different,  and  in  some  respects,  opposite 
senses,  is  the  occasion  of  numberless  misapprehensions. 
9* 


102  LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY. 

According  to  some  philosophers,  the  dependence  of  our 
volitions  upon  any  thing  preceding  is  necessity ;  where- 
as, in  common  language,  the  want  of  dependence  of  our 
actions  upon  our  volitions,  is  what  is  called  necessity. 
Why  should  necessity,  in  the  one  case,  signify  depen- 
dence, and  in  the  other,  the  opposite  of  dependence. 

Liberty  and  necessity  are  generally  understood  to  be 
inconsistent  with  each  other.  But  if  very  diverse  mean- 
ings are  given  to  both  these  terms,  it  is  not  certain,  that 
every  kind  of  liberty  is  inconsistent  with  every  thing 
which  any  one  may  choose  to  call  necessity.  If  it  be 
said,  that  all  necessity  is  necessity,  and  that  in  relation 
to  liberty,  it  makes  no  difference,  of  what  kind  the  ne- 
cessity is  ;  it  may  be  answered,  that  what  is  sometimes 
called  necessity,  is  not  necessity,  in  any  proper  accepta- 
tion of  the  term.  It  is  to  be  regretted,  that  writers  on 
both  sides  of  the  question  concerning  the  power  of  the 
will  have  given  occasion  to  numerous  and  great  misap- 
prehensions, by  adopting  this  confusion  of  language 
respecting  necessity.  The  danger  of  mistake  may  be 
lessened,  but  is  far  from  being  removed,  by  observing 
the  distinction  between  natural  and  moral  necessity. 
The  discrimination  may  be  accurately  and  clearly  sta- 
ted ;  but  an  eager  controversial  writer  may  easily  prac- 
tice an  illusion  upon  a  large  portion  of  his  readers,  if  not 
upon  himself,  by  confounding  the  different  meanings,  or 
by  insensibly  substituting  one  for  the  other.  And  when 
metaphysical  philosophy  is  dealt  out  to  the  common 
people,  they  will  be  sure  to  interpret  the  language,  ac- 
cording to  the  customary  use  of  the  terms,  in  their  own 
walks  of  life.  With  them,  necessity  will  be  necessity, 
however  much  you  may  define  and  explain.  You  may 


LIBEKTY     AND     NECESSITY.  103 

state  definitely  the  difference  between  common  and  phi- 
losophical necessity;  but  very  few  will  be  philosophical 
enough  to  keep  the  distinction  steadily  in  view. 

It  is  sometimes  said,  that  the  connection  between  vo- 
litions and  the  antecedents  on  which  they  depend  is  cer- 
tain, but  not  necessary.  By  this  may  be  meant,  that 
certain  connection  and  dependence  imply  no  opposition 
to  acts  of  the  will ;  no  compulsion  or  constraint.  But 
according  to  others,  the  certain  connection  of  antece- 
dents and  consequents  is  itself  necessity,  whether  there 
be  any  opposition  to  the  will  or  not.  The  argument 
from  necessity,  in  favor  of  contingent  self-determination, 
is  a  play  upon  the  ambiguity  of  terms.  All  agree,  that 
a  necessity  which  is  opposed  to  our  choice  is  inconsis- 
tent with  liberty.  Coercion,  compulsion,  restraint,  that 
is,  opposition  to  our  will,  is  the  very  quality  to  which 
the  inconsistency  with  freedom  belongs.  And  when  phi- 
losophers have  given  the  name  of  necessity  to  that  in 
which  there  is  no  opposition  to  our  choice,  they  still  in- 
sist, that  as  necessity  is  necessity,  of  whatever  kind  it 
may  be,  it  must,  in  all  cases,  be  inconsistent  with  liberty. 
If  one  wishes  to  represent  any  relation  or  quality  what- 
ever as  essential  to  volition,  he  has  only  to  call  it  liberty  ; 
and  if  he  would  make  the  impression,  that  a  particular 
relation,  dependence  for  example,  is  incompatible  with 
volition  and  freedom,  he  has  only  to  call  it  necessity  ;  and 
this  will  pass  for  argument,  with  those  who  are  accus- 
tomed, in  their  reasoning,  to  pay  more  attention  to  the 
sound  of  words,  than  to  their  signification.  By  com- 
mon readers,  the  term  necessity,  however  it  may  be  ap- 
plied by  the  writer,  will  be  understood  to  mean  that 
which  is  opposed  to  the  will. 


• 
104  LIBERTY    AND    NECESSITY. 

The  expression  moral  necessity,  adopted  for  the  pur- 
pose of  avoiding  ambiguity,  is  itself  ambiguous.  It  is 
frequently  used  to  signify  a  high  degree  of  probability 
merely ;  an  approach  to  necessity,  where  there  is  not 
supposed  to  be  any  infallible  certainty.  The  first  Presi- 
dent Edwards  and  his  son  are  sufficiently  explicit,  in 
stating  what  they  mean  by  moral  necessity.  With  them, 
it  is  "a  sure  and  perfect  connection  between  moral 
causes  and  effects."  It  "may  be  as  absolute  as  natural 
necessity."  "  A  man's  evil  dispositions  may  be  as  strong 
and  immovable,  as  the  bars  of  a  castle."*  "  Moral  ne- 
cessity is  the  certain  or  necessary  connection  between 
moral  causes  and  moral  effects. "f  It  is  observable, 
however,  that  these  very  logical  writers,  in  their  defini- 
tions of  moral  necessity,  both  use  the  word  moral  in 
different  senses :  so  difficult  is  it  to  avoid  altogether  the 
use  of  ambiguous  terms.  Moral  necessity,  is  defined  to 
be  "  a  certain  or  necessary  connection  between  moral 
causes  and  moral  effects"  The  moral  effects  here  spo- 
ken of  are,  evidently,  volitions ;  that  is,  acts  which  are 
themselves  right  or  wrong,  sinful  or  holy,  and  which  are, 
for  this  reason,  denominated  moral.  But  what  are  here 
called  moral  causes,  are  not  always  right  or  wrong,  sin- 
ful or  holy.  They  are  probably  spoken  of  as  moral,  be- 
cause they  are  the  causes  of  moral  effects.  Among  these 
causes  are  mentioned,  by  President  Edwards,  "motives 
exhibited  to  the  understanding."  And  Dr.  Edwards 

says,  "  By  moral  necessity," "  I  inean  all  necessity 

or  previous  certainty  of  the  volition  or  voluntary  action 

*  Edwards  on  the  Will :  Part  I,  Sec.  4.    Part  IV,  Sec.  4. 
f  Dr.  Edwards,  on  Liberty  and  Necessity,  p.  6. 


LIBERTY     AND     NECESSITY.  105 

of  a  rational  being,  whatever  be  the  cause  or  influence 
by  which  that  necessity  is  established."  "  Though  vo- 
litions may  be  the  effects  of  a  bias  of  mind  bom  with 
us,  yet  those  volitions  are  moral  acts,  and  therefore 
the  necessity  from  which  they  proceed,  is  a  moral  neces- 
sity."* The  effects  are  called  moral,  because  they  are 
themselves  right  or  wrong ;  but  the  causes  are  called 
moral,  because  right  or  wrong  actions  proceed  from 
them.  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke  observes,  that  "moral  neces- 
sity, in  true  and  philosophical  strictness,  is  not  indeed 
any  necessity  at  all;  but  is  merely  a. figurative  manner 
of  speaking."!  And  even  President  Edwards  says;  "I 
have  largely  declared,  that  the  connection  between  ante- 
cedent things  and  consequent  ones,  which  takes  place 
with  regard  to  the  acts  of  men's  wills,  which  is  called 
moral  necessity,  is  called  by  the  name  of  necessity  im- 
proper /2/."J  He  speaks  of  it  as  a  metaphysical,  specu- 
lative and  abstract  notion.  If  an  expression  which  is 
so  liable  to  be  misinterpreted,  is  still  retained  in  use,  it 
ought  to  be  employed  with  very  great  caution,  and  to 
be  accompanied  with  such  explanations  as  will  effect- 
ually guard  it  against  perversion. <§» 

*  Essays  on  Liberty  and  Necessity,  pp.  13,  19. 
f  Answer  to  Collins,  p.  15. 

\  Remarks  on  the  Essays  on  the  Principles  of  Morality  and  Nat- 
ural Religion. 
§  See  Examination  of  Edwards,  Sec.  2  and  3. 


106 


SECTION    Y. 

ABILITY     AND     INABILITY. 

Inability  in  relation  to  external  conduct — Natural  and  moral  ina- 
bility—  Opposition  to  the  will  belongs  to  natural  inability — Ina- 
bility in  relation  to  acts  of  the  will — President  Edwards'  defini- 
tion of  moral  inability — Different  meanings  of  the  terms  ability, 
inability,  &c. — In  what  sense,  is  ability  commensurate  with  obli- 
gation?— Controversies  respecting  inability — Practical  applica- 
tion of  the  doctrine  of  ability  and  inability — Natural  and  moral 
inability. 

IN  no  department  of  theological  philosophy  has  the 
confusion  of  tongues  been  more  complete,  than  in  the 
use  of  the  terms  ability  and  inability,  can  and  can  not, 
unavoidable,  &c.  Throughout  entire  campaigns  of  met- 
aphysical warfare,  there  has  been  little  else  than  a  dex- 
trous brandishing  of  weapons  furnished  by  this  ambig- 
uous phraseology.  Such  controversies  must  be  inter- 
minable, unless  the  combatants  can  come  to  some  agree- 
ment with  respect  to  the  interpretation  to  be  given  to 
the  principal  terms  in  the  discussion. 

In  familiar  language,  and  with  reference  to  external 
conduct,  the  most  common  meaning  of  the  terms  ability, 
inability,  &c.  is  very  simple  and  distinct.  A  man  is 
said  to  be  able  to  do  a  thing,  if  he  does  it  whenever  he 
wills  to  do  it ;  in  other  words,  when  there  is  nothing  to 
prevent  him  from  doing  it,  but  a  want  of  inclination. 
If  there  is  something  else  which,  in  opposition  to  his 
will,  effectually  restrains  him  from  acting  in  the  case, 


ABILITY     AND     INABILITY.  107 

he  is  said  to  be  unable.  But  not  unfrequently,  in  philo- 
sophical discussion,  and  even  in  common  use,  inability 
implies  nothing  more  than  strong  disinclination.  A 
miser  can  not  be  liberal.  Joseph's  brethren  "  could  not 
speak  peaceably  to  him."  The  apostle  Peter  speaks  of 
men  "having  eyes  full  of  adultery,  and  that  cannot 
cease  from  sin."  In  these,  and  in  similar  instances, 
power  is  to  be  understood  according  to  its  most  extensive 
signification,  as  including  not  only  the  common  requi- 
sites for  action,  but  also  a  willing  mind.  To  distin- 
guish the  two  kinds  of  inability,  one  has  been  called 
natural,  and  the  other  moral.  If  there  is  any  thing  be- 
sides want  of  inclination,  which  prevents  a  man  from 
performing  a  particular  act,  he  is  said  to  be  naturally 
unable  to  do  it.  If  unwillingness  is  the  only  obstacle 
in  the  way,  he  is  said  to  be  morally  unable.  That 
which  prevents  a  man  from  doing  as  he  will,  is  natural 
inability.  That  which  prevents  him  from  doing-  as  he 
ought,  is  moral  inability. 

In  natural  inability,  that  which  is  most  properly  call- 
ed inability,  two  elements  are  implied  ;  first,  some  obsta- 
cle to  the  performance  of  that  which  is  willed ;  second- 
ly, opposition  between  the  obstacle  and  the  will.  In 
moral  inability,  no  such  opposition  can  be  supposed ;  as 
the  obstacle  in  the  way  is  unwillingness  itself.  There 
may,  indeed,  be  opposition  to  this  state  of  the  will ;  but 
it  does  not  appertain  to  the  inability  which  there  is  in 
the  case.  For,  by  the  supposition,  the  inability  depends 
on  the  unwillingness.  Any  opposition  to  this  unwilling- 
ness, therefore,  is  opposition  to  the  inability,  and  of 
course,  can  not  constitute  a  part  of  it.  A  son  is  pre- 
vented, by  a  perverse  will,  from  obeying  the  orders  of 


108         ABILITY  AND  INABILITY. 

his  father.  There  may  be,  at  the  same  time,  a  severe 
struggle  in  his  mind,  between  this  perverseness  and  his 
apprehension  of  punishment,  or  the  remonstrances  of 
conscience,  urging  him  to  a  contrary  decision.  But  his 
fears  of  correction,  or  conviction  of  duty,  are  no  part  of 
the  unwillingness  which  prevents  him  from  obeying. 
They  are  as  much  opposed  to  his  moral  inability,  as  to 
his  disobedient  perverseness.  But  in  the  case  of  natu- 
ral inability,  the  opposition  to  the  will  belongs  to  the 
very  obstacle  which  lies  in  the  way  of  performing  that 
which  is  willed.  If  a  man  desires  to  raise  a  weight  for 
which  his  physical  strength  is  insufficient,  his  inability 
is  not  in  his  will,  but  in  that  which  is  opposed  to  his 
will. 

The  distinction  between  natural  and  moral  inability 
would  be  easily  understood,  if  in  its  application,  it  were 
confined  to  external  conduct.  But  philosophers  and  di- 
vines have  occasion  to  carry  back  their  inquiries,  from 
outward  actions,  to  the  acts  of  the  will  itself.  Here  the 
distinction  between  the  two  kinds  of  inability  becomes 
more  liable  to  misapprehension.  If  a  man  is  unable  to 
do  a  particular  act,  it  must  be  either  because  he  is  un- 
willing, which  is  moral  inability ;  or  because  he  could 
not  if  he  would,  which  is  natural  inability.  But  if  he 
is  unable  to  will  in  a  particular  way,  is  it  because  he 
ivills  not  to  will  so  ;  or  because  he  could  not  will  so,  if  he 
would  ?  The  first  part  of  the  alternative  implies  that 
every  volition  concerning  which  inability  is  predicated, 
is  preceded  by  another  volition.  The  other  part  im- 
plies, that  the  will  may  be  opposed  to  itself.  What 
then  can  be  the  meaning,  when  it  is  said,  that  a  man  is 
unable  to  will  as  he  ought  ?  On  this  point  theologians 


ABILITY  AND  INABILITY. 


109 


are  riot  agreed.  According  to  President  Edwards, 
"  Moral  inability  consists  either  in  the  want  of  inclina- 
tion, or  the  strength  of  a  contrary  inclination  j  or  the 
want  of  sufficient  motives  in  view,  to  induce  and  ex- 
cite the  act  of  the  will,  or  the  strength  of  apparent 
motives  to  the  contrary."*  If  inclination  here  be  un- 
derstood to  mean  volition,  the  former  part  of  this  defi- 
nition is  applicable  to  external  conduct.  It  imports  that 
a  man  is  morally  unable  to  perform  that  which  he 
does  not  choose  to  do.  But  the  latter  part  relates  ex- 
pressly to  acts  of  the  will.  If  it  be  an  executive  volition 
which  the  man  is  morally  unable  to  put  forth,  it  must, 
according  to  Edwards,  be  for  want  of  the  proper  emo- 
tions or  internal  motives.  If,  as  his  language,  in  other 
places,  would  admit,  the  required  act  of  will,  which  the 
man  is  morally  unable  to  exercise,  is  an  emotion  or  affec- 
tion, for  instance,  love  to  God ;  the  inability,  according 
to  the  definition,  must  be  owing  to  the  want  of  external 
motives  or  considerations,  fitted  to  excite  the  emotion, 
in  such  a  mind  as  his. 

Some  appear  to  suppose,  that  the  moral  inability  of 
willing  right,  is  precisely  of  the  same  nature,  as  the 
moral  inability  of  doing  right,  of  performing  a  required 
external  action  ;  that  is,  that  it  consists  in  previous  acts 
of  choice.  All  other  influence,  giving  a  wrong  direction 
to  the  will,  they  would  consider  as  natural  inability. 
According  to  Edwards,  moral  inability  consists  in  a 
want  of  something  on  which  virtuous  volitions  depend. 
According  to  others,  it  consists  in  a  want  of  power,  in 
imperative  acts  of  the  will,  to  control  the  affections. 

*  Freedom  of  the  Will,  Part  I,  Sec.  4. 
10 


110 


ABILITY     AND     INABILITY. 


Some  writers  define  moral  inability,  to  be  that  kind  of 
inability  which  is  consistent  with  accountability,  with 
desert  of  praise  or  blame.  This  would  be  well  enough, 
if  we  were  agreed  respecting  the  kinds  of  inability 
which  are  to  be  considered  as  consistent  with  accounta- 
bility. But  the  definition  ought  not  to  embrace  contro- 
verted points ;  especially  when  it  is  known,  that  many 
earnestly  contend,  that  all  inability  is  inconsistent  with 
accountability.  Even  President  Edwards'  definition  of 
moral  inability,  is  not  altogether  free  from  the  difficulty 
of  involving  a  controverted  point.  It  goes  on  the  sup- 
position, that  there  is  a  fixed  connection  between  mo- 
tives and  volitions  ;  which  many  deny.  His  definition 
can  not  be  consistently  adopted,  by  those  who  believe 
in  contingent  determination.  According  to  them,  the 
certain  dependence  of  volition  upon  any  thing  preceding, 
for  being  as  it  is,  would  imply  a  natural  inability  of 
acting  otherwise.  There  are  other  definitions  of  moral 
inability,  which  it  is  not  necessary  to  introduce  in  this 
place. 

No  way  has  yet  been  devised,  by  which  the  difficul- 
ties connected  with  this  subject  may  be  wholly  avoided. 
There  are  violent  and  long  continued  controversies,  with 
respect  to  the  inability  of  the  will,  among  those  who 
appear  to  differ  very  little  in  opinion,  except  as  to  the 
meaning  of  terms.  One  class  use  the  word  power,  and 
the  corresponding  expressions  in  their  greatest  latitude, 
to  include  all  the  antecedents  on  which  an  act  immedi- 
ately depends.  According  to  this  mode  of  explaining 
the  terms,  a  man  has  not  power  to  do  any  thing,  except 
what  he  actually  does.  Whatever  it  be,  which  prevents 
him  from  acting,  they  call  it  inability.  But  another 


ABILITY  AND  INABILITY.          Ill 

class  restrict  the  meaning  of  the  word  power,  to  those 
prerequisites  which  render  a  man  accountable  for  not 
acting,  or  for  acting  wrong.  If  it  be  an  external  action 
which  he  has  omitted,  merely  from  not  willing  to  do  it ; 
they  say  that  he  had  power  to  do  it,  but  would  not. 
If  he  fails  to  exercise  right  volitions,  for  no  other  rea- 
son than  a  perverse  disposition ;  they  say  that  he  has 
all  the  power  of  willing, right  which  is  requisite  to 
render  him  accountable.  There  is  something  which 
prevents  men  from  fully  obeying  the  divine  commands. 
Is  it  want  of  power,  or  want  of  inclination  merely? 
According  to  some,  want  of  inclination  to  obey  is 
itself  inability,  because  it  effectually  prevents  obedi- 
ence. According  to  others,  mere  want  of  inclination 
is  not  properly  called  inability.  It  is  no  excuse  for 
disobedience.  When  it  is  said,  that  obligation  is  com- 
mensurate with  ability,  that  we  are  not  bound  to  do  any 
thing  which  we  have  not  power  to  do,  the  term  power 
must  evidently  be  taken  in  a  limited  sense.  For  if  it 
embrace  not  only  capacity,  opportunity,  &c.  but  inclina- 
tion ;  if  it  comprehend  all  that  on  which  the  action  de- 
pends ;  then  the  assertion  amounts  to  this,  that  a  man  is 
not  under  obligation  to  do  any  thing,  but  what  he  actu- 
ally does.  If  he  has  all  the  prerequisites  to  a  particular 
act,  it  must  really  follow,  unless  its  taking  place  or  not 
is  a  matter  of  accident. 

A  large  portion  of  the  Christian  church  believe  that 
no  man  ever  did  or  ever  will  repent,  without  the  special 
influence  of  the  Divine  Spirit.  But  can  a  man  repent, 
has  he  power  to  repent,  without  this  influence?  On 
this  point  there  is  a  strenuous  debate,  among  those  who 
are  agreed  with  respect  to  the  facts  in  the  case.  Both 


112         ABILITY  AND  INABILITY. 

parties  believe,  that  a  man  never  will  repent,  without 
divine  influence.  They  are  agreed,  that  he  is  inexcusa- 
ble for  not  repenting.  But  they  differ  widely  with  re- 
spect to  the  meaning  of  the  terms  power  and  ability. 
An  effect  is  frequently  owing  to  the  combined  influence 
of  several  antecedents.  According  to  one  class  of  wri- 
ters, the  word  power  is  not  properly  applied  to  any  part 
of  these  taken  separately,  but  only  to  the  whole  taken 
collectively.  According  to  others,  some  power  belongs 
to  each  of  the  antecedents,  though  it  be  not,'  of  itself, 
sufficient  to  produce  the  effect.  If  the  strength  of  ten 
men  be  necessary  to  raise  a  given  weight,  a  single  indi- 
vidual can  not  do  it ;  and  therefore,  in  one  sense,  he  has 
no  power  over  the  weight.  But  in  another  sense,  he 
may  be  said  to  have  some  power  with  respect  to  it,  as 
he  possesses  a  part  of  the  strength  which  is  required  to 
raise  it.  In  the  controversy  respecting  ability  and  ina- 
bility, one  party  applies  the  term  power  exclusively  to 
the  aggregate  of  the  antecedents  upon  which  the  effect 
depends ;  the  other,  to  those  which  are  necessary  to  ac- 
countability. According  to  the  former,  a  man  has  not 
ability,  unless  he  has  a  willing  mind,  as  well  as  the 
other  qualifications  for  doing  his  duty.  According  to 
the  latter  he  has  ability,  if  the  want  of  a  right  will  is 
all  that  prevents  him  from  obeying.  One  side  main- 
tains, that  that  which  is  insufficient  to  effect  the  requir- 
ed change,  is  not  properly  called  power ;  that  it  can  be 
nothing  more  than  powerless  power.  The  other  insists, 
that  a  man  is  not  bound  to  do  that  which  he  has  no 
power  to  do.  In  short,  one  party  asserts,  that  a  man 
has  not  full  power  to  repent ;  the  other,  that  he  has 
some  power.  Is  there  any  contradiction  in  this  ?  Some 


ABILITY     AND     INABILITY. 


113 


believe,  that  a  man  has  not  full  power  to  repent,  and 
therefore  say,  that  he  has  not  ability ;  while  others  be- 
lieve, that  he  has  some  power  to  repent,  and  therefore 
say,  that  he  has  ability.  If  each  side  could  only  un- 
derstand the  meaning  of  the  other,  their  controversy,  on 
this  point,  would  be  at  an  end.  But  what  hope  is  there, 
that  they  can  be  brought  together,  so  long  as  they  are 
resolved  they  will  not  understand  each  other  ?  so  long 
as  each  refuses  to  hear  any  explanation  which  is  not  ex- 
pressed in  its  own  peculiar  dialect  ?  The  forms  of  ex- 
pression adopted  by  each  of  the  contending  parties,  are 
liable  to  perversion,  unless  very  cautiously  guarded 
against  misconstruction. 

There  are  two  most  momentous  practical  truths  con- 
nected with  the  question  of  inability ;  one,  that  a  sinner 
never  will  repent,  without  the  influence  of  the  Spirit ; 
the  other,  that  he  is  under  full  obligation  to  repent,  and 
wholly  inexcusable  for  not  repenting.  One  or  the  other 
of  these  truths,  he  who  persists  in  disobedience  will,  if 
possible,  disbelieve.  He  will  not  admit  both  his  depen- 
dence and  his  guilt.  If  you  tell  him,  in  unqualified  terms, 
that  he  can  repent,  he  will  draw  the  conclusion  that  he 
shall;  and  will  remain  at  ease,  loaiting  his  own  time 
for  repentance.  If  you  tell  him,  without  explanation, 
that  he  can  not  repent,  he  will  infer  that  he  is  not  under 
obligation  to  repent  of  himself,  and  will  profess  to  be 
waiting  God's  time  to  give  him  repentance.  Whatever 
language  you  use,  in  impressing  on  him  a  sense  of  his 
obligation  and  guilt,  you  need  to  guard  it  well,  lest  he 
remain  insensible  of  his  dependence  on  the  influence  of 
the  Spirit. 

10* 


114         ABILITY  AND  INABILITY. 

With  respect  to  the  terms  natural  and  moral  inability, 
though  it  is  a  matter  of  high  moment,  that  the  distinc- 
tion be  clearly  drawn,  between  that  want  of  power 
which  releases  from  obligation,  and  that  inability,  or 
whatever  else  it  may  be  called,  which  leaves  the  sinner 
without  excuse ;  yet  this  distinction  will  not,  to  every 
mind,  be  definitely  marked,  by  merely  using  the  above 
phrases.  Moral  inability,  when  applied  to  external  con- 
duct, appears  to  be  clearly  enough  defined,  by  those  who 
are  accustomed  to  use  the  expression.  It  signifies  noth- 
ing more  nor  less  than  decided  unwillingness.  A  man 
is  said  to  be  morally  unable  to  do  that  which  he  will  not 
do.  Many  consider  it  a  great  impropriety  to  speak  of 
mere  unwillingness  as  being  a  want  of  power.  It  is 
evidently  a  departure  from  the  original,  literal  meaning 
of  the  terms.  "  It  must  be  observed  concerning  moral 
inability,"  says  President  Edwards,  "that  the  word  ina- 
bility is  used  in  a  sense  very  diverse  from  its  original 
import.  The  word  signifies  only  a  natural  inability,  in 
the  proper  use  of  it."  "  A  man  can  not  be  truly  said  to 
be  unable  to  do  a  thing,  when  he  can  do  it  if  he  will." 
"No  inability  whatever  which  is  merely  moral,  is  prop- 
erly called  by  the  name  of  inability."*  The  common 
signification  of  inability,  as  has  already  been  observed, 
implies  two  things;  First,  that  there  is  some  thing 
which  will  effectually  prevent  the  action  spoken  of; 
Secondly,  that  this  prevention  is  in  opposition  to  the 
will ;  so  that  the  man  could  not  do  the  thing  if  he 
would.  Bat  what  is  called  moral  inability  includes  only 
one  of  these,,  that  which  will  effectually  prevent  the 

*  Edwards  on  the  Will,  Part  I,  Sec.  4,  and  Part  III,  See.  4. 


•9 
ABILITY    AND    INABILITY.  115 

action ;  though  this  be  nothing  but  the  will  itself,  and 
therefore  cannot  be  opposed  to  the  will.  But  from  the 
strength  of  early  association,  the  idea  of  opposition  will, 
in  many  minds,  be  almost  unavoidably  connected  with 
the  use  of  the  word  inability,  and  the  corresponding 
terms,  can  not,  impossible,  &c.  Yet  as  these  expres- 
sions are  occasionally  employed,  both  in  the  scriptures, 
and  in  familiar  discourse,  to  signify  unwillingness,  we 
are  not  justified  in  pronouncing  this  figurative  use  to  be 
wholly  improper. 

But  the  liability  to  misapprehension  respecting  the 
meaning  of  moral  inability  is  increased,  when  it  is  con- 
trasted, as  it  commonly  is,  with  natural  inability ;  ap- 
parently implying  that  moral  inability  is  not  natural  to 
man ;  that  his  unwillingness  to  do  his  duty,  does  not 
proceed  from  any  thing  belonging  to  his  nature.  This 
is  far  from  being  intended,  however,  by  those  divines 
who  most  frequently  make  the  distinction  of  which  we 
are  speaking.  "  When  I  use  this  distinction  of  moral 
and  natural  necessity,"  says  President  Edwards,  "I 
would  not  be  understood  to  suppose,  that  if  any  thing 
comes  to  pass  by  the  former  kind  of  necessity,  the  na- 
ture  of  things  is  not  concerned  in  it,  as  well  as  in  the 
latter."*  This  observation  is  as  applicable  to  moral  in- 
ability, as  to  moral  necessity ;  for  the  inability  to  do  a 
particular  thing,  is  only  a  different  expression  for  a  ne- 
cessity of  not  doing  it.  With  some  writers,  the  distinc- 
tion between  natural  and  moral  inability  appears  to  be 
this ;  that  the  former  will  certainly  prevent  particular  ac- 
tions, while  the  latter  interposes  such  a  difficulty  merely 

*  Freedom  of  the  Will,  Part  I,  Sec.  4, 


116  ABILITY     AND     INABILITY. 

as  will  probably  prevent  them.  And  when  they  hear 
it  asserted  by  others,  that  there  is  no  natural  inability  in 
the  way  of  a  sinner's  repenting  and  doing  his  duty; 
they  understand  the  meaning  to  be,  that  there  is  noth- 
ing, arising  from  his  nature  and  the  nature  of  things 
around  him,  which,  without  the  renewing  grace  of 
God,  will  certainly  prevent  him  from  repenting  and 
obeying.* 


*  See  Examination  of  Edwards,  Sec.  3  and  4.  ' 


117 


SECTION    VI. 

CONSCIOUSNESS     AND     ACCOUNTABILITY. 

Consciousness  of  power — In  what  sense  are  we  conscious  of  self- 
determination  ? — Liberty  of  indifference — Consciousness  of  lib- 
erty— Accountability  in  relation  to  external  conduct — to  acts  of 
the  will — to  emotions — and  to  purposes — Is  contingence  essential 
to  accountability? — Originating  volition — Avoiding  particular 
volitions. 

IT  is  often  said,  that  we  are  conscious  of  a  self-deter- 
mining power  in  the  will.  To  enable  ns  to  judge  of  the 
correctness  of  this  assertion,  it  is  necessary  that  we  un- 
derstand definitely  how  much  is  meant  to  be  implied  in 
consciousness,  and  what  kind  of  self-determining  power 
it  is,  of  which  we  are  said  to  be  conscious.  Writers  on 
mental  philosophy  define  consciousness  to  be  the  notice 
which  the  mind  takes  of  its  own  operations,  including 
thoughts,  volitions,  emotions,  &c.  In  what  sense,  then, 
can  a  man  be  conscious  of  power  ?  It  is  not  a  thing 
which  can  be  seen  in  the  abstract.  We  can  observe  it 
only,  by  taking  notice  of  some  change,  and  of  the  an- 
tecedents on  which  the  change  depends.  Dr.  Reid,  a 
zealous  advocate  for  self-determination,  says,  "  Power  is 
not  an  operation  of  the  mind,  and  therefore  is  no  object 
of  consciousness.  Indeed  every  operation  of  the  mind 
is  the  exertion  of  some  power  of  the  mind ;  but  we  are 
conscious  of  the  operation  only,  and  the  power  lies  be- 
hind the  scene.  And  though  we  may  justly  infer  the 


118  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

power  from  the  operation,  it  must  be  remembered,  that 
inferring  is  riot  the  province  of  consciousness,  but  of 
reason."*  We  are  conscious  of  willing  to  move  our 
limbs  ;  and  we  perceive  that  they  move  accordingly.  In 
this  case,  consciousness  and  perception  together  give  us 
a  knowledge  of  the  power  of  our  minds  over  the  mo- 
tions of  our  bodies.  One  mental  act  may  depend  on 
another  preceding  it.  As  both  these  are  objects  of  con- 
sciousness, it  may  be  proper  to  say,  that  we  are  con- 
scious of  the  power  of  one  over  the  other.  But  are  we 
conscious  that  every  act  of  our  mind  is  preceded  by 
another  ;  that  every  volition  is  preceded  by  another  vo- 
lition ? 

In  what  sense  are  we  conscious  of  a  self-determining 
power?  A  man  is  conscious  that  he  wills  or  deter- 
mines. This  implies  that  it  is  he  himself  who  wills  • 
that  his  volitions  are  his  own  acts,  and  not  the  acts  of 
another.  So  far  we  are  conscious  of  self-determination. 
But  are  we  conscious,  that  our  volitions  are  dependent 
on  nothing  preceding  ?  that  motives  from  without  have 
no  influence  in  determining  our  minds  to  choose  as  they 
do  ?  If  there  can  be  such  influence,  it  can  not  be  an 
object  of  consciousness ;  except  in  this  sense,  that  we 
may  be  conscious  of  its  effects.  For  that  which  is  with- 
out is  no  part  of  the  operations  of  our  minds.  The 
fact,  therefore,  that  we  are  not  conscious  of  external  in- 
fluence, does  not  prove  that  there  is  no  such  influence. 

Will  it  be  said,  that  we  know,  that  we  will  indepen- 
dently of  any  external  influence,  though  it  may  not  be 
proper  to  give  to  this  knowledge  the  name  of  conscious- 

*  Reid's  Active  Powers,  Essay  I,  Chapter  I. 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  119 

ness  ?  In  many  instances,  at  least,  we  know  the  con- 
trary. When  a  father  rushes  into  a  house  on  fire,  to 
snatch  his  child  from  the  flames,  does  he  act  indepen- 
dently of  all  influence  from  circumstances  ?  Has  the 
fire  no  concern  in  determining  which  way  his  will  shall 
turn  ?  If  there  are  instances  in  which  we  are  not  sen- 
sible of  any  external  influence  upon  us ;  is  our  igno- 
rance, in  the  case,  certain  proof  that  no  such  influence 
can  exist  ?  If  it  be  possible,  that  the  mind  may,  some- 
times, be  so  nicely  poised  between  two  objects,  to  all  ap- 
pearance, perfectly  alike,  as  to  present  a  case  of  liberty 
of  indifference  or  of  equilibrium  j  what  application  has 
this  to  the  determination  of  the  will,  by  the  great  in- 
terests of  social  life,  of  morality,  and  of  religion  ?  If  a 
man  may  be  indifferent  which  of  two  pepper  corns  to 
take,  what  effect  can  this  have  upon  his  choice  between 
the  practice  of  iniquity  and  the  service  of  God  ?  Are 
such  rare  and  trifling  cases  worthy  the  grave  considera- 
tion of  the  philosopher  ?  Are  we  conscious  that  our  af- 
fections and  passions,  however  strong  they  may  be,  have 
no  influence  upon  our  purposes  and  executive  volitions? 
Are  we  conscious,  that  neither  external  circumstances, 
nor  the  habitual  character  of  our  minds,  have  any  con- 
cern in  determining  the  nature  of  our  emotions  ?  Are 
we  conscious  that  motives  are  mere  objects  of  choice,  to 
which  we  are  perfectly  indifferent,  till  we  have  made 
our  election  ?  Are  we  conscious  that  we  are  able  to 
prefer  chains  and  a  dungeon,  in  themselves  considered, 
to  liberty,  and  the  light  of  heaven  ?  Are  we  conscious 
of  ever  acting  against  all  the  motives  which  are  before 
our  minds  ;  and  that,  without  any  inducement  to  such 
a  determination  ? 


120  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

But  are  we  not  conscious  of  liberty  ;  of  liberty  to  ei- 
ther side ;  of  a  power  of  contrary  volition  ?  We  are 
conscious  of  willing ;  and,  therefore,  we  know  intui- 
tively, that  we  have  the  power  of  willing ;  and  this  is 
what,  by  some,  is  called  liberty.  But  it  is  certain  that 
we  are  not  conscious  of  liberty,  in  every  sense  of  the 
word  ;  for  liberty,  as  defined  by  some  writers,  is  directly 
opposed  to  the  meaning  which  others  attach  to  the  term. 
We  are  not  conscious,  that  every  volition  is  dependent 
on  a. preceding  volition,  for  being  as  it  is;  and,  at  the 
same  time,  that  it  is  dependent  on  nothing  ;  that  it  is, 
in  the  absolute  sense,  contingent.  Yet  each  of  these 
considerations  enters  into  the  notion  of  liberty  as  main- 
tained by  different  writers.  We  are  conscious  of  fre- 
quently changing  our  purposes ;  of  willing,  sometimes, 
to  move  one  way,  and  at  other  times,  to  move  in  an  op- 
posite direction.  But  are  we  conscious,  that  these  chan- 
ges are  made  by  mere  contingence  j  that  they  are  de- 
pendent on  nothing  preceding  ;  on  no  condition,  motive, 
reason,  cause,  or  influence,  for  being  as  they  are,  rather 
than  otherwise  ?  If  it  be  claimed,  that  we  are  conscious 
of  having  power  to  will  otherwise  than  we  do ;  does 
this  power  include  all  the  antecedents  on  which  volition 
depends?  all  that  on  which  a  particular  volition  de- 
pends ?  Does  it  imply,  that  we  always  have  equal  in- 
clinations in  opposite  directions  ?  Are  we  equally  in- 
clined to  preserve  our  lives,  and  to  destroy  them  ;  to 
covet  wealth,  and  to  welcome  poverty ;  to  aspire  to  dis- 
tinction, and  to  seek  disgrace  ?  Is  the  genuine  patriot 
conscious  of  being  indifferent,  whether  he  saves  his 
country  or  betrays  it :  or  if  he  takes  a  deep  interest  in 
her  welfare,  is  he  conscious,  that  this  has  no  effect  what- 


ACCOUNTABILITY.  121 

ever  upon  his  conduct  ?  Is  the  Christian  conscious,  that 
nothing  but  the  power  of  contingent  determination,  has 
had  any  influence,  in  turning  him  from  sin  to  holiness  ? 
It  is  said,  that  we  are  conscious  of  originating  volition. 
We  are,  indeed,  conscious,  that  our  acts  of  choice  pro- 
ceed from  ourselves.  They  begin  with  us.  They  are 
not  made  elsewhere,  and  communicated  to  our  minds. 
But  does  this  imply,  that  nothing  antecedent  has  any 
influence,  in  determining  of  what  nature  they  shall  be  ? 

ACCOUNTABILITY. 

It  is  frequently  asserted,  that  a  self-determining  power 
is  essential  to  accountability;  to  a  conviction  of  guilt; 
to  a  feeling  of  moral  obligation.  How  can  a  man  be 
justly  blamed  or  punished,  for  doing  that  which  he  has 
no  power  to  avoid ;  or  for  omitting  that  which  he  has 
no  power  to  perform  ?  Ought  he  to  be  condemned,  for 
doing  as  well  as  he  can  ?  No  correct  view  can  be  taken 
on  this  point,  without  a  distinct  understanding  of  the 
meaning  which  is  to  be  given  to  the  expressions  "  no 
power,"  and  "  self-determining  power,"  in  this  connec- 
tion. There  is  no  difficulty  in  knowing  what  is  meant, 
when  the  language  is  applied  to  external  conduct.  All 
the  world  are  agreed,  that  a  man  is  not  to  blame  for 
failing  to  walk,  when  he  could  not  walk  if  he  would. 
And  for  this  plain  reason,  that  his  remaining  inactive,  in 
this  case,  is  no  indication  of  the  state  of  his  will.  If  he 
is  afflicted  with  convulsions,  his  limbs  move  without  his 
consent ;  the  motions  of  his  body  do  not  obey  the  orders 
of  his  will.  He  is  not  responsible  for  them,  because 
they  are  not,  properly  speaking,  his  motions. 
11 


122 


ACCOUNTABILITY. 


Bat  what  is  necessary  to  render  a  man  accountable 
for  acts  of  the  will  itself '?  They  must,  unquestionably, 
be  his  own  acts,  and  not  those  of  another.  He  must  be 
the  agent,  the  person  who  wills.  In  this  sense,  his  vo- 
litions are  self-determined.  And  if  he  actually  wills, 
he  certainly  has  power  to  will.  But  must  he  not  also 
have  power  to  will  the  contrary  ?  Now  what  can  this 
inquiry  mean  ?  Power  over  an  action  implies  some  an- 
tecedent or  antecedents,  on  which  the  action  depends. 
Volitions,  if  they  depend  upon  any  thing  besides  the 
agent  himself,  must  depend  on  his  feelings,  his  affec- 
tions, his  dispositions,  his  apprehensions.  When  it  is 
affirmed,  that  an  accountable  agent  must  have  poAver  to 
will  in  opposite  directions;  are  we  to  understand  the 
meaning  to  be,  that  he  has  equal  power  to  either  side  ; 
or  only  that  he  has  some  power  to  the  contrary  ?  If  the 
latter  only  be  intended,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  seeing, 
that  the  balance  of  feeling  may  be  so  decisively  on  one 
side,  as  to  control  the  man's  volitions.  Is  it  necessary 
to  accountable  agency,  that  the  feelings  for  and  against 
the  decisions  of  the  will,  should  be  equal?  Is  the  mur- 
derer free  from  guilt,  unless  he  has  as  strong  an  inclina- 
tion to  spare  his  victim,  as  to  take  his  life  ?  Is  the  sin- 
ner excusable  for  his  impenitence,  unless  he  has  an  equal 
disposition  to  obey  God,  and  to  disobey  him  ?  Are  the 
angels  in  heaven  deserving  of  no  praise  for  their  con- 
stancy, unless  they  have  an  equal  propensity  to  revolt  ? 
Is  Washington  entitled  to  no  credit,  for  giving  freedom 
to  his  country,  unless  it  can  be  proved,  that  he  was 
equally  inclined  to  betray  it  ?  Will  it  be  said,  that  al- 
though our  feelings  may  be  all  on  one  side,  or  much 
stronger  on  one  side,  than  on  the  other,  yet  that  this 


ACCOUNTABILITY. 


123 


does  not  determine  what  our  volitions  will  be  ?  How 
then,  from  a  man's  conduct,  can  any  opinion  be  formed 
of  his  feelings  ?  How  does  it  appear,  that  Judas  had 
not  as  sincere  an  attachment  to  his  master,  as  Peter  or 
John  ?  Why  may  we  not  ascribe  his  treachery  to  a  power 
of  willing  and  acting  contrary  to  his  disposition  ? 

Will  it  be  said,  that  the  liberty  to  either  side,  lies  in 
the  affections  themselves  ?  Is  it  true,  that  a  man's  affec- 
tions depend  on  nothing  preceding,  for  being  as  they 
are  ;  that  it  is  a  matter  of  perfect  accident,  whether  he 
loves  or  hates,  rejoices  or  mourns ;  and  that,  so  far  as  his 
feelings  are  owing  to  any  influence  from  within  or  with- 
out, he  is  not  accountable  for  them  ?  Or  will  it  be  said, 
that  he  can  control  his  affections  by  his  resolutions  or 
commanding  purposes ;  and  that  this  is  what  renders 
him  accountable  ?  But  are  resolutions  formed  without 
any  inducement ;  without  any  consideration  which  has 
an  influence  in  determining  what  they  shall  be  ? 

Must  we,  then,  come  to  the  conclusion,  that  we  are 
not  accountable  for  our  imperative  volitions,  or  our  pur- 
poses, or  our  affections,  or  the  state  of  our  hearts,  unless 
they  are  entirely  fortuitous ;  entirely  independent  of 
every  thing  preceding  ?  If  contingence  is  essential  to 
accountability ;  then,  so  far  as  any  thing  has  an  influ- 
ence in  determining  the  acts  or  states  of  our  minds,  so 
far  it  goes  to  destroy  their  moral  quality. 

A  man  is  not  considered  accountable  for  external  ac- 
tions, unless  they  depend  on  his  will.  Why  should  an 
opposite  principle  be  applied  to  his  volitions  ?  Why 
should  it  be  deemed  essential  to  his  responsibility,  that 
they  should  be  ^dependent  of  every  thing  preceding, 
for  being  as  they  are  ?  Is  it  said,  that  they  are  depend- 


124  ACCOUNTABILITY. 

ent  on  the  man  himself ;  that  he  is  accountable,  be- 
cause it  is  he  that  determines  of  what  character  his  acts 
shall  be  ?  Bat  does  this  imply,  that  he  wills  without 
any  regard  to  the  good  or  evil  in  the  objects  offered  to 
his  .choice?  Have  worldly  gratifications  no  influence 
on  the  decision  of  one  who  resolves  to  devote  himself 
to  the  pursuit  of  them  ?  Have  the  character  of  God, 
the  evil  of  sin,  and  the  interests  of  eternity,  no  concern 
in  determining  the  course  of  the  Christian  ?  If  it  be 
true,  that  our  acts  of  will  are  put  forth,  by  perfect  acci- 
dent ;  that  for  being  as  they  are,  rather  than  the  con- 
trary, they  have  no  dependence  on  the  state  of  the  heart, 
or  motives,  or  the  reasons,  causes,  and  conditions  of  vo- 
lition, or  on  any  thing  whatever ;  is  this  the  only  con- 
sideration which  renders  us  accountable  for  them  ?  Is 
absolute  contingence  the  sole  ground  of  responsibility  j 
of  our  deserving  praise  or  blame,  reward  or  punishment  ? 
It  is  sometimes  said  that  a  man  is  not  accountable  for 
acts  which  he  does  not  himself  originate.  Every  man 
does  originate  all  his  volitions,  in  this  sense,  that  they 
are  his  acts,  and  not  the  acts  of  another,  that  they  begin 
with  him,  that  they  do  not  exist  before  he  puts  them 
forth.  But  does  this  imply,  that  nothing  can  have  any 
influence  to  induce  him  to  originate  them  ? 

It  is  frequently  said,  that  if  a  man's  volitions  certainly 
follow  from  the  state  of  his  heart,  feelings,  desires,  &c.; 
then  he  can  not  avoid  willing  as  he  does ;  and  therefore 
can  not  be  accountable  for  his  acts  of  choice.  But  how 
can  he  any  more  avoid  willing  as  he  does,  on  the  oppo- 
site supposition,  that  his  volitions  spring  up  in  his  mind 
fortuitously,  without  depending,  for  being  as  they  are, 
on  any  thing  preceding  ?  The  question  is  not  whether 


ACCOUNTABILITY.  125 

his  volitions  are  his  own  ;  whether  it  is  he  that  chooses  ; 
or  something  else  for  him.  The  two  suppositions  agree 
in  this,  that  it  is  the  agent  himself  that  wills.  But  accor- 
ding to  the  one,  he  chooses  invariably  as  he  pleases. 
According  to  the  other,  his  volitions  have  no  certain 
conformity  to  his  feelings,  desires,  &c.  They  may  as 
often  happen  to  be  in  opposition  to  his  wishes,  as  in  ac- 
cordance with  them.  How  can  he  avoid  the  acts  which 
spring  up  in  his  mind,  with  entire  casualty  ?  To  ena- 
ble a  man  to  avoid  such  volitions  as  he  wishes  to  avoid, 
it  is  necessary  that  his  wishes  should  have  some  control 
over  his  volitions.  But  how  can  this  be,  if  they  come 
forth  fortuitously,  not  subject  to  any  control  whatever? 
What  prospective  measures  can  a  man  take,  to  guard 
against  improper  volitions,  if  nothing  previous  to  their 
actually  taking  place  can  be  of  any  avail,  towards  giving 
them  a  right  or  wrong  direction  ?* 

*  See  Examination  of  Edwards,  Sec.  13. 


11* 


126 


SECTION    VII. 

C  OMMO  N     SENSE. 

Customary  use  of  the  phrase — Philosophical  use — Intuitive  truths — 
Application  of  common  sense  to  philosophical  speculations— Re- 
marks of  President  Edwards — Decisions  of  common  sense  re- 
specting volition,  the  influence  of  motives,  and  accountable 
agency. 

AN  appeal  to  common  sense,  in  behalf  of  a  self-deter- 
mining power  of  the  will,  is  not  unfrequently  made. 
This  phrase,  in  customary  use,  has  a  meaning  sufficient- 
ly well  settled.  It  signifies  the  practical  judgment  ex- 
ercised by  the  mass  of  the  community,  especially  by 
men  of  plain  education,  on  subjects  with  which  they 
are  familiar,  in  the  common  business  and  intercourse  of 
life.  It  is  the  sense  of  common  men,  about  common 
things.  But  in  philosophical  speculations,  the  phrase  is 
not  entirely  free  from  ambiguity.  Some  writers  appear 
to  use  it,  as  nearly  or  exactly  synonymous  with  intui- 
tion ;  the  power  of  the  mind  to  decide  immediately  re- 
specting self-evident  truths ;  a  faculty  which  is  common 
to  all  mankind,  the  learned  and  the  unlearned.  In  pub- 
lic discussions,  propositions  ought  not  to  be  ranked  with 
intuitive  truths,  imless,  like  mathematical  axioms,  they 
are  universally  admitted.  That  which  is  self-evident 
to  one  man,  may  not  always  be  so  to  another.  But  for 
the  purposes  of  controversial  argument,  some  common 
ground  must  be  agreed  upon.  Nothing  should  be  taken 
for  granted  on  one  side3  which  is  not  admitted  by  the 


COMMON     SENSE.  127 

other.     To  assume  a  point  as  self-evident,  is  to  come  to 
a  conclusion  previous  to  discussion. 

But  it  is  presumed,  that  when  an  appeal  is  made  to 
common  sense,  in  behalf  of  self-determination,  it  is  in- 
tended that  the  phrase  should  be  understood  according 
to  its  usual  acceptation,  as  expressing  the  decision  of  the 
great  body  of  plain,  practical  men.  This  is  a  tribunal 
very  competent  to  judge,  in  cases  with  which  it  is  fa- 
miliar. But  on  points  of  intricate  philosophical  specu- 
lation, it  is  no  easy  matter  to  bring  a  statement  before 
men  not  versed  in  metaphysical  phraseology,  in  such  a 
shape  as  to  be  effectually  guarded  against  misapprehen- 
sion. The  common  people  know  what  liberty  means, 
as  they  are  accustomed  to  use  the  word.  But  they  are 
not  informed  of  all  the  strange  significations  which  are 
given  to  the  term,  in  metaphysical  speculation.  Ac- 
cording to  them,  a  man  is  in  the  enjoyment  of  liberty, 
when  he  does  as  he  will.  Now  if  you  present  a  case  for 
their  decision,  in  which  the  term  is  intended  to  have  a 
very  different  meaning,  their  verdict  may  be  correct, 
according  to  their  own  understanding  of  its  import ; 
while  it  has,  in  truth,  no  application  to  the  case  actually 
proposed.  "  There  is  a  grand  illusion,"  says  Edwards, 
"in  the  pretended  demonstration  of  Arminians  from 
common  sense.  The  main  strength  of  all  these  demon- 
strations, lies  in  that  prejudice  that  arises,  through  the 
insensible  change  of  the  use  and  meaning  of  such  terms 
as  liberty,  able,  unable,  necessary,  impossible,  unavoida- 
ble, invincible,  action,  &c.,  from  their  original  and  vul- 
gar sense,  to  a  metaphysical  sense,  entirely  diverse."* 

*  Freedom  of  the  Will,  Part  IV,  Sec,  4, 


128  COMMON     SENSE. 

Common  sense  decides,  that  a  man  is  free,  when  he 
does  as  he  will ;  that  is,  when  his  actions  are  obedient 
to  his  volitions.  But  has  common  sense  taken  up  this 
question  for  adjudication,  whether  we  will  as  we  will ; 
whether  every  volition  is  preceded  by  another,  on  which 
it  depends  ?  Common  sense  considers  a  man  accounta- 
ble for  what  he  does  willingly,  when  he  is  in  possession 
of  his  reason.  But  does  it  find  it  necessary,  before 
awarding  praise  or  blame,  to  inquire  whether  the  will 
always  follows  the  last  dictate  of  the  understanding  ; 
whether,  immediately  before  acting  freely,  it  must  be  in 
a  state  of  equilibrium ;  whether  every  volition  is  prece- 
ded by  an  infinite  series  of  volitions  ?  Does  a  jury  ever 
undertake  to  settle  these  points,  before  pronouncing  on 
the  innocence  or  guilt  of  the  accused  ?  Would  the  court 
allow  arguments  of  this  nature  to  be  addressed  to  them 
by  the  counsel  ?  Is  it  said,  that  the  common  people 
take  these  things  for  granted,  as  self-evident,  and  essen- 
tial to  freedom  ?  How  can  they  take  that  for  granted, 
which  they  do  not  even  think  of,  unless  some  specula- 
ting philosopher  has  made  efforts,  commonly  unavailing, 
to  introduce  into  their  minds  some  of  his  finely  wrought 
theories  ?  "  The  common  people,"  says  Edwards,  "  don't 
ascend  up,  in  their  reflections  and  abstractions,  to  the 
metaphysical  sources,  relations,  and  dependencies  of 
things,  in  order  to  form  their  notion  of  faultiness  or 
blame-worthiness.  They  don't  wait  till  they  have  de- 
cided, by  their  refinings,  what  first  determines  the  will  ; 
whether  it  be  determined  by  something  extrinsic  or  in- 
trinsic •  whether  volition  determines  volition,  or  wheth- 
er the  undertanding  determines  the  will ;  whether  there 
be  any  such  thing  as  metaphysicians  mean  by  contin- 


COMMON     SENSE. 


129 


gence,  (if  they  have  any  meaning  ;)  whether  there  be 
a  sort  of  a  strange  unaccountable  sovereignty  in  the 
will,  in  the  exercise  of  which,  by  its  own  sovereign  acts, 
it  brings  to  pass  all  its  own  sovereign  acts.  They  don't 
take  any  part  of  their  notion  of  fault  or  blame,  from  the 
resolution  of  any  such  questions.  If  this  were  the  case, 
there  are  multitudes,  yea,  the  far  greater  part  of  man- 
kind, nine  hundred  and  ninety-nine  out  of  a  thousand, 
that  would  live  and  die,  without  having  any  such  notion 
•as  that  of  fault  ever  entering  into  their  heads."* 

Common  sense  teaches,  that  motives  do  not  choose 
and  act  of  themselves,  without  an  agent ;  that  they  do 
not  lie,  or  swear,  or  steal.  But  is  it  a  doctrine  of  common 
sense,  that  the  agent  acts  without  motives  ;  or  that  mo- 
tives are  merely  objects,  upon  which  volition,  put  forth 
fortuitously,  may  fasten ;  that  they  have  no  influence 
whatever  upon  his  decision ;  that  the  sparkling  bowl 
offers  no  allurement  to  the  voluptuary  ;  that  to  the  thief, 
a  purse  of  guineas  presents  no  temptation  to  steal ;  that 
external  objects  have  no  effect  in  moving  the  passions; 
or  that  the  passions,  when  excited,  have  no  tendency  to 
give  a  direction  to  the  will  ?  Is  it  a  dictate  of  common 
sense,  that  acts  of  the  will  are  entirely  accidental ;  that 
they  are  affected  by  nothing  preceding,  either  appetites, 
or  emotions,  or  perceptions,  or  suggestions  of  imagina- 
tion ?  Common  sense  decides,  that  it  is  the  mind  itself 
which  determines  ;  that  is,  which  wills.  But  does  this 
imply,  that  it  always  determines,  by  a  preceding  deter- 
mination ;  that  whenever  it  chooses,  it  chooses  to  choose 
as  it  does;  that  its  choice  is  not  influenced  by  any 

*  Freedom  of  the  Will,  Part  IV,  Sec.  4, 


130 


COMMON     SENSE. 


thing  either  agreeable  or  disagreeable,  in  the  objects  pre- 
sented to  its  view,  or  in  any  of  their  relations  ? 

According  to  common  sense,  a  man  is  not  accountable, 
for  failing  to  do  that  which  he  has  no  power  to  do.  But 
suppose  that  some  philosophers  think  proper  to  include, 
under  the  term  power,  not  only  bodily  strength,  and 
understanding,  and  opportunity,  but  willingness  also  ; 
not  only  natural,  but  moral  ability  ;  in  short,  every  thing 
on  which  the  doing,  and  the  willing  to  do,  depends  ; 
does  common  sense  determine,  that  a  man  is  not  ac- 
countable, unless  he  has  all  this  power;  or  in  other 
words,  that  he  is  not  accountable,  for  failing  to  do  any 
thing  which  he  does  not  actually  do  ?  According  to 
common  sense,  a  man  is  not  to  blame  for  an  action, 
when  he  has  no  power  to  the  contrary  ;  when  the  action 
would  be  the  same,  whatever  his  will  concerning  it 
might  be.  But  does  this  imply,  that  he  is  not  to  blame 
for  doing  a  thing,  unless  his  will  is  equally  balanced  be- 
tween doing  and  not  doing  it ;  or  that  he  is  not  to  blame 
for  any  act  of  his  will,  unless  he '  is  equally  inclined  to 
will  the  contrary ;  or  that  he  is  not  to  blame  for  the  in- 
dulgence of  any  malignant  passion,  unless  his  disposi- 
tion has  an  equal  tendency  to  lead  him  to  the  exercise  of 
the  opposite  benevolent  affection  ? 

The  judgment  of  common  sense,  respecting  the  effi- 
cacy of  motives,  is  manifest  in  all  the  intercourse  of  life. 
Every  instance  in  which  one  man  endeavors  to  have  an 
influence  over  the  voluntary  conduct  of  another,  is  an 
example  of  the  universal  conviction,  that  motives  have 
more  or  less  power  over  the  will.  What  are  persuasions, 
but  means  of  giving  direction  to  the  volitions  of  oth- 
ers ?  They  may  not  always  be  effectual,  as  they  are 


COMMON     SENSE.  131 

liable  to  be  overbalanced  by  opposing  influence.  But  if 
they  have  any  adaptation  to  the  purpose  for  which  they 
are  used,  they  have  a  tendency  to  determine  the  acts  of 
the  will.  With  what  view  does  a  statesman  address  a 
popular  assembly,  if  not  to  bring  them  to  a  decision,  in 
conformity  with  his  wishes  ?  Why  does  the  faithful  min- 
ister of  Christ,  urge  upon  his  hearers  repentance  and 
obedience,  if  he  believes  that  their  volitions  are  entirely 
contingent  ?  What  is  civil  government,  but  a  system  of 
measures  designed  to  regulate  the  conduct  of  men,  by 
giving  direction  to  their  wills  ?  Of  what  avail  are  re- 
wards and  punishments,  promises  and  threatenings,  if 
human  volitions  are  determined  wholly  by  chance  ? 
For  what  purpose  is  temptation  to  be  avoided,  if  it  has 
no  influence  in  giving  a  wrong  direction  to  the  will  ? 
We  do  not  expect,  indeed,  that  the  same  means  will 
have  the  same  effect  upon  all  minds  ;  for  the  power  of 
a  motive  depends  on  the  relation  which  it  bears  to  the 
feelings  of  him  to  whom  it  is  presented.  It  is  by  adapt- 
ing our  arguments  and  persuasions  to  the  character  of 
the  persons  addressed,  that  we  hope  to  render  our  efforts 
successful.  The  way  in  which  we  endeavor  to  control 
our  own  future  volitions,  is  by  placing  ourselves  in  such 
circumstances,  and  bringing  into  view  such  considera- 
tions, as  will  tend  to  incline  our  wills,  in  the  direction 
which  we  wish.* 


*  See  Examination  of  Edwards,  Sec.  15. 


132 


SECTION    VIII. 

MECHANICAL     AND     PHYSICAL     AGENCY. 

Is  the  will  a  mere  machine  ? — Does  it  resemble  a  machine  ? — Sever- 
al significations  of  the  term  physical — Is  the  will  subject  to  phys- 
ical laws  ? — or  to  the  laws  of  cause  and  effect  ? — Motives  are 
not  the  sole  cause  of  volition — Is  the  certain  connection  between 
cause  and  effect  to  be  considered  as  physical  causation  ? — What 
is  meant  by  moral  certainty  ? — Certainty  ofknoivledge — President 
Edwards'  opinion — Dr.  Edwards  on  moral  certainty — Physical 
necessity. 

WE  sometimes  hear  it  said,  that  if  the  will  is  directed 
by  motives,  if  it  is  not  a  self-moving  power,  it  is  a  mere 
machine.  It  is  easy  to  use  words  without  meaning. 
What  is  a  machine  ?  It  is  commonly  understood  to  be 
an  instrument  entirely  composed  of  matter,  having  cer- 
tain movements^  and  set  in  operation  by  a  material  force. 
Has  the  will  or  its  acts  any  of  these  properties?  Is  it  a 
material  substance  ?  Has  it  any  bodily  motions  ?  Is  it 
impelled  by  a  mechanical  force  ?  Does  a  machine,  like 
the  mind  in  willing,  act  from  choice  ?  Is  it  under  the 
influence  of  rational  motives  ?  Is  it  moved  by  persua- 
sion, by  argument,  by  commands,  by  the  hope  of  re- 
ward, or  fear  of  punishment  ?  Nothing  of  all  this. 
But  if  the  mind,  in  its  volitions,  is  not  self-moved,  it 
resembles  a  machine,  in  this  respect,  that  its  acts  have  a 
dependence  upon  something  preceding.  So  does  the 
mind  resemble  a  machine  in  this,  that  both  have  a  real 
existence.  Is  it,  therefore,  a  mere  machine  ?  Both  have 


PHYSICAL     AGENCY. 


133 


begun  to  exist.  Does  this  prove  the  mind  to  be  a  ma- 
chine ?  Both  have  been  created.  Both  are  subject  to 
change.  Is  the  mind,  therefore,  nothing  more  nor  less 
than  a  machine  ?  The  human  understanding  is  una- 
voidably affected,  by  the  objects  in  the  world  around  it. 
Is  it  for  this  reason,  a  mere  machine  ?  Is  every  thing 
which  is  like  another  in  any  respect,  to  be  called  by  the 
same  name  ?  Is  man  an  elephant,  because  both  have 
the  faculties  of  hearing  and  seeing?  Is  the  human 
mind  a  watch,  or  a  clock,  because  its  volitions  succeed 
each  other,  like  the  beats  of  a  time  piece  ? 

PHYSICAL     AGENCY. 

Nearly  allied  to  the  objection  which  represents  depen- 
dent volition  as  being  mechanical,  is  another  which  con- 
siders such  volition  as  being  physical  agency,  rather 
than  moral.  The  multifarious  meanings  of  the  term 
physical,  render  it  difficult  to  determine  what  is  intend- 
ed by  this  objection.  It  is  one  of  those  pliable  words, 
which  may  be  made  to  mean  one  thing  or  another,  any 
thing  or  nothing,  as  occasion  may  require.  Its  proper 
signification  is,  according  to  nature.  Is  it  claimed,  that 
nothing  can  be  moral  agency,  but  that  which  is  contrary 
to  nature,  or  which  has  no  connection  with  nature  ? 

Physical  is  sometimes  used  in  reference  to  the  sub- 
stance of  the  mind,  in  distinction  from  its  acts.  By  the 
expression  physical  depravity,  is  often  meant  a  corrup- 
tion of  the  very  essence  of  the  soul,  as  distinguished 
from  its  exercises.  But  does  the  dependence  of  volition 
upon  the  mind,  render  it  a  part  of  the  substance  of  the 
mind  ?  Does  its  being  influenced  by  external  objects, 
make  it  to  be  of  the  same  nature  with  those  objects? 
12 


134  PHYSICAL     AGENCY. 

Can  acts  of  the  will  be  a  substance  of  any  kind  ?  Or  is 
this  the  meaning  of  the  objector,  that  volitions  must 
be  physical  and  not  moral,  if  they  depend  on  the  mind ; 
or  upon  any  other  substance  ?  Are  thought  and  memo- 
ry, hope  and  fear,  love  and  hatred  physical,  because  they 
depend  on  the  mind,  and  the  objects  which  are  brought 
before  it  ?  If  the  mind  is  the  cause  of  its  own  acts,  do 
they  not  proceed  from  a  substance  ?  Is  it  to  be  taken 
for  granted,  that  nothing  which  depends  on  any  thing 
else,  can  be  of  a  moral  nature  ? 

Is  the  purport  of  the  objection  this,  that  acts  of  the 
will  are  not  subject  to  the  laws  of  nature  ?  This  is  very 
true,  if  by  physical  laws  be  meant  those  ordinances  of 
heaven  by  which  the  motions  and  positions  of  material 
objects  are  regulated,  such  as  the  attraction  of  gravita- 
tion, chemical  affinity,  electrical  repulsion,  mechanical 
equilibrium,  the  quantity  and  direction  of  impelling 
forces.  Though  matter  may  have  an  influence  on  the 
mind,  it  is  not,  so  far  as  we  know,  in  the  way  in  which 
one  body  acts  on  another.  The  gold  of  the, miser  does 
not  determine  the  acts  of  his  will,  by  the  same  kind  of 
force,  as  that  by  which  it  turns  the  beam  of  the  jewel- 
ler's balance.  The  love  of  glory  which  inspires  the 
warrior,  does  not  move  him  on  to  battle,  with  an  im- 
pulse of  the  same  nature,  as  that  with  which  the  can- 
non shot  strikes  its  object.  The  passion  and  rage  which 
burst  forth  in  deeds  of  violence,  do  not  operate  in  pre- 
cisely the  same  manner  as  the  explosive  force  of  gun- 
powder. But  from  the  fact,  that  matter  has  its  laws, 
are  we  justified  in  drawing  the  conclusion,  that  the  will 
can  be  subject  to  no  laws  whatever;  or  if  it  have  laws 
of  its  own,  that  there  can  be  no  point  of  resemblance 


PHYSICAL     AGENCY.  135 

between  these  and  the  laws  of  matter  ?  A  law  is  com- 
monly understood  to  be  a  rule,  by  which  something  is 
regulated.  But,  to  avoid  admitting  any  resemblance  be- 
tween the  laws  of  matter  and  those  of  the  will,  must 
we  affirm,  that  the  latter  are  rules  by  which  nothing  is 
regulated  ;  that  they  are  only  the  ordinances  of  absolute 
and  blind  contingence  ?  To  what  extent,  are  we  to 
carry  this  denial  of  any  resemblance  between  the  prop- 
erties and  relations  of  matter,  and  the  prerogatives  of 
the  will.  Matter  exists  ;  is  the  will,  therefore,  a  nonen- 
tity ?  Matter  has  begun  to  exist ;  are  we,  therefore,  to 
conclude,  that  the  human  will,  if  it  exist  at  all,  has  ex- 
isted from  eternity?  The  properties  of  matter  have 
been  given  it  by  the  Creator ;  are  the  attributes  of  the 
will,  therefore,  self-existent?  Matter  continues  from 
one  day  to  another ;  is  it  denied,  that  this  is  the  case 
with  the  will  ?  The  motions  of  a  body  are  successive  ; 
does  it  follow,  that  there  is  no  succession  in  our  voli- 
tions ;  that  they  all  take  place  at  the  same  instant  ? 

Perhaps  it  may  be  thought,  that  the  objection  which 
we  are  considering,  is  principally  directed  against  the 
law  of  causation.  Because  material  phenomena  have 
their  causes,  does  it  follow,  that  volition  has  no  cause  ? 
If  so,  how  can  the  mind  be  the  cause  of  its  own  acts 
of  will  ?  The  evidence  that  human  volitions  depend 
on  something  preceding,  is  not  obtained,  by  reasoning 
analogically  from  the  axiom,  that  every  change  in  the 
natural  world  must  have  a  cause.  But  does  the  fact, 
that  changes  in  the  world  of  matter  must  have  a  cause, 
prove  that  acts  of  the  will  can  not  have  a  cause  ?  It 
must  not,  you  say,  be  a  cause  of  the  same  kind.  There 
must  be  no  physical  causation,  in  the  case  of  volition. 


136  PHYSICAL     AGENCY. 

Who  supposes  that  there  is?  Who  believes  that  any 
influence  acts  upon  the  will,  in  the  same  way  in  which 
the  wind  moves  a  ship,  or  a  stream  of  water  turns  the 
wheel  of  a  mill  ?  But  is  there  any  relation  of  cause 
and  effect,  between  external  motives  and  volitions? 
Not  in  the  sense  of  being  the  sole  cause.  Acts  of  choice 
are  not  produced  by  motives  without  a  mind,  any  more 
than  by  the  mind  without  motives.  A  motive  does  not 
examine,  compare;  and  choose.  But  do  volitions  come 
forth  fortuitously,  without  being  affected  by  any  influ- 
ence whatever  ?  Do  they  depend  on  nothing  preceding 
for  being  as  they  are,  rather  that  otherwise  ?  Does  it 
make  no  difference  what  motives  are  before  the  mind, 
when  it  is  about  to  will  ?  The  result  of  the  same  ex- 
ternal influence,  operating  upon  different  minds,  may 
undoubtedly  be  very  different.  But  does  this  prove, 
that  the  difference  in  the  volitions,  is  not  owing  to  a 
difference  in  any  of  the  antecedents?  While  every 
material  phenomenon  has  its  cause,  is  chance  the  su- 
preme law  of  the  moral  world  ?  Is  every  thing  physi- 
ical,  which  is  not,  in  the  absolute  sense,  contingent  ? 

Is  it  the  certain  connection  between  cause  and  effect, 
which  is  considered  as  inadmissible  in  the  case  of  voli- 
tion ?  Is  it  this  that  is  called  physical  causation  ?  And 
is  it  true,  that  certainty  belongs  only  to  the  relations  of 
the  material  world  ?  Or  if  it  extend  to  mental  phenom- 
ena, is  it  confined  to  the  understanding,  without  having 
any  application  to  the  will  ?  Is  uncertainty  the  univer- 
sal law  of  accountable  agency?  Is  there  no  certainty 
that  fallen  men  will  continue  in  sin,  till  they  are  renew- 
ed by  the  Spirit  of  God  ?  Is  there  no  ground  of  assur- 
ance, that  in  the  days  of  the  millennium,  the  hearts  of 


PHYSICAL     AGENCY.  137 

the  children  of  men  will  be  turned  to  the  Lord  ?  Will 
there  not  be  causes  in  operation,  of  sufficient  efficacy  to 
secure  this  result  ?  Is  there  no  certainty,  that  the  saints 
in  heaven  will  continue  steadfast  in  holiness  ?  Is  there 
nothing  more  than  a  strong  probability  ?  Even  this 
would  imply  the  general  prevalence  of  motives  favora- 
ble to  obedience,  over  influence  of  a  contrary  tendency. 
For  probability,  as  well  as  certainty,  has  its  laws,  though 
absolute  contingence  has  none.  It  may  be  said,  perhaps, 
that  there  is  a  moral  certainty  in  the  case,  but  not  a 
physical  certainty.  This  is  granting  all  that  is  asked, 
if  by  moral  certainty  be  meant  real  certainty  ;  a  sure 
connection  between  moral  acts  and  the  antecedents  on 
which  they  depend.  But  even  so  definite  arid  simple  a 
term  as  certainty,  when  subjected  to  metaphysical  treat- 
ment, is  not  without  ambiguity ;  especially  when  con- 
nected with  the  term  moral.  What  is  frequently  meant 
by  the  expression  moral  certainty,  is  no  certainty  at  all  ; 
but  merely  a  strong  probability.  It  is  often  used  to  dis- 
tinguish that  which  is,  in  some  degree,  doubtful,  from 
that  which  is  unquestionably  true. 

There  is  another  point  of  view,  in  which  the  term 
certainty  is  ambiguous.  There  is  certainty  of  know- 
ledge^ and  also  a  certainty  in  the  nature  and  relations  of 
things,  which  is  the  foundation  of  certain  knowledge. 
That  a  sphere  is  two  thirds  of  its  circumscribing  cylin- 
der, was  a  certain  truth,  long  before  it  was  discovered 
by  Archimedes.  Certain  knowledge  of  any  truth  im- 
plies, that  it  is  a  certain  truth.  It  is  certainly  known, 
because  it  is  certainly  true.  Some  metaphysicians  main- 
tain, that  volitions  which  are  neither  certain  in  them- 
selves, nor  certainly  dependent  on  any  thing  preceding, 


138  PHYSICAL     AGENCY. 

but  wholly  contingent,  may,  nevertheless,  be  certainly 
foreknown.  President  Edwards  was  of  a  different  opin- 
ion. "  Metaphysical  or  philosophical  necessity,"  he  ob- 
serves, "  is  nothing  different  from  their  certainty."  But 
to  prevent  misapprehension,  he  adds,  "  I  speak  not  now 
of  the  certainty  of  knowledge,  but  the  certainty  that  is 
in  things  themselves,  which  is  the  foundation  of  the 
certainty  of  the  knowledge  of  them."  "  There  must 
be  a  certainty  in  things  themselves,  before  they  are  cer- 
tainly known."  "  For  certainty  of  knowledge  is  noth- 
ing else  but  knowing  or  discerning  the  certainty  there 
is  in  the  things  themselves  which  are  known."*  He  is 
so  far  from  admitting,  that  that  which  is  uncertain  in 
itself  can  be  certainly  foreknown,  even  by  the  Divine 
Mind,  that  he  has  entered  into  an  extended  argument  to 
prove,  that  no  future  event  can  be  certainly  foreknown, 
whose  existence  is  contingent."! 

The  younger  Edwards  also,  though  he  frequently  as- 
serts, that  by  moral  necessity,  he  means  nothing  differ- 
ent from  the  certainty  of  moral  actions;  yet  shews 
abundantly,  that  by  certainty,  as  used  in  this  explanation, 
he  intends-  not  merely  certainty  of  knowledge,  but  a 
certainty  in  things  themselves,  and  in  their  relations. 
"  All  moral  actions,"  he  observes,  "  are  foreknown  by 
God,  in  consequence  of  an  antecedent  moral  necessity." 
"  As  God  sees  all  things  as  they  are,  therefore  when  he 
sees  them  to  be  certainly  future,  they  are  certainly  fu- 
ture ;  and  this  certain  futurity,  which  is  the  object  of  the 


*  Freedom  of  Will,  Part  I,  Sec.  3>  and  Part  II,  Sec.  12. 
f  Freedom  of  Will,  Part  II,  Sec.  12.     Examination  of  Edwards^ 
Sec.  11. 


PHYSICAL     AGENCY.  139 

divine  knowledge,  existed,  in  the  order  of  nature,  ante- 
cedently to  the  divine  knowledge."*  The  certainty 
which  he  calls  moral  certainty  is;  according  to  him,  "  the 
real  and  certain  connection  between  some  moral  action 
and  its  cause  ;"  not  the  certain  foreknowledge  of  an  ac- 
tion which  is,  in  the  absolute  sense,  contingent.  It  is 
objective,  and  not  merely  subjective  certainty.  "  No 
doubt  knowledge  in  the  Deity,  is  the  same  thing  with 
subjective  certainty,  or  certain  knowledge  ;  but  it  is  not 
the  same  with  objective  certainty,  or  the  truth  which  is 
the  object  of  the  divine  knowledge."! 

The  term  physical,  even  when  taken  by  itself,  is  a 
word  of  very  vague  signification.  But  when  it  is  com- 
bined with  another  ambiguous  term,  it  forms  a  com- 
pound the  meaning  of  which  is  still  more  multifarious. 
The  expression  physical  necessity,  for  instance,  compo- 
sed of  two  words  each  of  which  has  half  a  dozen  dif- 
ferent meanings,  is  sufficiently  indefinite  to  answer  the 
purposes  of  the  most  evasive  metaphysician.  Or  if  he 
ever  has  occasion  for  phraseology  still  more  ambiguous,  he 
has  only  to  call  to  his  aid  a  few  more  similar  expressions, 
such  as  necessary  cause,  physical  efficiency,  fatal  neces- 
sity, originating  volition,  efficient  cause,  irresistible  influ- 
ence, &c.,  taking  care  not  to  annex  to  them  any  definite 
signification.  The  whole  subject  of  the  freedom  of  the 
will,  may  easily  be  thrown  into  utter  confusion,  by  a 
liberal  use  of  a  few  ambiguous  words  and  phrases. 


Essays  on  Liberty  and  Necessity,  pp.  145,  149.        f  Page 


140 


SECTION  IX. 

MORAL     GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD. 

Has  the  government  of  God  any  influence  upon  the  human  will  ? — 
Has  his  providence  any  concern  in  giving  direction  to  volition  ? — 
Influence  of  commands  and  threatenings,  rewards  and  punish- 
ments— Does  God  merely  accommodate  his  administration  to 
what  he  foresees  will  be  the  conduct  of  his  creatures  ? — Have  the 
word  and  Spirit  of  God  any  efficacious  influence  upon  the  will  ? — 
Is  God  the  author  of  sin  ? — Why  has  he  not  prevented  all  sin  ? — 
Cou]^  he  not  do  this,  without  destroying  moral  agency  ? — Is  sin 
the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good  ? — Can  God  promote 
the  highest  good  of  the  universe  without  means  ? — Are  there  any 
limits  to  the  power  of  God  ? — Is  it  certain  that  the  highest  sup- 
posable  good  of  the  universe  is  actually  attainable  ? — Happiness 
of  God — Three  different  theories  to  account  for  the  origin  of 
evil — Agreement  of  the  three  suppositions — Difference  of  the 
suppositions. 

THE  deep  interest  which  belongs  to  the  subject  of 
contingent  self-determination,  lies  in  its  relation  to  the 
moral  government  of  God.  This,  in  the  more  enlarged 
acceptation  of  the  term,  is  commonly  understood  to 
mean  that  system  of  dispensations,  by  which  he  not 
only  distributes  rewards  and  punishments  to  the  right- 
eous and  the  wicked  ;  but  exerts  an  efficacious  influence 
in  favor  of  holiness,  and  in  opposition  to  iniquity.  It 
implies  that,  in  some  way  or  other,  he  has  the  power  of 
giving  a  direction  to  the  volitions  of  his  creatures ;  of 
securing  some  in  a  course  of  uniform  obedience,  and  re- 
covering others  from  the  dominion  of  sin.  The  great 


MORAL     GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD. 


141 


question  before  us  is,  whether  he  has,  in  fact,  any  such 
determining  influence  ;  or  whether  he  merely  arranges 
his  system  of  providential  and  retributive  dispensations, 
in  such  a  manner,  as  to  adapt  them  to  what  he  foresees 
may  happen  to  be  the  results  of  man's  voluntary  agency. 
The  very  definition  of  absolute  contingence  implies  that 
it  is  inconsistent  with  any  control  or  direction,  from  any 
cause  whatever.  If  the  nature  of  moral  agency  requires, 
that  whenever  two  objects  of  choice  are  before  the  mind, 
the  tendency  in  the  will  to  choose  the  one,  should  be 
exactly  balanced  by  its  tendency  to  choose  the  other ; 
and  if  any  influence  which  interposes  to  disturb  this 
equilibrium,  interferes  with  the  freedom  of  the  will  ; 
then  how  is  it  possible,  that  even  divine  power  should 
give  a  direction  to  the  acts  of  choice,  without  interfering 
with  the  accountability  of  the  agent  ?  The  impossi- 
bility in  the  case,  according  to  the  supposition,  is  not 
owing  to  any  limitation  of  power,  but  to  an  incompati- 
bility in  the  nature  of  things.  It  is  immaterial  what  is 
the  kind  or  degree  of  the  determining  influence,  if  all 
such  influence  is  inconsistent  with  voluntary  agency. 

If  contingency  is  an  essential  attribute  of  volition, 
then  God  can  not  create  moral  agents  with  such  a  na- 
ture, such  capacities,  and  such  propensities,  as  will  se- 
cure their  continuance  in  holiness.  To  say  that  a  man's 
volitions  are  contingent,  in  the  absolute  sense,  and  yet 
that  they  are  invariably  holy,  is  a  manifest  contradic- 
tion. There  is  no  uniformity  in  the  results  of  contin- 
gence. If  a  man's  volitions  are  rendered  holy,  by  the 
very  nature  which  his  Creator  has  given  him,  they  are 
not  left  to  the  determination  of  chance.  Nor  can  acts 
of  the  will,  if  they  are  contingent,  be  controlled  by  the 


142  MORAL     GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD. 


providence  of  God.  He  may  bring  objects  of  choice  be- 
fore the  mind,  and  thus  give  it  an  opportunity  to  make 
an  election.  But  so  far  as  these  objects  have  any  deter- 
mining influence  on  the  will,  they  must  affect  its  de- 
cision, in  a  way  inconsistent  with  contingence. 

The  same  observation  may  be  applied  to  what  is  more 
appropriately  called  the  moral  government  of  God ;  his 
commands  and  prohibitions,  his  promises  and  threaten- 
ings,  his  rewards  and  punishments.  To  what  purpose 
are  all  the  precepts  and  sanctions  of  his  law,  the  press- 
ing invitations  of  his  gospel,  the  representations  of  heav- 
enly glory,  and  the  terrors  of  the  world  of  perdition ;  if 
they  have  no  power  to  influence  the  decisions  of  the 
will,  without  destroying  moral  agency ;  if  their  efficacy 
is  inconsistent  with  that  contingence  which  is  supposed 
to  be  essential  to  the  freedom  of  the  will  ? 

How  can  the  doctrine,  that  volition  is  independent  of 
all  directing  power  of  motives,  be  reconciled  with  what 
is  commonly  understood  to  be  the  benevolent  design  of 
the  divine  administration,  the  increase  and  continuance 
of  holiness  and  consequent  happiness  ?  Has  the  law  of 
God,  with  its  penalty,  its  promises,  and  its  threatenings, 
no  tendency  to  promote  obedience,  and  deter  from 
transgression  ?  From  the  exhibitions  of  mercy  in  the 
gospel,  from  the  sufferings  and  death  of  the  Savior,  from 
his  compassionate  calls  to  those  who  are  ready  to  perish, 
from  the  offers  of  a  free  and  everlasting  salvation,  does 
there  come  no  influence  which  can  reach  the  heart,  to 
bring  forth  holy  affections,  and  purposes  and  works  ?  If 
both  the  law  and  the  gospel  are  really  efficacious,  in  re- 
straining iniquity  and  promoting  holiness,  is  this  at  the 
expense  of  the  free  agency  of  man  ?  What  purpose  is 


MORAL     GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD.  143 

to  be  answered,  by  the  manifestations  of  majesty,  and 
justice,  and  grace,  in  the  retributions  of  the  judgment 
day  ;  if  they  are  to  have  no  effect  to  bind  the  heavenly 
hosts  in  firmer  bonds  of  love  and  gratitude,  arid  allegi- 
ance to  their  Maker  ?  Of  what  avail  are  all  the  terrors 
of  the  eternal  prison,  if  they  have  no  tendency  to  deter 
others  from  disobedience  and  revolt.  Would  a  God  of 
infinite  compassion  inflict  punishment  on  his  creatures, 
even  when  it  is  deserved,  if  it  could  have  no  effect  in 
maintaining  the  authority  of  his  law,  and  securing  the 
holiness  and  happiness  of  his  kingdom  ?  If  acts  of  the 
will  are  altogether  contingent,  can  he  have  any  moral 
government,  any  course  of  dispensations  which  will 
have  a  determining  influence  over  the  volitions  of  his 
creatures  ? 

It  may  be  thought,  perhaps,  that  although  the  nature 
of  our  minds,  constitutional  propensities,  acquired  habits, 
circumstances,  and  motives,  are  not  the  causes  of  voli- 
tion, and  do  not  determine  of  what  character  they  shall 
be  ;  yet  the  omniscient  Ruler  of  the  universe,  having  a 
perfect  comprehension  of  all  the  possible  antecedents  of 
volition,  can  select  and  introduce,  into  his  providential 
arrangements,  those  which  he  foresees  will  be  followed 
by  certain  acts  of  the  will.  To  this  it  may  be  answer- 
ed, that  if  these  volitions  are  not  dependent  on  the  sup- 
posed antecedents,  then  no  change  in  the  antecedents 
would  make  any  difference  in  the  volitions ;  and  there- 
fore no  influence  would  be  exercised  over  the  volitions, 
by  any  regulation  of  the  antecedents.  But  if  the  voli- 
tions are  dependent,  they  are  not,  in  the  absolute  sense, 
contingent.  Their  character  is  determined  by  some- 
thing preceding. 


144  MORAL     GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD. 

If  man  is  no  longer  a  free  agent,  when  the  acts  of 
his  will  are  subject  to  any  determining  influence  ;  then 
the  Spirit  of  God  can  not  transform  the  heart,  arid  turn 
it  to  the  exercise  of  holiness.  Whether  he  operates  on 
the  mind  directly,  or  through  the  instrumentality  of  mo- 
tives ;  in  either  case,  if  a  change  of  the  will  is  effected, 
by  his  agency,  there  is  no  room  left  for  the  determining 
power  of  contingence.  But  if  this  has  absolute  control, 
neither  the  providence  of  God,  nor  his  government  and 
laws  ;  neither  the  mercy  of  the  gospel,  nor  the  terrors  of 
his  throne  of  judgment ;  neither  his  word  nor  his  Spirit  ; 
nor  all  these  together,  can  have  efficacy  sufficient  to  se- 
cure the  decisions  of  the  will.  No  accumulation  of 
power  comes  any  nearer  towards  gaining  the  point. 
The  greater  the  controlling  influence,  the  greater  the 
interference  with  the  determinations  of  contingence. 

But  if  the  volitions  of  accountable  agents  are  depen- 
dent, for  their  nature,  on  any  thing  preceding ;  if  con- 
tingence does  not  come  in,  to  break  the  chain  of  con- 
nection ;  then  the  Creator  may  have  a  determining  in- 
fluence over  the  volitions  themselves,  by  the  power 
which  he  possesses  over  the  causes,  conditions,  oc- 
casions, and  other  antecedents  on  which  choice  de- 
pends. If  the  natural  constitution  of  the  agent  has  any 
concern  in  deciding  the  character  of  his  volitions,  this 
constitution  is  moulded  by  the  hand  of  God.  If  external 
'motives  have  any  sway  over  the  will,  these  are  presented 
under  a  superintending  providence.  If  internal  percep- 
tions and  emotions  have  any  influence  on  volition,  these 
are  dependent  on  other  antecedents  which  are  tinder  the 
regulation  of  divine  power.  By  either  leaving  his  crea- 
tures to  themselves,  to  yield  to  their  own  propensities, 


MORAL    GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD. 


145 


and  the  various  influences  with  which,  in  the  natural 
course  of  events,  they  are  surrounded  ;  or  by  the  special 
interposition  of  his  providence,  whenever  he  sees  fit,  and 
by  the  agency  of  his  Spirit;  he  can  exercise  a  control- 
ling power  over  the  acts  of  the  will.  This  he  can  do, 
if  such  a  superintendence  is  not  inconsistent  with  the 
nature  of  moral  agency.  The  inquiry,  then,  concerning 
contingent  self-determination,  involves  no  less  a  question 
than  this ;  Whether  God  can  exercise  any  determining 
influence  over  the  moral  actions  of  his  creatures  ?  Are 
we  prepared  to  decide  this  momentous  question  in  the 
negative  ?  While  the  worlds  and  systems  of  worlds  in 
the  material  universe,  are  under  the  perfect  control  of 
their  Maker,  is  the  moral  world  unavoidably  left  to  the 
dominion  of  chance  ? 

It  may  be  thought,  perhaps,  that  although  God  can 
not  control  the  free  acts  of  his  creatures,  yet  he  may  ad- 
minister a  moral  government,  by  rendering  to  them 
righteous  retribution  ;  by  rewarding  or  punishing  them, 
according  to  their  deserts.  But  if  motives  have  no  ten- 
dency to  affect  the  decisions  of  the  will,  all  this  array 
of  precepts  and  penalties,  of  promises  and  threatenings, 
of  representations  of  heavenly  glory,  and  the  hopeless 
doom  of  the  finally  impenitent,  is  devoid  of  all  efficacy, 
for  the  promotion  of  holiness,  and  the  prevention  of 
iniquity.  It  has  no  influence  which  can  reach  the  em- 
pire of  contingence. 

AUT  HOR     OF     SIN. 

To  the  supposition,  that  human  volitions  are  de- 
pendent on  something  preceding,  for  being  as  they  are,  it 
may  be  objected,  that  this  makes  God  the  author  of  sin. 

13 


146 


MORAL     GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD. 


What  is  it  to  be  the  author  of  sin  ?  According  to  the 
proper  use  of  language,  it  is  to  commit  sin.  To  be  the 
author  of  sinful  actions,  is  to  do  that  which  is  sinful. 
To  be  the  author  of  sinful  volitions,  is  to  put  forth  such 
volitions.  The  author  of  sin  is  the  agent  who  wills  and 
does  the  evil.  To  avoid  bringing  upon  God  the  impu- 
tation of  being  the  author  of  sin,  is  it  necessary  to  con- 
sider all  sinful  volitions  as  contingent ;  having  no  de- 
pendence on  any  thing  preceding,  for  being  what  they 
are  ?  If  it  be  said,  that  they  are  dependent  upon  nothing 
but  the  nature  of  the  agent ;  will  it  also  be  said,  that 
this  nature  has  been  derived  from  nothing  preceding, 
that  it  has  come  into  existence  by  accident  ?  If  sin  must 
not  be  dependent  on  any  thing  which  is  dependent  on 
God,  then  he  can  do  nothing  in  his  providence,  which 
may  be  even  the  occasion  of  sin.  For  occasions  are 
among  the  antecedents  on  which  volition  depends.  Is 
it  making  God  the  author  of  sin,  to  ascribe  to  him  the 
creation  of  the  agent  who  sins  ?  Will  any  one  charge 
upon  God  the  sin  which  his  creatures  commit  ?  He  is 
the  author  of  their  being.  He  may  be  the  author  of  the 
circumstances  in  which  they  are  placed.  But  does  this 
make  him  the  author  of  their  sin  ?  If  it  does,  how  is 
the  difficulty  removed,  by  considering  volitions  as  alto- 
gether contingent ;  by  representing  it  to  be  the  very  na- 
ture of  a  moral  agent,  to  be  liable  to  sin  by  accident  ? 
Who  gave  to  man  this  nature,  from  which  contingent 
volitions  proceed  ?  Did  not  the  author  of  our  being  fore- 
see that,  with  such  a  nature  as  he  gave  us,  and  in  such 
a  world  as  that  in  which  he  placed  us,  we  should  not 
only  be  liable  to  sin,  but  should  actually  sin  ?  If  the 
millions  of  millions  of  volitions  which  are  put  forth  every 


MORAL     GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD.  147 

moment,  are  all  perfectly  contingent ;  that  is,  if  there 
is  an  even  chance,  with  respect  to  each  one,  whether  it 
will  be  sinful  or  holy,  it  is  certain  that  some  of  them 
will  be  sinful.  Is  the  author  of  our  moral  nature  to  be 
considered  the  author  of  these?  Is  our  Creator  the 
author  of  all  the  acts  of  his  creatures  ?  Is  he  to  be  con- 
sidered the  author  of  sin,  if  he  gives  being  to  that  which 
causes  sin  ?  Nothing  is  more  directly  the  cause  of  sin, 
than  the  sinner  himself.  -Yet  he  is  a  creature  of  God. 
Is  God  to  be  considered  the  author  of  sin,  if  he  has 
either  created  such  agents  as  would  be  liable  to  sin,  or 
brought  before  his  creatures  such  objects  as  might  in- 
fluence them  to  sin?  Is  he  the  author  of  sin,  if  he 
creates  a  being  who  will  certainly  sin  ?  In  our  fallen 
world,  it  is  certain  that  every  rational  creature  of  God 
will  sin. 

PREVENTION     OF      SIN. 

If  the  volitions  of  moral  agents  are  under  the  control 
of  the  Creator,  the  inquiry  may  be  made,  why  has  he 
not  wholly  prevented  the  existence  of  sin  ?  Perfect 
goodness  must  be  displeased  with  all  iniquity.  If  hu- 
man volitions  are  always  dependent  on  some  antecedent 
or  antecedents ;  if  these  are  connected  with  something 
preceding ;  if  the  links  in  the  chain  of  dependence  are 
uninterrupted,  till  they  terminate  in  the  self-existent 
cause  of  all  things  ;  does  not  he  hold  the  whole  succes- 
sion of  intermediate  causes,  of  circumstances,  and  agents, 
and  conditions,  and  occasions,  and  motives,  and  voli- 
tions, entirely  at  his  disposal  ?  Why  then  does  he  suffer 
that  which  he  abhors  to  take  place  ?  Does  not  the  ex- 
istence of  sin  imply  a  limit,  either  to  his  power,  or  to 
his  goodness  1 


148 


MORAL     GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD. 


This  difficulty  does  not  press  exclusively  upon  the 
opinion,  that  volitions  are  dependent  upon  something 
preceding,  for  being  what  they  are.  It  bears  upon  the 
scheme  of  the  objectors,  as  well  as  upon  that  of  their 
opponents.  Yet  they  bring  it  forward,  and  reiterate  it, 
with  an  air  of  triumph  which  indicates  their  forgetful- 
ness  of  the  force  with  which  it  may  be  turned  upon 
their  own  views.  Let  it  be  supposed,  that  volitions 
are  contingent.  It  is  generally  admitted,  by  those  who 
believe  that  this  is  the  case,  that  they  are  foreseen  by 
God.  Why  then  does  he  give  existence  to  beings  who 
he  knows  will  sin ;  and  that  many  of  them  will  so  sin, 
that  it  would  have  "  been  good  for  them  if  they  had 
never  been  born  ?'r  Will  it  be  said  that  he  could  not 
avoid  bringing  them  into  being,  consistently  with  the 
best  good  of  the  universe?  And  how  do  we  know, 
even  supposing  that  the  volitions  of  his  creatures  are 
under  his  control,  that  he  could  interpose  to  prevent 
all  sin,  in  a  way  consistent  with  the  best  good  of  the 
universe  ?  Do  you  say,  that  if  he  could  not,  it  must  be 
because  he  could  not  prevent  all  sin  without  destroying 
moral  agency  ?  Is  the  destroying  of  moral  agency  the 
only  evil  which  could  possibly  result  from  deranging  the 
plans  of  infinite  wisdom  and  benevolence  ?  If  it  be  ad- 
mitted, that  all  sin  can  not  be  prevented,  in  the  best 
moral  system  ;  does  it  follow,  that  it  could  not  be  pre- 
vented in  any  moral  system  ? 

Will  it  be  said,  that  if  we  do  not  adopt  the  opinion, 
that  sin  is  suffered  to  take  place  to  avoid  destroying  moral 
agency,  we  must  be  driven  to  the  position,  that  sin  itself 
is  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good  ?  Can  no 
intermediate  supposition  be  made  ?  Do  these  two  theo 


MORAL     GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD.  149 

ries  stand  in  such  relation  to  each  other,  that  either  one 
or  the  other  must  certainly  be  true  ?  God  has  arranged 
a  vast  and  complicated  system  of  means,  for  advancing 
the  interests  of  his  kingdom.  May  it  not  be  true,  that 
the  measures  necessary  to  prevent  all  sin,  would  involve 
such  a  change  in  this  system  of  means,  as  would  impair 
the  happiness  of  the  universe  ?  This  supposition  does 
not  necessarily  imply,  that  sin  itself  is  one  of  the  means 
of  the  greatest  good.  It  only  implies,  that  greater  good 
will  follow  from  the  permission*  of  sin,  than  could  result 
from  such  a  change  of  measures  in  the  moral  system,  as 
would  be  necessary  in  order  to  prevent  all  sin.  The 
means  which  God  employs,  for  enlarging  the  happiness 
of  his  kingdom,  may  be  so  perverted  by  his  creatures, 
as  to  become  the  occasion  of  sin.  The-  exalted  natures 
of  the  angels,  and  their  capacity  for  high  enjoyment, 
may  have  been,  to  some  of  them,  a  temptation  to  rebel- 
lion. The  bounties  of  providence,  which  in  rich  abun- 
dance are  spread  before  us  for  our  good,  are  our  principal 
temptations  to  sinful  indulgence.  The  plan  which  infi- 
nite benevolence  has  devised,  for  the  salvation  of  our 
race,  is,  by  multitudes,  perverted  to  licentiousness.  The 
long-continued  forbearance  of  God  towards  sinful  men, 
to  give  them  an  opportunity  of  securing  eternal  life,  is 
often  so  abused,  as  greatly  to  aggravate  their  guilt.  The 
measures  of  the  divine  providence  and  government  are 
not  all  employed  in  preventing  evil.  Some  must  be 
directed  to  the  attainment  of  positive  good ;  and  these 
may  indirectly  be  the  occasion  of  sin. 

*  Permission  of  sin  may  signify  either  not  forbidding  or  not  pre- 
venting sin.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  state,  that  the  expression 
is  to  be  understood  in  the  latter  sense  only,  in  this  discussion. 

13* 


150  MORAL,     GOVERNMENT     OF     G00. 

The  doctrine,  that  God  can  control,  at  pleasure,  the 
volitions  of  his  creatures,  does  not  necessarily  imply,  that 
he  can  do  this  without  means.  Do  you  say,  that  om- 
nipotence can  accomplish  every  thing,  by  any  means,  or 
even  with  no  means  ?  Then  surely  sin  is  not  the  neces- 
sary means  of  the  greatest  good ;  he  can  effect  his  be- 
neficent purposes  without  its  aid.  Is  it  urged,  that  to 
consider  means  necessary  in  the  government  of  God,  is 
limiting  his  power  ?  And  is  it  not  limiting  his  power, 
to  affirm  that  he  can  not  promote  the  highest  good,  ex- 
cept by  means  of  sin  ?  If  he  can  accomplish  all  hi& 
purposes  as  well  without  means  as  with  them,  why  does 
he  ever  make  use  of  means  ?* 

Do  we  always  understand  ourselves,  when  we  speak 
of  limitations  to  the  power  of  God  ?  May  it  not  some- 
times be  the  case,  that  what  we  call  a  limit  of  power,  is 
really  an  inconsistency  in  the  nature  and  relations  of 
things  ?  It  is  not  owing  to  defect  of  power,  that  the 
diameter  of  a  circle  can  not  be  made  equal  to  its  circum- 
ference ;  that  a  straight  line  can  not  be  made  to  coincide 
in  all  its  parts,  with  a  curve ;  or  that  a  world  can  not  be 
made  perfectly  happy,  while  perfectly  sinful.  In  the 
nature  and  relations  of  things  supposed  to  exist,  there 
may  be  inconsistencies  not  observed  by  us.  An  unedu- 
cated man  does  not  see  the  absurdity  of  affirming,  that 
the  three  angles  of  a  plane  triangle  may  be  greater  than 
two  right  angles.  "  With  God,  all  things  are  possible." 
But  the  suggestions  of  metaphysical  philosophy  are  not 
always  things.  Frequently,  they  are  neither  realities 

*  See  Chalmersr  Natural  Theology,  Vol.  II,  Book  V,  Chap.  !„ 
Sec.  17. 


MORAL    GOVERNMENT    OF    G  0  fi  < 

nor  possibilities.     A  God  of  infinite  power  and  benevo- 
lence will   undoubtedly  secure  the  highest  attainable 
good  of  the  created  universe.     But  every  created  thing 
is  finite.     Does  it  imply  any  deficiency  either  of  power 
or  of  goodness  in  God,  that  he  does  not  confer  infinite 
happiness  on  his  creation  ?     We  may  suppose  all  the 
holy  and  happy  beings  in  the  universe  to  be  as  holy  and 
happy  as  they  now  are,  or  as  they  ever  will  be  j  and  in 
addition  to  this,  that  all  who  are  now  sinful  and  misera- 
ble, should  be  entirely  holy  and  happy.     Would  not  this, 
to  our  fallible  apprehensions,  be  a  more  perfect  universe 
than  the  present  ?     Or  if  we  assume,  with  the  Univer- 
salist,  that  all  will  be  holy  and  happy  hereafter ;  we  may 
suppose,  that  they  might  have  been  as  holy  and  happy 
from  the  beginning.     We  may  suppose,  that  all  these 
might  have  commenced  their  existence,  ages  of  ages  be- 
fore they  did.     We  may  still  go  on  with  our  supposi- 
tions, till  we  imagine  an  infinite  number  of  created  be- 
ings, all  infinitely  .great,  and  infinitely  happy,  and  exist- 
ing from  eternity.     Is  there  no  impossibility  or  absurdity 
in  this  ?     Yet  any  thing  short  of  this,  implies  a  limita- 
tion somewhere  ;  not  a  limitation  of  the  power  of  Godj 
but  of  the  powers  and  capacities  of  things.     There  is  no 
avoiding  this  conclusion,  but  by  denying  that  there  ever 
has  been,  or  ever  will  be,  either  sin  or  misery,  in  this  or 
any  other  world.     By  admitting  such  a  limitation,  are 
we  guilty  of  ascribing  a  defect  to  the  power  or  goodness 
of  God  ?     May  it  not  be  inconsistent  with  the  nature 
of  things,  that  all  sin  should  be  prevented,  in  a  universe 
filled  with  intelligent  beings,  possessing  such  natures, 
capacities,  and  propensities,  placed  in  such  circumstances, 
and  with  such  motives  before  them,,  as  are  best  calcu- 
lated for  attaining  the  highest  good  ? 


152  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    OF     GOD. 

For  aught  that  we  can  tell,  it  may  be  necessary,  in 
carrying  into  execution  the  purposes  of  infinite  benevo- 
lence, not  only  that  means  should  be  used,  but  that 
there  should  be  a  choice  of  means ;  a  selection  of  those 
which  are  better  adapted  than  others  to  the  great  end 
proposed.  And  this  system  of  means  may  be  inconsist- 
ent with  such  a  course  of  measures  as  would  prevent  the 
existence  of  all  sin.  This  supposition  does  not  imply, 
that  sin  itself  is  one  of  the  necessary  means  by  which 
the  greatest  good  is  attained;  but  only  that  it  could  not 
be  wholly  prevented,  except  in  such  a  way  as  would  de- 
range and  impair  the  best  possible  system  of  means. 
According  to  this  view,  sin  is  neither  good  in  itself,  nor 
in  its  tendency.  Though  wholly  evil,  infinite  wisdom 
suffers  it  to  take  place,  rather  than  relinquish  the  course 
of  measures  which  are  necessary  to  the  best  good  of  the 
universe.  These  may  have  been  adopted,  not  for  the 
sake  of  the  sin  which  follows,  but  notwithstanding  the 
sin,  for  the  sake  of  the  good,  which  they  are  calculated 
to  produce,  and  which  greatly  overbalances  the  evil  of 
sin  and  its  consequences. 

Will  it  be  said,  that  God  must  be  rendered  unhappy, 
if  sin  and  misery  result  from  the  measures  which  are 
necessary  to  secure  the  highest  good  of  the  universe  ? 
Why  then  must  he  not  be  unhappy,  if  it  is  out  of  his 
power  to  secure  this  highest  good,  except  by  means  of 
the  sin  which  he  abhors?  On  either  supposition,  the 
actual  amount  of  sin  and  misery  is  the  same ;  and  is 
equally  displeasing  to  a  being  of  infinite  holiness  and  be- 
nevolence. Is  it  said,  that  he  would  be  more  happy,  if 
the  immense  good  of  his  kingdom  could  be  attained, 
without  involving  the  sin  and  suffering  of  any  of  his 


MORAL     GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD. 


153 


creatures  ?  Why  then  would  he  not  be  more  happy,  if 
this  immense  good  could  be  attained  in  some  other  way 
than  by  means  of  sin ;  so  that  all  those  who,  upon  the 
present  system,  are  or  will  be  perfectly  holy  and  happy, 
would  be  equally  so,  without  sin  in  others ;  and  in  addi- 
tion to  this,  that  those  who  are  now  lost  would  also  be 
perfectly  holy  and  happy  ?  Has  not  God  abundant 
reason  to  rejoice  in  his  works,  if  the  good  in  the  crea- 
tion immeasurably  overbalances  the  evil  ? 

The  three  suppositions  which  have  been  mentioned 
here,  respecting  the  origin  of  evil,  are  these  : 

1.  That  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest 
good. 

2.  That  sin  is  the  natural  consequence  of  a  moral  sys- 
tem ;  of  any  system  of  voluntary  agents. 

3.  That  sin  is  the  certain  consequence  of  the  best 
moral  system  ;  the  system  of  divine  administration  which 
will  result  in  the  highest  good  of  the  universe. 

In  what  respects  do  these  three  suppositions  agree, 
and  in  what  do  they  differ  ?  The  advocates  of  each,  it 
is  presumed,  will  agree  that  the  present  system  of  the 
created  universe,  considered  in  all  its  results,  in  all 
worlds,  and  throughout  all  ages,  is  the  best  possible  ;  or 
at  least,  that  none  better,  if  another  equally  good,  could 
have  been  produced  by  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness. 
By  the  best  possible  system,  is  meant  that  in  which  the 
greatest  attainable  good,  the  greatest  amount  of  holiness 
and  happiness,  will  be  actually  attained.  The  principle 
here  stated  may  be  inferred,  with  certainty,  from  the 
fact  that  all  the  parts  of  the  system  have  been  arranged 
and  are  superintended,  by  a  being  of  unlimited  goodness, 
intelligence  and  power  j  of  infinite  benevolence  to  choose, 


154  MORAL     GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD. 

of  infinite  skill  to  devise,  and  infinite  power  to  execute, 
the  best  possible  plan  of  a  created  universe.  We  may, 
indeed,  suppose  a  more  perfect  system,  than  that  which 
now  exists ;  but  to  affirm  that  there  might  have  been 
one  chosen,  from  which  better  results,  on  the  whole, 
could  be  obtained,  is  to  say  that  which  implies,  that  a 
God  of  infinite  benevolence  has  preferred  a  lesser  good 
to  a  greater.  It  may  be  said,  that  our  limited  capacities 
are  wholly  unable  to  bring  into  view  all  possible  sys- 
tems, and  by  a  comparison  of  their  respective  natures 
and  results,  to  determine  which  is  the  most  perfect.  It 
is  not  pretended  that  we  are  able  to  do  this ;  or  that, 
from  an  actual  survey  of  all  moral  systems,  we  judge 
that  the  best  has  been  selected.  But  to  the  omniscient 
mind,  they  must  be  all  present  at  one  view ;  and  if  there 
is  any  difference  between  them,  we  infer  from  his  per- 
fect benevolence,  that  the  one  which  He  has  adopted  is 
not  inferior  to  any  of  the  others. 

As  this  is  the  best  possible  system  of  created  things, 
or  certainly  one  of  the  best,  and  as  in  this,  sin  actually 
exists  j  it  would  seem,  that  the  respective  advocates  of 
the  three  suppositions  stated  above  must  further  agree, 
that  in  the  best  moral  system,  all  sin  could  not  be  pre- 
vented j — that  it  could  not  be  prevented,  by  divine  inter- 
position, consistently  with  that  course  of  measures  which 
infinite  wisdom  has  adopted,  for  attaining  the  ends  which 
infinite  benevolence  has  chosen. 

Again,  the  three  suppositions  must  agree  in  admitting 
that  there  is  a  limit,  not  to  the  divine  attributes,  but  to  the 
natures  and  capacities  of  created  beings,  and  consequent- 
ly, to  the  amount  of  good  to  which  they  can  attain. 
The  best  possible  system  is  not  the  best  supposable.  Sin 


MORAL     GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD.  155 

and  misery  actually  exist.  The  holiness  arid  happiness 
of  the  creation,  therefore,  are  not  infinite  ; — not  as  great 
as  they  would  be,  if  to  the  present  and  future  amount, 
there  could  be  added  the  holiness  and  happiness  of  all 
who,  in  the  present  system,  are  sinful  and  miserable. 

Still  farther,  it  would  seem,  that  the  advocates  of  the 
first  two  suppositions  must  admit  all  which  is  affirmed 
in  the  third.  If  according  to  the  first,  sin  is  the  neces- 
sary means  of  the  greatest  good,  then  it  must  be  the 
certain  consequence  of  the  best  moral  system.  And  if 
according  to  the  second,  sin  is  the  natural  consequence 
of  every  moral  system,  it  is  the  consequence  of  the  best. 
But  each  of  the  first  two  suppositions  affirms  something 
more  than  what  is  contained  in  the  third.  The  advo- 
cates of  the  first  two  appear  to  take  it  for  granted,  that 
the  only  alternative  in  the  case  must  be  this,  that  sin  is 
not  wholly  prevented,  under  the  divine  government, 
either  because,  so  far  as  it  is  not  restrained,  it  is  the 
means  of  the  greatest  good,  or  that  an  entire  prevention 
of  it  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  nature  of  moral 
agency.  Each  party  sees  that  to  one  of  the  suppositions 
there  are  formidable  objections;  and  finds  no  way  of 
escape  from  these,  but  by  adopting  the  other  alternative. 

By  the  third  supposition,  the  necessity  of  being  con- 
fined, in  our  inquiries,  within  the  limits  of  the  other 
two  is  avoided.  It  admits  of  a  different  mode  of  account- 
ing for  the  existence  of  sin,  under  the  government  of  a 
Being  infinitely  wise  and  benevolent.  It  differs  from 
the  first  supposition,  in  not  representing  the  sin  which 
exists  in  the  world  as  the  necessary  means  of  the  great- 
est good.  Why  then  has  it  not  been  wholly  prevented  ? 
May  not  the  reason  be  this,  that  it  could  not  be  entirely 


156  MORAL     GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD, 

excluded,  except  in  a  way  which  would  derange  and 
impair  the  best  system  of  measures  for  securing  the  great- 
est amount  of  positive  good  ?  According  to  this  expla- 
nation, the  Creator  and  Governor  of  the  universe  adopts 
no  measures  for  the  sake  of  introducing  sin  into  the  sys- 
tem ;  though  He  knows  that  what  he  designs  for  good, 
will  be  perverted  to  the  introduction  of  evil.  What  He 
is  supposed  to  purpose  is  not  directly  the  existence  of 
sin,  but  those  dispensations  of  benevolence  which  He 
foresees  will  become,  by  abuse,  the  occasion  of  sin. 
These  may  be  adopted,  not  merely  to  furnish  an  oppor- 
tunity of  overruling  sin  for  good  ;  but  for  the  valuable 
results  which  they  are  fitted  directly  to  produce,  greatly 
overbalancing  the  evil  of  sin  and  its  consequences,  of 
which  they  are,  by  perversion,  the  occasion.  This  ex- 
planation does  not  imply,  that  sin  and  its  consequences 
are  preferred  to  holiness  and  its  consequences,  in  the 
circumstances  in  which  sin  is  actually  committed.  It 
does  not  imply  that,  in  these  circumstances,  sin  answers 
a  better  purpose,  than  holiness  in  its  stead. 

The  third  supposition  above  differs  from  the  second, 
in  not  representing  the  prevention  of  all  sin  as  inconsist- 
ent with  the  nature  of  accountable  agency.  That  it  can 
not  be  wholly  prevented  in  the  best  moral  system,  we 
have  the  evidence  of  fact.  It  has  entered  a  universe  of 
accountable  beings,  under  the  government  of  infinite 
wisdom  and  goodness.  But  we  have  not  this  proof,  that 
it  must  take  place  in  every  supposable  system  of  volun- 
tary agents.  With  hypothetical  systems,  we  have  no 
practical  concern.  All  our  interests  lie  in  that  one  which 
a  God  of  boundless  wisdom  and  benevolence  has  chosen ; 
and  which  we  therefore  conclude  to  be  the  best  possible. 


MORAL     GOVERNMENT     OF     GOD.  157 

In  this  real  universe,  we  have  abundant  evidence,  both 
from  His  word  and  His  providence,  that  He  does  re- 
strain sin  ;  and  therefore,  that  this  interposition  is  not 
inconsistent  with  accountable  agency.  To  what  extent 
this  pre.vention  might  be  carried,  in  any  supposable  sys- 
tem, we  have  not  the  evidence  of  fact,  to  enable  us  to 
determine.  This  is  a  field  for  a  free  and  profitless  indul- 
gence in  metaphysical  speculation. 

It  does  not  come  within  the  design  of  the  present  in- 
quiry, to  discuss  the  subject  of  the  permission  of  sin, 
except  so  far  as  it  has  a  bearing  on  the  question  of  self- 
determination.* 

*  For  a  more  particular  view  of  this  subject,  see  Examination  of 
Edwards,  Sec.  1& 


14 


158 


SECTION   X. 

ACTIVITY     AND     DEPENDENCE. 

Ambiguity  of  the  terms  active  and  passive — Can  any  tiling  be  ac- 
tive and  passive,  at  the  same  time  ? — Mental  activity — Can  voli- 
tion be  passive  ? — Can  an  agent  be,  in  any  sense,  passive  ? — Can 
any  being  act,  if  he  is  acted  upon  ? — Mr.  Chubb  on  action  and 
passion. 

To  the  supposition,  that  the  will  is  dependent  on  any 
thing  without  itself,  for  the  nature  of  its  volitions,  it  is 
objected,  that  an  accountable  agent  must  be  an  active 
being  ;  that  dependence  implies,  that  he  who  is  the  sub- 
ject of  it  is  passive ;  and  that  these  are  opposite  quali- 
ties, each  being  inconsistent  with  the  other ;  so  that  he 
who  is  active  can  not,  at  the  same  time,  be  passive  or 
dependent.  These  are  terms  of  very  convenient  ambi- 
guity, with  which  it  is  easy  to  construct  a  plausible  but 
fallacious  argument.  The  word  passive  is  sometimes 
used  to  signify  that  which  is  inactive.  With  this  mean- 
ing, it  must,  of  course,  be  the  opposite  of  every  thing 
which  is  active.  To  say  that  that  which  is  in  this 
sense  passive,  is  at  the  same  time  active,  is  to  assert  that 
that  which  is  active  is  not  active.  But  this  is  not  the 
only  signification  of  the  term  passive  in  common  use.  It 
is  very  frequently  employed  to  express  the  relation  of  an 
effect  to  its  cause.  In  this  sense,  it  is  so  far  from  being 
inconsistent  with  activity,  that  activity  may  be  the  very 
effect  which  is  produced.  A  thing  may  be  caused  to 


ACTIVITY     AND     DEPENDENCE.  159 


be  active.  A  cannon  shot  is  said  to  be  passive,  with 
respect  to  the  charge  of  powder  which  impels  it.  But 
is  there  no  activity  given  to  the  ball  ?  Is  not  the  whirl- 
wind active,  when  it  tears  up  the  forest  ?  If  it  is,  does 
this  prove  that  it  has  no  cause  ;  that  it  has  not  received 
its  impulse  from  any  thing  without  itself?  But  are  not 
cause  and  effect,  you  ask,  opposite  in  their  nature  ? 
They  are  opposite  relations;  but  not  always  opposite 
things.  The  very  same  thing  may  be  both  cause  and 
effect.  The  mountain  wave,  which  is  the  effect  of  the 
wind,  may  be  the  cause  which  buries  the  ship  in  the 
ocean.  The  stream  of  volcanic  lava,  which  is  the  cause 
of  ruin  to  fields,  and  herds,  and  villages,  may  be  the 
effect  of  internal  fires  and  vapors.  The  same  thing  is 
not  both  cause  and  effect,  in  the  same  respect.  It  is  not 
the  cause  of  its  antecedents,  nor  the  effect  of  its  conse- 
quents. It  is  not  passive,  in  the  same  sense,  in  the  same 
relation,  in  which  it  is  active.  The  axe  is  passive,  with 
respect  to  the  hand  which  moves  it ;  but  active,  with 
respect  to  the  object  which  it  strikes.  The  wicket  club 
is  passive  in  receiving  motion  from  the  hand  of  the 
player ;  it  is  active  in  communicating'  motion  to  the  ball. 
It  may  be  objected,  that  these  are  all  examples  of  in- 
animate objects ;  and  that  they  have  no  proper  applica- 
tion to  mental  activity.  Take  then  the  case  of  deep 
and  earnest  thinking.  Is  there  no  activity  in  this  ? 
And  is  it  without  a  cause  ?  When  reading  the  orations 
of  Demosthenes,  or  the  demonstrations  of  Newton,  are 
our  minds  wholly  inactive ;  or  if  they  think  intensely, 
have  our  thoughts  no  dependence  on  the  book  before 
us  ?  Is  there  no  activity  in  the  passions  ?  Do  they 
always  burst  forth  without  a  cause  ?  When  a  patriotic 


160 


ACTIVITY     AND     DEPENDENCE. 


orator  rouses  his  countrymen  to  deeds  of  heroism,  is 
there  no  cause  of  their  impetuous  ardor? 

But  can  volition  be  passive  ?  Mast  it  not  be  alto- 
gether active  ?  A  volition  is  undoubtedly  an  act.  The 
mind  must,  therefore,  be  active  in  willing ;  and  if  the 
term  passive  be  used  to  signify  simply  that  which  is  in- 
active, the  will  can  not,  in  this  sense,  be  passive,  in  the 
same  exercise  in  which  it  is  active.  But  this  truism 
does  not  touch  the  question,  whether  volition  is  depend- 
ent, for  being  as  it  is,  on  any  thing  preceding,  and 
whether  it  is,  therefore,  in  that  sense,  passive.  The 
most  active  thing  in  the  world  may  be  passive,  in  the 
sense  of  being  dependent  for  its  activity  on  some  an- 
tecedent. It  may  be  caused  to  be  active.  This  will 
be  admitted,  with  respect  to  inanimate  matter,  if  not 
with  respect  to  the  understanding  also.  But  it  is  claim- 
ed, that  the  agency  of  the  will  implies  independence ; 
that  moral  action  is  opposed  not  only  to  inaction,  but  to 
its  being  affected  by  any  external  influence.  Now  if  a 
metaphysician  chooses  to  annex  to  the  terms  active,  ac- 
tion, and  activity,  when  applied  to  the  will,  a  meaning 
entirely  different  from  their  signification  in  all  other 
cases ;  and  even  in  this  case,  according  to  all  common 
usage ;  he  has  a  right  to  use  language  in  his  own  way, 
if  he  will  take  the  requisite  precaution  to  make  his 
anomalous  vocabulary  understood.  But  he  has  no  right 
to  avail  himself  of  this  license,  to  offer  to  the  public 
deceptive  arguments,  which  derive  all  their  plausibility 
from  an  artful  interchange  of  his  own,  with  the  common 
meaning. 

It  is  asserted,  that  to  be  an  agent,  is  to  act  independ- 
ently of  external  influence.     If  this  is  given  as  a  defi- 


ACTIVITY     AND     DEPENDENCE.  161 

nition  of  an  agent,  it  remains  still  to  be  shown,  that  the 
human  mind  is  in  fact  such  an  agent.  The  definition 
is  of  no  use,  unless  it  correspond  with  the  real  nature 
of  the  being  to  whom  it  is  applied.  Is  it  a  self-evident 
truth,  that  man  is  such  an  agent,  that  neither  his  natural 
constitution,  nor  his  acquired  propensities,  neither  his 
bodily  appetites,  nor  external  objects,  have  any  influ- 
ence in  determining  the  nature  of  his  volitions?  Can 
this  be  proved  by  any  analogy  with  the  material  world  ? 
The  vapor  which  gives  motion  to  the  steam  engine,  the 
fire  which  devours  a  dwelling,  the  wind  which  sweeps 
over  the  ocean,  are  all  very  active.  Does  it  follow,  that 
they  can  not  be  passive,  in  the  sense  of  being  depend- 
ent on  something  preceding?  Does  the  fact,  that  all 
activity  in  material  things  must  have  a  cause,  prove  that 
activity  of  will  can  not  have  a  cause  ?  Do  you  say,  that 
the  man  himself  is  the  cause  of  his  volitions  ?  Very 
true.  But  how  does  this  agree  with  the  assertion,  that 
that  activity  which  consists  in  willing  has  no  relation  to 
a  cause  ?  Do  you  still  insist,  that  the  agent  himself  is 
active,  and  not  passive  ?  Does  this  imply  that  he  is  un- 
caused ;  that  he  is  self-originated.  If  a  created  being 
can  be  an  agent,  he  can  be  active  in  willing,  though  he 
is  passive  in  relation  to  the  cause  of  his  being.  Do 
you  admit,  that  he  is  passive,  in  relation  to  the  cause  of 
his  existence  ;  but  deny  that  he  is  passive,  in  relation  to 
any  cause  of  his  activity  ?  Is  there  then  no  cause  of  his 
activity  ?  Is  it  a  mere  matter  of  accident,  that  he  wills 
as  he  does  ?  Is  absolute  contingence  an  essential  con- 
dition of  all  activity  of  the  will  ? 

It  has  been  said,  that  a  man  can  not  be  a  free  agent, 
if  he  is  a  mere  passive  recipient  of  influence  from  with- 
14* 


162  ACTIVITY     AND     DEPENDENCE. 

out.  This  is  very  true.  If  he  is  merely  passive;  he  is 
no  agent  at  all.  If  he  is  merely  passive,  he  is  not  ac- 
tive, and  therefore  does  not  act.  But  what  absurdity  is 
there  in  supposing,  that  he  may  be  active  and  passive 
too :  active  in  willing,  passive  in  being  caused  to  will  ? 
If  a  thing  is  caused  to  be  active,  does  it  follow,  that  it 
is  not  active :  that  it  is  merely  passive  ?  If  a  man  is 
made  willing  to  act  in  a  certain  way,  does  this  prove, 
that  he  is  not  willing  ?  Is  it  urged,  that  to  suppose  a 
man  to  be  caused  to  act  freely,  is  inconsistent  with  the 
definition  of  free  agency  ?  Would  it  not  be  more  to  the 
purpose,  to  endeavor  to  render  our  definitions  conform- 
able to  the  reality  of  things;  rather  than  to  take  it  for 
granted,  that  facts  correspond  with  our  arbitrary  defini- 
tions? Dr.  Reid  appears  to  suppose,  that  that  which  is 
acted  upon  can  not  act.  Would  he  say,  that  the  water 
wheel  can  not  act,  when  it  is  acted  upon  by  the  stream  ? 
1  am  aware  that  his  observations  were  probably  meant 
to  be  applied,  not  to  the  action  of  matter  upon  matter, 
but  to  the  agency  of  the  will.  The  laws  and  condi- 
tions of  these,  it  is  said,  are  not  only  different,  but  con- 
trary. Matter  can  not  act,  if  it  is  not  acted  upon ;  but 
the  will,  it  is  supposed,  can  not  act,  if  it  is  acted  upon. 
Why  not  ?  Because  this  would  be  inconsistent  with 
our  definition  of  action,  when  speaking  of  the  will. 
When  a  definition  is  framed,  for  the  express  purpose  of 
excluding  all  dependence  of  agency  of  the  will  upon 
any  thing  preceding  ;  it  is  easy  to  see,  that  such  agency, 
if  such  there  ever  was  or  can  be,  in  the  human  mind,  is 
inconsistent  with  being  acted  upon.  But  it  ought  to  be 
understood,  that  a  definition  is  not  argument.  It  is  of 
itself  no  proof.  Though  it  may  be  the  basis  of  an  ar- 


ACTIVITY     AND     DEPENDENCE.  163 

gument,  yet  something  more  is  necessary,  to  justify  us 
in  drawing  a  conclusion.  In  all  cases,  except  those  in 
which  our  reasoning  is  merely  hypothetical,  it  is  essen- 
tial to  a  good  definition,  that  it  correspond  with  fact. 
How,  then,  does  it  appear  to  be  a  fact,  that  the  will  can 
not  act,  when  it  is  acted  upon;  that  it  can  not  choose, 
when  it  is  caused  to  choose,  when  it  is  persuaded  to 
choose  ? 

To  maintain  the  doctrine  of  independent  volition, 
Mr.  Chubb  and  others  make  the  broad  assumption,  that 
whatever  is  active  can  not  be,  in  any  sense,  passive ; 
that  it  can  not  be  acted  upon  ;  that  it  can  not  sustain 
the  relation  of  an  effect  to  its  cause  ;  in  short,  that  noth- 
ing which  is  a  cause  can  be  an  effect,  and  nothing  which 
is  an  effect  can  be  a  cause.  From  this  it  follows,  that 
there  can  be  no  success-ion  of  causes,  one  depending  on 
another ;  that  every  cause  must  be  a  first  cause,  the 
commencement  of  a  series  of  changes  which  are  mere 
passive  effects.  No  place  is  here  left  for  the  common 
distinction  between  primary  and  secondary  causes ;  be- 
tween those  which  are  remote,  and  those  which  are  in- 
termediate, or  proximate  j  all  being  considered  as  o^igin- 
al  and  immediate. 

In  accordance  with  this  representation,  but  in  a  wide 
departure  from  the  common  use  of  language,  it  is  assum- 
ed that  in  the  material  world  there  is  no  action,  no 
cause  ;  all  its  changes  being  passive  effects  only.  The 
wind,  the  cataract,  the  tempest,  and  the  volcano,  unless 
they  are  self-determined,  are  the  causes  of  nothing,  are 
not  active  agents,  but  mere  passive  movements.  Being 
acted  upon,  they  can  not  act ;  being  effects,  they  can 
not  be  causes.  Even  mental  operations^  unless  they  are 


164  ACTIVITY     AND     DEPENDENCE. 

self-originated,  are  not  acknowledged  as  active.  Noth- 
ing is  called  a  cause  but  volition.  Action  is  synony- 
mous with  choice.  Even  this  is  allowed  the  privilege 
of  being  considered  as  active,  only  on  the  ground  that 
it  is  itself  uncaused.  If  it  is  acted  upon,  it  can  not  act. 

We  have  here  then  a  series  of  most  gratuitous  as- 
sumptions and  arbitrary  definitions,  viz.  that  the  mean- 
ing of  the  term  active  is  in  opposition  to  every  correct 
meaning  of  passive ;  that  nothing  which  is  acted  upon 
can  act ;  that  no  effect  can  be  a  cause  ;  that  a  material 
substance  never  acts,  and  is  the  cause  of  nothing ;  that 
what  are  called  acts  of  the  understanding  are,  properly 
speaking,  no  acts ;  that  the  only  appropriate  meaning  of 
action  is  volition,  and  that  even  this  can  not  be  passive, 
in  the  sense  of  being  subject  to  the  influence  of  a 
cause.  All  this  is  preparatory  to  the  final  assumption, 
which  is  a  complete  principii  petitio,  that  volition  is  in- 
dependent of  all  directing  influence  from  without  itself. 

Momentous  consequences  are  deducible  from  these 
unwarrantable  assumptions.  If  nothing  which  is  a 
cause  can  be  an  effect,  and  if  volition  is  the  cause  of 
any  changes  whatever,  then  it  is  itself  uncaused ;  and 
the  mind  is  not  the  cause  of  its  own  acts  of  choice,  be- 
ing only  the  subject  of  volitions  which  occur  without 
any  cause.  But  if  the  ground  be  taken,  that  the  mind 
is  the  cause  of  its  volitions,  then  according  to  the  phi- 
losophy under  consideration,  it  has  had  no  cause  of  it- 
self, and  is  not  a  created  substance.  If  it  has  been  cre- 
ated, it  is  an  effect,  and  therefore  can  be  the  cause  of 
nothing.  Again,  if  nothing  which  is  an  effect  can  be  a 
cause,  then  as  all  created  things  are  effects,  He  who 
made  them  must  be  the  only  cause  in  the  universe. 


165 


SECTION    XI. 

FATALISM     AND     PANTHEISM. 

Different  forms  of  Fatalism— Many  of  the  ancient  Fatalists  believ- 
ed the  acts  of  the  will  not  to  be  determined  by  the  Fates— Is 
there  no  middle  ground,  between  Fatalism  and  the  doctrine  of 
contingent  volition  ? — Pantheism  of  Spinoza. 

AN  argument  in  favor  of  independent  self-determina- 
tion is  drawn,  by  some,  from  the  consideration  that  it 
enables  us  to  keep  at  a  safe  distance  from  the  doctrine  of 
Fatalism.  Cousin  says,  "  The  theory  of  Locke  con- 
cerning freedom  tended  to  Fatalism."*  This  calling  in 
the  aid  of  an  odious  appellation,  is  a  very  convenient 
and  summary  mode  of  confuting  an  opponent.  It  has 
a  special  advantage,  when  the  name  which  is  substitu- 
ted for  argument,  is  so  indefinite  and  mysterious,  that 
the  reader  is  in  no  danger  of  discovering  its  meaning. 
Fatalism  is  commonly  understood  to  be  something  hea- 
thenish. But  it  has  assumed  such  a  diversity  of  forms, 
the  Astrological,  the  Platonic,  the  Stoical,  the  Mani- 
chean,  and  the  Mohammedan  fatality,  that  it  is  suffi- 
ciently unintelligible  to  answer  the  purpose  of  an  argu- 
ment which  is  most  efficacious  when  least  understood. 
It  would  be  a  more  simple,  if  not  a  more  satisfactory 
mode  of  reasoning,  to  offer  direct  proof  of  the  reality  of 
contingent  self-determination  ;  instead  of  taking  the  cir- 


*  Psychology,  277. 


166  FATALISM     AND     PANTHEISM. 

cuitous  method  of  first  making  a  selection  from  eight  or 
ten  different  kinds  of  Fatalism,  explaining  what  this  is, 
then  proving  it  to  be  false,  and  afterwards  supporting 
the  doctrine  of  self-determination,  by  shewing  in  what 
respect  it  differs  from  Fatalism.  Whatever  was  meant 
by  the  Fatalism  of  the  ancients,  it  did  not  imply,  that 
all  the  changes  in  the  world  are  under  the  guidance  of 
a  being  of  infinite  wisdom  and  infinite  goodness.  This 
was  so  far  from  being  the  case,  that  the  Gods  themselves 
were  represented,  by  the  doctrine,  as  being  under  the 
control  of  the  Fates.  According  to  the  astrological  Fa- 
talists, every  thing  was  affected  by  influence  derived 
from  the  motions,  positions,  and  aspects  of  the  heavenly 
bodies.  The  Stoics  and  some  other  sects  held  to  an 
eternal  succession  of  causes  and  effects,  analogous  to  the 
infinite  series  of  volitions  which  President  Edwards  as- 
cribes to  the  advocates  of  a  self-determining  power  in 
the  will.  It  is  urged  that  Fatalists  refer  every  change 
to  a  cause.  So  do  the  believers  in  self-determination  ; 
not  excepting  even  acts  of  the  will.  For  they  hold, 
that  the  agent  himself  is  the  cause  of  his  own  volitions. 
They  believe  also  in  a  succession  of  causes,  dependent 
on  God.  They  do  not  suppose  that  man  has  come  into 
being  by  chance.  They  admit  that  he  has  derived  his 
existence,  and  powers  of  willing  from  the  Creator.  But 
they  insist,  that  the  succession  of  causes  does  not  deter- 
mine volitions  to  be  in  one  direction,  rather  than  the 
contrary.  In  this  also,  they  agree  with  many  of  the 
ancient  Fatalists,  who  held  that  the  Fates  determine 
other  things,  but  not  the  free  acts  of  the  will. 

Is  there  no  way  of  escaping  the  odium  of  Fatalism, 
but  by  adopting  the  fortuitous  contingence  of  Epicurus  ? 


FATALISM     AND     PANTHEISM. 


167 


Is  it  Fatalism  to  believe,  that  He  who  formed  the  soul  of 
man,  can  so  touch  the  springs  of  its  action,  as  to  influ- 
ence the  will,  without  interfering  with  the  freedom  of 
its  choice  ?  Is  a  chain  of  causes,  suspended  from  the 
throne  of  nonentity,  to  be  likened  to  the  purposes  and 
agency  of  the  omniscient  Creator  ?  Is  it  Fatalism  to 
believe,  that  motives  may  have  a  real  influence  in  deter- 
mining volitions,  and  that  they  may  be  presented  by  the 
providence  of  God ;  that  the  state  of  the  heart  has  also 
some  concern  in  giving  direction  to  our  acts  of  choice, 
and  that  this  native  or  acquired  state  is  not  always 
the  product  of  chance  ?  Is  there  no  medium  between 
acknowledging  the  sovereignty  of  the  Fates  over  the 
will,  and  admitting  no  control,  but  the  dominion  of 
chance  ?  The  object  of  our  inquiry  is  to  learn  whether 
moral  acts  are  determined  by  accident.  If  they  are  not, 
does  it  certainly  follow,  that  they  must  be  subject  to  the 
Fates  of  the  heathen  ?  Is  the  authority  over  the  heart 
so  divided  between  fate  and  contingence,  that  what  is 
not  ascribed  to  one,  must  of  necessity  belong  to  the 
other  ?  Is  there  no  room  left  for  any  effectual  influence, 
from  infinite  wisdom  arid  benevolence  ?* 

Pantheism. — The  suggestion  that  a  denial  of  contin- 
gent self-determination  leads  to  Pantheism,  is  as  indefi- 
nite in  its  application,  as  the  charge  of  Fatalism.  The 
doctrine  of  Pantheism,  as  held  by  Spinoza  and  his  fol- 
lowers, is  that  the  universe  is  God ;  that  all  finite  exis- 
tences are  only  modes  of  the  one  infinite  substance. 
With  him  agree  substantially  the  Hindoo,  Persian,  Gre- 
cian, and  German  Pantheists.  With  some  diversity  in 

*  See  Examination  of  Edwards,  latter  part  of  Sec.  17. 


168  FATALISM     AND     PANTHEISM. 

the  mode  of  representation,  they  concur  in  the  state- 
ment, that  all  finite  beings,  both  material  and  immate- 
rial, either  constitute  God,  or  are  parts  of  God  ;  that 
there  is  but  one  substance  in  the  universe  ;  that  all  the 
phenomena  in  the  world  are  properties,  manifestations, 
or  developments,  of  the  divine  existence.  These  are 
sometimes  spoken  of  as  emanations  from  the  substance 
of  the  Deity  ;  parts  separated  from  Him  for  a  time,  and 
assuming  the  appearance  of  distinct  agents ;  but  destined 
to  lose  hereafter  their  individuality,  and  to  be  re-absorbed 
into  the  infinite  Being  from  whom  they  have  emanated. 

What  has  this  hypothesis  to  do  with  the  dependence 
of  volition  on  the  state  of  the  heart,  and  the  influence  of 
motives  ?  Is  every  action  which  is  even  remotely  de- 
pendent on  God  to  be  considered  as  his  act  ?  If  in  him 
"we  live,  and  move,  and  have  our  being,"  does  it  fol- 
low, that  our  life  is  his  life,  our  motion  his  motion,  our 
existence  his  existence?  Is  it  Pantheism  to  believe, 
that  he  "  worketh  in  us,  both  to  will  and  to  do  ?"  Does 
such  agency  of  his  imply,  that  he  only  acts  in  the  case  ; 
that  there  is  neither  willing  nor  acting  on  our  part ;  that 
there  is  really  but  one  agent  in  the  universe  ? 

Pantheism  is  so  far  from  coinciding  with  the  doctrine, 
that  God  is  the  original  cause  of  all  other  beings,  with 
their  modes  of  existence  and  of  action,  that  it  does  not 
even  admit  that  there  are  other  beings  ;  that  either  mat- 
ter or  mind  has  been  created  ;  or  that  there  can  be  any 
effects  which  were  not  previously  contained  in  their 
cause;  confounding  the  relation  of  a  cause  to  its  effects, 
with  the  relation  of  a  substance  to  its  properties.  If  it 
be  Pantheism  to  believe,  that  God  is  the  original  cause 
of  whatever  is  the  cause  of  volition  in  his  creatures, 


FATALISM     AND     PANTHEISM.  169 


then  they  are  Pantheists  who  hold  that  while  men  are 
creatures  of  God,  they  are  the  immediate  cause  of  their 
own  volitions. 

The  charge  of  Fatalism  and  Pantheism  is  sometimes 
met,  in  the  same  style  of  argumentation,  and  the  ac- 
count is  balanced,  by  raising  the  cry  of  Pelagian  and 
Arminian  heresy.  But  it  is  quite  as  important,  and  in 
most  cases,  far  more  easy,  to  determine  whether  a  pro- 
posed doctrine  is  true  or  false,  than  to  settle  the  ques- 
tion, whether  it  is  most  nearly  allied  to  Fatalism  or  Ar- 
minianism,  to  Pantheism  or  Pelagianism. 


15 


170 


SECTION   XII. 

TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE. 

Difficulty  of  settling  the  question  before  us  by  philosophical  discus- 
sion— Appeal  to  scripture  testimony — Upon  what  principle,  are 
the  scriptures  to  be  interpreted  ? — How  far  are  we  to  make  their 
meaning  conform  to  our  previous  opinions  ? — Does  scripture  ever 
contradict  reason  ? — Has  God  any  agency  in  determining  the  acts 
of  the  will  ? — He  causes  his  people  to  do  his  will — He  inclines 
their  hearts  to  obey  him — His  purposes  extend  to  the  heart — He 
changes  the  hearts  of  men — In  consequence  of  his  agency,  they 
change  their  own  hearts — The  purpose  of  God  in  relation  to  sin 
— Men  harden  their  own  hearts — Permission  of  sin — Practical 
importance  of  the  subject  of  our  inquiry — Efficacy  of  the  means 
of  holiness — The  doctrine  of  entire  depravity — Influence  of  the 
Spirit  of  God — Conversion  of  the  world — Perpetual  holiness  of 
the  saints  and  angels  in  heaven. 

OUR  inquiry  having  been  conducted  thus  far,  will  it 
now  be  said,  that  after  all,  there  is  uncertainty  and 
doubt  hanging  over  this  subject ;  that  whichever  side  of 
the  question  we  take,  there  are  formidable  difficulties  to 
be  encountered ;  that  although  our  conclusions  may 
appear  to  be  fairly  drawn,  yet,  as  we  have  arrived  at 
them,  through  a  series  of  logical  distinctions,  and  defini- 
tions, and  explanations,  and  such  a  variety  of  metaphys- 
ical phraseology,  there  is  reason  to  suspect  there  may 
be  some  latent  fallacy  in  the  argument ;  that  we  want 
surer  ground  on  which  to  rest  our  opinions,  upon  a  sub- 
ject of  such  momentous  interest.  This  is  the  very  re- 
sult to  which  I  have  been  aiming  to  bring  the  discus- 


TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE.  171 

sion.  My  object  has  not  been  to  lay  a  philosophical 
foundation  for  religious  belief;  but  to  prepare  the  way 
for  simple  and  confident  reliance  on  the  testimony  of 
scripture.  I  have  not  undertaken  to  prove,  by  such  ar- 
guments as  must,  at  once,  carry  conviction  to  every 
mind,  that  a  controlling  influence  is  exercised  over  the 
will,  in  a  way  which  is  consistent  with  accountable 
agency.  It  has  been  my  aim  to  ascertain,  whether  the 
absurdity  of  the  doctrine  has  been  so  demonstrated,  as 
to  preclude  all  possibility  of  finding  it  asserted  in  the 
scriptures.  If  the  subject  is  one  which  admits  of  doubt, 
let  us  look  for  a  decision  to  the  oracles  of  God.  He  who 
made  the  human  soul,  knows  whether  its  volitions  are 
contingent  or  not. 

But  here  is  presented  the  question,  in  what  manner 
are  we  to  examine  the  scriptures,  to  learn  their  decision 
respecting  a  point  in  discussion  ?  By  what  rules  are  we 
to  interpret  the  language  of  inspiration  ?  Are  we  to 
open  the  sacred  volume,  in  the  spirit  of  mere  learners, 
prepared  to  receive  implicitly  whatever  we  find  to  be  dis- 
tinctly impressed  on  its  pages  ?  Or  are  we  to  call  in  the 
aid  of  our  previous  opinions  on  the  subject  in  question,  to 
enable  us  to  make  out  a  correct  interpretation  ?  When 
professing  to  refer  to  the  authority  of  scripture,  to  settle  a 
controverted  point,  are  we  to  take  it  for  granted,  that  the 
meaning  of  the  passages  consulted  must  coincide  with 
the  decision  which  we  have  already  formed  in  our  own 
minds?  What  kind  of  reliance  on  the  testimony  of 
revelation  is  that  which  pre-judges  the  very  case  on  ac- 
count of  which  the  reference  is  made  ? 

The  scriptures,  it  must  be  admitted,  are  addressed  to 
rational  beings,  to  men  capable  of  understanding  moral 


172 


TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE. 


truth.  Without  these  faculties,  they  could  not  investi- 
gate the  evidence  by  which  the  bible  is  shown  to  be  a 
revelation  from  God.  Nor  would  they  have  the  power 
of  interpreting  correctly  the  language  of  the  inspired 
penmen.  But  does  the  faculty  of  comprehending  the 
meaning  of  the  scriptures,  imply  that  we  are  capable  of 
discovering,  by  reason  without  revelation,  ail  the  truths 
which  these  writings  contain  ?  Does  a  capacity  of  un- 
derstanding the  language  of  a  witness,  in  a  court  of  jus- 
tice, include  a  previous  knowledge  of  all  which  that  wit-  • 
ness  can  testify  ?  Can  every  one  who  comprehends  the 
meaning  of  the  declaration,  that  the  dead  shall  be  raised 
from  their  graves,  demonstrate,  by  arguments  not  drawn 
from  revelation,  that  there  will  actually  be  a  resurrec- 
tion? 

It  is  said,  and  truly  said,  that  the  instructions  of  the 
scriptures  go  upon  the  supposition,  that  we  have,  or  at 
least  are  capable  of  having,  some  previous  knowledge  of 
religious  and  moral  subjects.  But  does  this  imply,  that 
all  which  is  contained  in  the  word  of  God,  is  known  to 
us,  before  we  open  its  pages  ?  Can  he  who  created  the 
soul  of  man,  and  gave  him  all  his  power  of  forming  and 
interpreting  language,  find  no  way  of  making  himself 
understood,  when  communicating  truths  not  previously 
discovered  ?  Does  the  faculty  of  knowing  something 
on  the  subject  of  religion,  without  revelation,  imply  the 
power  of  knowing  every  thing,  without  its  aid.  If  we 
can  learn  something  of  the  visible  objects  around  us,  by 
the  faint  light  of  the  moon,  does  it  follow  that  we  can 
make  no  additional  discoveries  by  the  bright  beams  of 
the  sun  ? 


TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE.  173 


It  is  urged,  that  the  author  of  revelation  is  also  the 
author  of  our  natural  powers  of  reasoning ;  and  there- 
fore, that  the  declarations  of  scripture  can  not  contradict 
the  legitimate  conclusions  of  reason.  Are  we  to  infer 
from  this,  that  in  the  exercise  of  our  rational  faculties, 
we  are  never  liable  to  be  led  into  error  ;  that  the  decis- 
ions of  human  reason,  unaided  by  revelation,  are  as  in- 
fallible as  the  scriptures  themselves  ;  that  the  searching 
light  of  inspiration  can  detect  no  fallacy  in  our  argu- 
ments ?  But  if  our  powers  of  reasoning  may  fail  us,  in 
our  common  investigations  ;  they  may  lead  us,  it  is  said, 
especially  under  the  influence  of  a  depraved  will,  to  er- 
roneous interpretations  of  scripture.  This  is  undoubt- 
edly true.  But  does  it  follow,  that  revelation  throws 
no  additional  light  upon  our  path,  in  our  search  after 
truth  ;  that  we  are  quite  as  liable  to  be  deceived,  when 
ingenuously  yielding  our  understandings  to  the  instruc- 
tions of  scripture,  as  when  relying  upon  the  guidance  of 
natural  reason  alone  ?  For  what  purpose,  then,  have 
these  divine  communications  been  made  to  us  ?  Why 
may  we  not  safely  lay  them  aside,  and  throw  ourselves 
back  on  the  resources  of  our  own  powers  of  investiga- 
tion ?  Why  not  discontinue  our  efforts  to  send  the  bible 
to  the  heathen,  who  have  the  pure  light  of  reason  for 
their  guide  ;  that  reason  which  was  given  them  by  the 
author  of  the  scriptures  ? 

There  can  be  nothing  in  the  word  of  God  opposed  to 
intuitive  or  demonstrative  certainty.  But  unless  human 
reason  is  infallible,  there  may  be  many  things  found  in 
the  scriptures  contrary  to  our  previous  opinions ;  opin- 
ions formed  by  evidence  which  is  merely  probable,  and 
therefore  subject  to  be  corrected  by  the  perfect  decisions 
15* 


174  TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE. 

of  revelation.  "  If  we  receive  the  witness  of  men,  the 
witness  of  God  is  greater."  But  we  daily  give  credit  to 
human  testimony,  though  directly  contradicting  our  pre- 
vious opinions.  Was  it  probable  to  the  view  of  natural 
reason,  that  the  waters  of  the  Red  Sea,  and  of  the  river 
Jordan,  would  "  stand  upright  as  a  heap,"  that  the  chil- 
dren of  Israel  might  pass  over  on  dry  ground ;  that 
Elijah  would  ascend  to  heaven  in  a  chariot  of  fire  ;  that 
five  thousand  people  could  be  fully  fed  upon  a  few  bar- 
ley loaves  ?  Was  it  a  probable  conclusion  of  reason  un- 
aided by  revelation,  that  he  by  whom  "all  things  were 
created,  that  are  in  heaven,  and  that  are  in  earth," 
would  be  "  made  flesh  and  dwell  among  us ;"  that  he 
would  labor,  and  suffer,  and  die  on  the  cross  ?  Here  is 
the  probable  decision  of  natural  reason,  contradicted  by 
the  certain  evidence  of  inspired  truth.  If  the  result 
obtained  by  our  reason  alone,  can  never  be  contrary  to 
revelation,  because  God  is  the  author  of  both  ;  upon  the 
same  principle,  the  opinions  of  one  man  can  never  be 
opposed  to  the  opinions  of  another ;  for  the  reasoning 
powers  of  all  have  been  given  by  the  same  Almighty 
Parent. 

If  it  be  admitted,  that  the  scriptures  contain  not  only 
truths  which  may  be  learned  without  revelation,  but 
some  which  are  different  from  conclusions  obtained  by 
our  unassisted  reason  ;  the  main  inquiry  returns  upon  us, 
in  what  way  are  we  to  come  to  a  knowledge  of  the  lat- 
ter class  ?  If  I  open  the  book  of  God,  with  a  determin- 
ation to  find  nothing  there  opposed  to  the  opinions 
which  I  have  previously  formed,  how  am  I  to  discover 
any  truths  not  known  before,  though  written  there,  in 
the  most  distinct  and  intelligible  characters  ?  How  is 


TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE.  175 

it  possible  for  me  to  receive  instruction  from  the  scrip- 
tures, to  correct  any  errors  which  I  may  have  adopted  ? 
My  rule  of  interpretation  would  remove,  at  a  stroke,  all 
obstacles  which  might  lie  in  the  way  of  accommodating 
the  meaning  to  my  own  creed. 

It  is  said,  that  absurd  conclusions  are  often  drawn 
from  the  scripture,  by  giving  a  literal  construction  to 
passages  which  are  really  figurative.  There  is  no  ques- 
tion of  this.  But  is  there  no  other  way  of  determin- 
ing whether  a  passage  is  to  be  taken  literally  or  figura- 
tively, than  to  inquire  which  interpretation  would  pre- 
sent a  doctrine  in  accordance  with  our  previous  opinions  ? 
When  it  is  once  decided,  that  a  portion  of  scripture  has 
a  figurative  meaning,  does  this  imply,  that  it  has  no 
meaning  at  all;  that  is,  that  it  may  signify  one  thing 
or  another,  as  occasion  may  require  ?  Figurative  lan- 
guage, though  "often  ambiguous,  may,  in  many  cases, 
have  significations  as  distinct  and  certain  as  literal  ex- 
pressions. When  God  says  to  Abraham,  "I  am  thy 
shield,"  the  meaning  is  as  definite  as  if  he  had  said,  I 
am  thy  protector. 

I  may  have  erred,  in  judging  it  necessary  to  devote  so 
large  a  portion  of  the  present  inquiry  to  an  examination 
of  the  question,  whether  the  doctrine  of  contingent 
self-determination  is  so  demonstrably  or  intuitively  true, 
that  no  evidence  on  the  other  side  is  admissible,  even  if 
found  on  the  sacred  page.  I  will  now  proceed  to  consult 
the  records  of  inspiration,  with  the  belief,  that  it  is  possi- 
ble they  may  throw  some  light  on  the  subject ;  provided 
we  are  willing  to  yield  our  understandings  implicitly  to 
the  illumination  and  guidance  of  the  divine  testimony. 


176        TESTIMONY  OF  SCRIPTURE. 

The  point  on  which  we  are  to  examine  the  evidence 
furnished  by  the  scriptures,  is  simply  this;  whether  any 
thing  except  a  man's  own  will,  has  any  influence  in  de- 
ciding what  his  volitions  shall  be  ;  and  especially  wheth- 
er God  has  any  agency  in  determining  the  character  of 
human  volitions.  It  is  not  necessary  for  our  present 
purpose  to  inquire  in  what  manner  he  exercises  a  con- 
trolling influence  over  our  hearts.  If  he  can  do  this  in 
any  way,  without  interfering  with  moral  agency,  he 
may  have  various  methods  of  reaching  the  heart,  and 
giving  a  direction  to  the  acts  of  the  will.  At  one  time, 
he  may  make  use  of  the  influence,  the  example,  and 
the  persuasions  of  our  fellow  men.  At  another,  he  may 
impress  the  truths  of  his  word  upon  the  conscience  and 
the  heart.  He  may  sometimes  operate  upon  us,  by  the 
arrangements  of  his  providence  ;  and  sometimes  by  the 
special  agency  of  his  Spirit.  If  in  any  or  all  of  these 
ways,  he  gives  a  direction  to  our  volitions,  they  are  not 
left  to  the  determination  of  chance ;  they  are  not,  in  the 
absolute  sense,  contingent. 

Absolute  contingency  is  incompatible  with  the  influ- 
ence of  any  cause.  But  God  is  said  to  cause  his  peo- 
ple to  do  his  will.  "  I  will  put  my  Spirit  within  you, 
and  cause  you  to  walk  in  my  statutes."  "  The  Lord 
God  will  cause  righteousness  and  praise  to  spring  forth 
before  all  nations.'1*  Are  these  declarations  consistent 
with  the  supposition,  that  righteousness  and  obedience 
are  altogether  self-determined ;  that  God  does  not,  in 
the  proper  sense,  cause  them  to  spring  forth  among  his 
people ;  that  at  farthest,  he  does  nothing  more  than 
render  them  probable,  but  not  certain. 

*  Ezekiel  xxxvi.  27.     Isaiah  Ixi.  11. 


TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE.  177 


He  is  said  to  incline  their  hearts  to  obey  him.  "  The 

Lord  our  God  be  with  us, that  he  may  incline  our 

hearts  unto  him,  to  walk  in  all  his  ways."  "  Incline  my 
heart  unto  thy  testimonies,  and  not  to  covetousness," 
says  the  Psalmist.  "  Incline  not  my  heart  to  any  evil 
thing."*  How  can  the  heart  be  inclined  in  one  direc- 
tion, if  the  law  of  moral  agency  requires,  that  it  be 
equally  inclined  to  either  side,  to  obedience  and  disobe- 
dience ? 

God  is  spoken  of,  as  turning  the  hearts  of  men, 
"  The  king's  heart  is  in  the  hand  of  the  Lord ;  as  the 
rivers  of  water,  he  turneth  it  whithersoever  he  will." 
Are  not  other  men's  hearts  as  much  in  the  hand  of  the 
Lord  as  those  of  kings  ?  The  Psalmist  prays,  "  Turn 
us,  O  God  of  our  salvation,  and  cause  thine  anger  to- 
wards us  to  cease."  "Turn  us  again,  O  God  of  hosts, 
and  cause  thy  face  to  shine,  and  we  shall  be  saved." 
"  Turn  thou  me,  and  I  shall  be  turned,  for  thou  art 
the  Lord  my  God."f  How  can  the  heart  be  turned  by 
the  Lord,  if  from  the  very  nature  of  moral  agency,  it 
must  be  left  to  turn  itself,  independently  of  any  control- 
ling influence  from  any  other  being  ? 

It  is  true,  that  in  many  instances,  God,  in  his  displeas- 
ure, leaves  men  to  themselves;  to  the  propensities  of 
their  own  hearts,  under  the  influence  of  the  objects  pre- 
sented to  them  in  the  common  course  of  his  providence. 
He  gives  "them  over  to  a  reprobate  mind."  He  with- 
holds from  them  the  sanctifying  influence  of  his  Spirit. 
But  this,  so  far  from  being  a  privilege  belonging  to  them 


*  I.  Kings  viii.  57,  8.     Psalrn  cxix.  36  and  cxli.  4. 

f  Proverbs  xxi.  1.    Psalm  Ixxx.  7.  Ixxxv.  4.     Jeremiah  xxxi.  18. 


178 


TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE. 


as  moral  agents,  is  a  dire  calamity,  a  judgment  of  heaven 
for  their  iniquities.  "  My  people  would  not  hearken  to 
my  voice,"  says  God,  "  so  I  gave  them  up  unto  their 
own  hearts'  lust ;  and  they  walked  in  their  own  coun- 
sels." "  Ephraim  is  joined  to  idols,  let  him  alone."* 

The  control  which  God  exercises  over  the  hearts  of 
men,  is  declared  in  many  other  forms  of  expression. 
He  is  said  to  make  them  obedient  or  perverse.  "  O 
Lord,  why  hast  thou  made  us  to  err  from  thy  ways,  and 
hardened  our  hearts  from  thy  fear?"  Says  Paul  to  the 
Thessalonians :  "  The  Lord  make  you  to  increase  and 
abound  in  love."  "  Make  me  to  go  in  the  path  of  thy 
commandments,"  says  the  Psalmist.  "  The  Lord  direct 
your  hearts  into  the  love  of  God,  and  the  patient  wait- 
ing for  Christ."f 

The  power  of  God  over  the  hearts  of  men,  is  exerci- 
sed according  to  the  arrangements  and  purposes  of  his 
infinite  wisdom.  "  Herod  and  Pontius  Pilate,  with  the 
Gentiles  and  the  people  of  Israel,  were  gathered  together, 
for  to  do  whatsoever  his  hand  and  his  counsel  deter- 
mined before  (ngotioiae)  to  be  done."  "  The  king  heark- 
ened not  unto  the  people,  for  the  cause  was  from  the 
Lord,  that  he  might  perform  his  saying,  which  the  Lord 
spake  by  Ahijah  the  Shilonite,  and  Jeroboam  the  son  of 
Nebat."  "  For  God  hath  put  in  their  hearts  to  fulfill, 
and  to  agree,  and  give  their  kingdom  unto  the  beast." 
"  Him  being  delivered  by  the  determinate  counsel  and 
foreknowledge  of  God,  ye  have  taken,  and  by  wicked 
hands,  have  crucified  and  slain."  Joseph  says  to  his 


*  Psalm  Ixxxi.  11, 12.     Hosea  iv.  17. 

f  Isaiah  Ixiii.  17.     Psalm  cxix.  35.     II.  Thessalonians  iii.  5. 


TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE.  179 


brethren :  "  It  was  not  you  that  sent  me  hither,  but 
God."* 

The  purpose  of  God  to  change  the  hearts  of  men, 
and  turn  them  from  sin  to  holiness,  is  declared  in  dis- 
tinct predictions.  To  the  people  of  Israel,  he  promises 
thus  :  "  I  will  take  you  from  among  the  heathen,  and 
gather  you  out  of  all  countries,  and  will  bring  you  into 
your  own  land.  A  new  heart  also  will  I  give  you,  and 
a  new  spirit  will  I  put  within  you  ;  and  I  will  take 
away  the  stony  heart  out  of  your  flesh,  and  I  will  give 
you  a  heart  of  flesh.  And  I  will  put  my  spirit  within 
you,  and  cause  you  to  walk  in  my  statutes.  I  will  put 
my  fear  in  their  hearts,  that  they  shall  not  depart  from 
me.  I  will  pour  upon  the  house  of  David,  and  upon 
the  inhabitants  of  Jerusalem,  the  spirit  of  grace  and  of 
supplication.  Thy  people  shall  be  willing,  in  the  day 
of  thy  power."! 

Whether  the  term  heart,  in  these  passages,  is  to  be 
understood  as  referring  to  the  substance  and  faculties  of 
the  soul,  or  a  spiritual  taste,  or  the  commanding  purpose 
of  life,  or  virtuous  affections  ;  on  either  supposition,  the 
change  must  be  such  as  to  secure  active  obedience ;  for 
the  promise  of  God  is,  "I  will  cause  you  to  walk  in  my 
statutes."  "  Elect,  according  to  the  foreknowledge  of 
God  the  Father,  through  sanctification  of  the  Spirit, 
unto  obedience."  It  is  such  a  change  as  is  connected 
with  salvation.  "  God  hath,  from  the  beginning,  chosen 

*  Acts  iv.  27,  28.  I.  Kings  xii.  J5.  Revelations  xvii.  17.  Acts 
ii.  23.  Genesis  xlv.  8. 

f  Ezekiel  xxxvi.  24,  26,  27.  Jeremiah  xxxii.  40.  Zechariah  xii. 
J  0.  Psalm  ex.  3. 


180  TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE. 

you  to  salvation,  through  sanctification  of  the  Spirit, 
and  belief  of  the  truth."* 

The  work  of  God,  changing  the  heart  from  sin  to 
righteousness,  is  represented  as  the  exercise  of  creative 
power.  "  Create  in  me  a  clean  heart,"  says  David,  "  and 
renew  a  right  spirit  within  me."  "  We  are  his  work- 
manship, created  unto  good  works."f 

The  continuance  of  a  religious  life,  as  well  as  its  com- 
mencement, is  ascribed  to  the  power  of  God  over  the 
heart.  "It  is  God  that  worketh in  you,  both  to  will  and 
to  do,  of  his  good  pleasure.  Who  are  kept  by  the  power 
of  God,  through  faith  unto  salvation."  "Now  unto 
him  that  is  able  to  keep  you  from*  falling,  and  to  present 
you  faultless  before  the  presence  of  his  glory,  with  ex- 
ceeding joy,  to  the  only  wise  God  our  Savior,  be  glory 
and  majesty,  dominion  and  power,  both  now  and  ever. 
Amen."J 

To  avoid  the  result  to  which  the  passages  now  ad- 
duced appear  so  conclusively  to  lead,  it  may  be  said, 
that  there  is  another  class  of  texts,  of  a  very  different, 
if  not  opposite  meaning.  If  in  one  place,  God  is  spo- 
ken of.  as  inclining  the  hearts  of  men  to  keep  his  law  ; 
in  others,  they  are  commanded  to  incline  their  own 
hearts  to  the  Lord.  If  the  Psalmist  prays,  "  Incline 
my  heart  unto  thy  testimonies;"  he  declares,  in  the 
same  psalm,  "  /  have  inclined  mine  heart  to  perform  thy 
statutes  alway."  If  God  is  spoken  of,  as  turning  the 
hearts  of  men ;  they  are  repeatedly  commanded  to  turn 

*  I.  Peter  i.  2.     II.  Thessalonians  ii.  13. 

f  Psalm  li.  10.     Ephesians  ii.  10. 

J  Philippians  ii.  13.     I.  Peter  i.  5.     Jude  24,  25. 


TESTIMONY     OP     SCRIPTURE.  181 


themselves  from  their  evil  ways.  If  he  is  said  to  give 
them  a  new  heart,  and  to  make  them  go  in  the  path  of  his 
commandments ;  they  are  required  to  make  themselves 
a  new  heart,  and  a  new  spirit.  If  he  is  said  to  be  able 
to  keep  his  saints  from  falling ;  they  are  exhorted,  by 
the  same  apostle,  to  keep  themselves  in  the  love  of  God. 

Now,  in  what  way,  are  we  to  determine  the  meaning 
of  these  two  classes  of  texts  ?  Are  we  to  consider  them 
as  directly  contradictory  ?  Are  we  at  liberty  to  make 
our  choice  between  them ;  to  adopt  the  one  class  as 
true,  and  to  reject  the  other  as  false  ;  or  so  explain  them 
away,  as  to  leave  them  no  determinate  signification  ?  If 
men  incline  their  own  hearts  to  obedience,  must  we 
conclude  that  God  does  not  incline  them  ?  If  they  are 
required  to  make  themselves  a  new  heart,  does  it  follow 
that  he  does  not  give  them  a  new  heart  ?  If  they  turn 
from  sin  to  righteousness,  is  it  certain,  that  he  does  not 
cause  them  to  turn ;  that  he  does  not  make  them  to  go 
in  the  path  of  his  commands ;  that  their  obedience  is 
independent  of  his  agency  and  influence  ? 

Are  we  not  bound  on  the  contrary,  to  put  such  a  con- 
struction upon  the  two  classes  of  texts,  that  both  may 
be  admitted  as  true  ?  How  is  this  to  be  done  ?  Evi- 
dently, by  considering  the  agency  of  men,  of  which  the 
passages  speak,  as  being  the  consequence  of  the  agency 
of  God.  If  he  causes  them  to  walk  in  his  commands, 
they  do  actually  thus  walk.  If  he  makes  them  obedi- 
ent, they  really  obey.  If  he  turns  their  hearts  to  him- 
self, they  themselves  turn  to  the  Lord.  If  he  gives 
them  a  new  heart  and  a  right  spirit,  they  exercise  the 
affections  of  a  new  and  obedient  heart.  Not  that  the 
agency  of  God  in  renewing  the  heart,  is  identified  with 
16 


182  TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE. 

the  agency  of  men  j  but  the  one  is  the  consequence  of 
the  other,  is  dependent  on  the  other.  His  turning  them 
is  not  their  turning.  Their  obedience  is  not  his  obedi- 
ence. His  giving  them  repentance  is  not  their  repent- 
ance. But  without  his  agency,  they  would  not  repent. 
His  giving  them  a  new  heart,  is  not  the  same  as  their 
making  themselves  a  new  heart ;  but  it  is  causing  them 
to  make  themselves  a  new  heart.  His  working  in  them, 
to  will  and  to  do,  is  not  their  working  ;  but  it  is  render- 
ing them  willing  to  work  out  their  own  salvation. 
God,  speaking  to  the  Israelites,  says,  "  I  will  give  them 
a  heart  to  know  me,  that  I  am  the  Lord  ;  for  they  shall 
return  unto  me  with  their  whole  heart.'7*  "And  that 
ye  put  on  the  new  man,"  says  the  apostle,  "  which  after 
God  is  created  in  righteousness  and  true  holiness."! 

The  divine  purposes  are  not  confined  to  the  com- 
mencement and  continuance  of  holiness.  They  have 
a  relation  to  the  commission  of  iniquity.  God  is  repeat- 
edly spoken  of,  in  the  scriptures,  as  hardening  the  hearts 
of  men.  Of  the  Canaanites  who  were  exterminated  by 
Joshua,  it  is  said,  "  It  was  of  the  Lord  to  harden  their 
hearts,  that  they  should  come  against  Israel  in  battle, 
that  he  might  destroy  them  utterly."  Of  Sihon,  king 
of  Heshbon,  it  is  said,  "  The  Lord  thy  God  hardened 
his  spirit,  and  made  his  heart  obstinate,  that  he  might 
deliver  him  into  thy  hand."  Isaiah  cries  unto  God  and 
says,  "  O  Lord,  why  hast  thou  made  us  to  err  from  thy 
ways,  and  hardened  our  heart  from  thy  fear  ?"{  God 
repeatedly  declared  to  Moses,  that  he  would  harden  the 


*  Jeremiah  xxiv.  7.  f  Ep'iesians  iv.  24. 

|  Joshua  xi.  20.     Deuteronomy  ii.  30.     Isaiah  Ixiii.  17. 


TESTIMONY     OF      SCRIPTURE. 


183 


heart  of  Pharaoh,  and"  the  hearts  of  the  Egyptians. 
"  Arid  the  Lord  said  unto  Moses,  when  thou  goest  to  re- 
turn unto  Egypt,  see  that  thou  do  all  those  wonders  be- 
fore Pharaoh,  which  I  have  put  in  thy  hand.  But  I 
will  harden  his  heart,  that  he  will  not  let  the  people 
go."* 

It  appears  that  he  had  a  purpose  to  accomplish,  in 
relation  to  the  hardening  of  the  king's  heart.  "  And  I 
will  harden  Pharaoh's  heart,  and  multiply  my  signs  and 
my  wonders  in  the  land  of  Egypt.  But  Pharaoh  shall 
not  hearken  unto  you,  that  I  may  lay  my  hand  upon 
Egypt,  and  bring  forth  my  armies,  and  my  people  the 
children  of  Israel,  out  of  the  land  of  Egypt,  by  great 
judgments."  "  For  Pharaoh  will  say  of  the  children  of 
Israel,  they  are  entangled  in  the  land ;  the  wilderness 
hath  shut  them  in.  And  I  will  harden  Pharaoh's  heart, 
that  he  shall  follow  after  them,  and  I  will  be  honored 
upon  Pharaoh,  and  upon  all  his  host ;  that  the  Egyp- 
tians may  know  that  I  am  the  Lord."  "  And  the  chil- 
dren of  Israel  shall  go  on  dry  ground,  through  the  midst 
of  the  sea:  And  I,  behold  I  will  harden  the  hearts  of 
the  Egyptians,  and  they  shall  follow  them ;  and  I  will 
get  me  honor  upon  Pharaoh,  and  upon  all  his  host."f 
When  the  fulfillment  of  these  predictions  was  seen,  in 
the  events  which  followed,  "  The  Lord  said  unto  Moses, 
go  in  unto  Pharaoh,  for  I  have  hardened  his  heart,  and 
the  heart  of  his  servants,  that  I  might  shew  these  my 
signs  before  him."f 


*  Exodus  iv.  21. 

f  Exodus  vii.  3,  4,  and  chap.  xiv.  3,  4,  16,  17, 

\  Exodus  x.  1. 


184  TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE. 

The  inference  which  the  apostle  draws,  from  the  his- 
tory of  Jacob  and  Esau,  and  of  Pharaoh,  is,  "  Therefore 
hath  he  mercy  on  whom  he  will  have  mercy,  and  whom 
he  will  he  hardeneth."*  If  these  several  passages  are 
allowed  to  have  any  meaning  at  all,  they  can  signify 
nothing  short  of  this,  that  God  so  ordered  the  course  of 
his  providence,  that  the  hardening  of  the  hearts  of  Pha- 
raoh and  of  the  Egyptians,  and  of  the  Canaanites,  was 
the  certain  consequence.  In  answer  to  these  numerous 
and  explicit  declarations,  will  it  be  urged  that,  in  other 
passages,  it  is  frequently  affirmed,  that  Pharaoh  hardened 
his  own  heart  ?  Does  it  follow,  of  course,  that  the  sev- 
eral texts  quoted  above  are  not  true ;  that  there  is  no 
sense,  in  which  God  has  ever  hardened  the  hearts  of 
men? 

Will  it  be  said,  that  God  merely  permitted  their  hearts 
to  be  hardened ;  or  permitted  them  to  harden  their 
own  hearts.  If  this  be  conceded,  it  must  still  be  un- 
derstood, that  he  had  power  to  prevent  this  result. 
What  sort  of  permission  is  a  mere  inability  to  prevent 
that  which  is  permitted  ?  When  it  is  said,  that  it  was 
of  the  Lord  to  harden  the  hearts  of  the  Canaanites,  that 
he  might  destroy  them  utterly ;  and  of  Sihon,  that  the 
Lord  God  hardened  his  spirit,  and  made  his  heart  obsti- 
nate, that  he  might  deliver  him  into  the  hand  of  the 
Israelites ;  and  of  Pharaoh,  that  the  Lord  hardened  his 
heart,  and  the  heart  of  his  servants,  that  he  might  shew 
his  signs  before  him ;  is  nothing  more  intended  by  all 
this,  than  that  God  had  no  power  over  the  hearts  of 
these  men ;  that  he  permitted  them  to  be  hardened,  be- 
cause he  was  unable  to  prevent  it  ? 

*  Romans  ix.  18. 


TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE.  185 

Do  you  say,  that  he  left  them  to  be  hardened,  under 
the  course  of  his  providence  ?  Then  the  course  of  his 
providence,  his  own  providential  dispensations,  had  an 
influence  on  them.  Is  the  declaration  of  the  apostle, 
that  "  he  hath  mercy  on  whom  he  will  have  mercy,  and 
whom  he  will  he  hardeneth,"  consistent  with  the  sup- 
position, that  God  has  no  power  to  prevent  the  harden- 
ing of  the  heart  ?  Is  there  no  distinguishing  interposi- 
tion, in  the  case  of  those  who  are  "  vessels  of  mercy  ?" 
Do  all  these  distinct  declarations  of  scripture,  respecting 
God's  hardening  the  hearts  of  men,  mean  nothing  more 
than  that  they  happen  to  become  hardened,  under  the 
influence  to  which  they  are  exposed  ? 

After  attentively  examining  the  various  passages  of 
scripture  which  speak  of  the  purposes  and  agency  of 
God,  in  relation  to  the  hearts  and  actions  of  men  ;  de- 
claring that  he  causes  righteousness  to  spring  forth ;  that 
he  inclines  the  hearts  of  his  people  to  obey  him ;  that 
he  turns  them  at  his  pleasure  ;  that  he  makes  them  obe- 
dient or  perverse ;  that  he  directs  their  hearts  into  the 
love  of  God ;  that  his  counsel  determines  before,  the 
things  to  be  done  by  human  agency ;  that  he  gives  a 
new  heart  and  a  right  spirit ;  that  he  works  in  his  people 
to  will  and  to  do  ;  that  he  is  able  to  keep  them  from  fall- 
ing, till  he  presents  them  faultless,  before  the  presence 
of  his  glory ;  and  that  on  the  other  hand  he  often  hard- 
ens the  heart  and  makes  it  obstinate :  after  weighing 
well  the  import  of  these  several  expressions,  can  any 
one  fail  to  admit,  that  according  to  the  scriptures,  God 
has  a  determining  influence  over  human  volitions ;  can 
lie  escape  from  this  conclusion,  on  any  other  ground, 
than  that  he  has  come  to  the  examination,  with  a  pre- 
16* 


186  TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE. 

conceived  and  settled  opinion,  that  such  a  doctrine  can 
not  be  true,  and  therefore,  can  not  be  found  in  the  ora- 
cles of  God  ?  Are  we  thus  to  explain  away  the  explicit 
declarations  of  scripture,  till  we  have  brought  them  to 
coincide  with  our  own  philosophy  ?  Can  the  advocates 
of  a  directing  and  determining  divine  influence,  express 
their  opinions  in  stronger  or  more  definite  terms,  than 
those  used  by  the  inspired  writers? 

It  is  not  necessary  to  contend,  that  a  determining  in- 
fluence implies,  in  all  cases,  a  positive  and  immediate 
agency  of  God  upon  the  heart.  If  in  his  unsearchable 
wisdom,  he  chooses,  in  many  instances,  to  leave  the  hu- 
man will  to  itself,  and  to  the  motives  presented  to  it,  in 
the  ordinary  course  of  events ;  while,  as  often  as  he  sees 
fit,  he  interposes  by  special  providences,  and  by  the  op- 
erations of  his  Spirit,  to  give  a  new  direction  to  its 
acts  ;  it  is  then  truly  under  his  control.  "  The  rivers  of 
water  are  in  the  hand  of  the  Lord,"  because  he  either 
allows  them  to  flow  in  their  accustomed  channels,  or 
"  turneth  them  whithersoever  he  will."  So  the  human 
heart  is  in  his  hand,  if  he  can  either  directly  or  indirect- 
ly, control  its  exercises,  whenever  he  pleases.  But  if, 
from  the  very  nature  of  moral  agents,  all  their  volitions 
must  be  contingent,  in  the  absolute  sense ;  they  can  be 
subject  to  no  directing  influence,  from  any  quarter  what- 
ever. They  must  be  left  wholly  to  the  determination 
of  chance.* 


The  question,  whether  human  volitions  are  contin- 
gent, is  nothing  less  than  this,  whether  God  can,  in  any 

*  On  the  testimony  of  scripture,  see  Examination  of  Edwards, 
Sec.  19. 


TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE.  187 

way,  by  the  measures  of  his  providence,  by  the  precepts 
and  sanctions  of  his  law,  by  the  mercy  of  the  gospel, 
by  the  terrors  of  perdition,  by  the  glories  of  heaven,  or 
by  the  operations  of  his  Spirit,  have  any  influence  over 
the  voluntary  acts  of  his  creatures.  It  is,  in  short,  a 
question,  whether  God  or  chance  is  on  the  throne  of  the 
moral  universe.  That  the  Creator  of  all  things  can 
control  the  material  world,  no  one  ventures  to  deny. 
But  the  theories  of  many  seem  to  suppose,  that  he  can 
not  touch  the  springs  of  moral  action,  without  deranging 
the  essential  laws  of  accountable  agency.  Yet  the  gov- 
ernment exercised  over  all  created  minds,  is  as  much 
more  important,  than  the  regulation  of  the  material  uni- 
verse, as  the  worlds  of  intelligent  creatures,  exceed  in 
value  the  worlds  of  matter  which  they  inhabit. 

This  is  not  a  subject  of  barren  speculation.  Tt  is  in- 
timately connected  with  some  of  the  most  important 
doctrines  and  duties  of  evangelical  religion.  Not  only 
does  the  efficacy  of  divine  influence  on  the  hearts  of 
men  imply,  that  something  from  without  the  will  is 
concerned  in  determining  its  volitions ;  but  the  success 
of  all  human  efforts  for  the  prevention  of  iniquity,  and 
the  promotion  of  holiness,  must  depend  on  their  tenden- 
cy, in  connection  with  other  influences,  to  give  direc- 
tion to  acts  of  the  will.  If  volitions  are,  in  the  absolute 
sense,  contingent ;  if  they  are  so  sellvdetermined,  as  t,o 
be  entirely  independent  of  every  thing  from  without, 
for  being  as  they  are  ;  how  unavailing  must  be  all  our 
endeavors  to  induce  others  to  turn  from  the  practice  of 
iniquity.  To  what  purpose  are  religious  instruction, 
and  admonition,  and  exhortation,  and  in  treaty,  if  they 
have  no  influence  upon  the  feelings  and  purposes  of  the 


188  TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE. 

persons  addressed  ?  How  can  a  preacher  enter  the  desk, 
with  any  hope  of  success,  if  he  believes,  that  the  hearts 
of  his  hearers  are  controlled  by  the  law  of  contingence? 
Why  should  a  parent  attempt  to  guard  his  child  against 
the  allurements  of  vice,  if  temptation  has  no  power  to 
influence  the  will ;  if  warning  has  no  efficacy  in  restrain- 
ing from  iniquity  ?  We  ought  not,  indeed,  to  rely  on 
any  human  means  as  being,  of  themselves,  sufficient  to 
produce  holiness,  without  the  accompanying  agency  of 
the  Divine  Spirit.  But  absolute  contingence  is  as  in- 
consistent with  any  efficacious  operation  of  the  Spirit  of 
God,  as  with  a  determining  influence  from  the  efforts 
of  men. 

The  belief  that  human  volitions  are  not  rendered  sin- 
ful or  holy  by  blind  contingence,  is  in  accordance  with 
the  scriptural  representation  of  the  entire  depravity  of 
man  in  his  unrenewed  state.  It  implies  that  there  are 
causes  and  influences  in  operation,  which  give  a  uniform 
character  of  sinfulness  to  his  acts  of  will.  But  there  is 
no  uniformity  in  the  results  of  contingence.  Perma- 
nent depravity  is  inconsistent  with  the  supposition  that, 
with  respect  to  each  separate  volition,  there  is  an  even 
chance  whether  it  will  be  sinful  or  holy. 

Contingent  determination  of  the  will  is  inconsistent 
with  the  scriptural  account  of  the  change  which  is 
wrought,  in  the  heart  of  man,  by  the  Spirit  of  God. 
Here  is  an  influence  from  without.  If  it  has  any  effica- 
cy, in  determining  the  acts  of  the  will  to  be  holy,  there 
is  something  besides  contingence,  something  besides  the 
man  himself,  which  is  concerned  in  deciding  what  his 
volitions  shall  be.  When  the  Spirit  of  God,  in  his 
sanctifying  influence,  descends  on  the  churches,  is  it  a 


TESTIMONY  OF  SCRIPTURE.        189 

matter  of  chance  whether  any  are  brought  to  repen- 
tance ?  Is  the  glory  of  the  marvelous  change  which  is 
witnessed,  to  be  ascribed  exclusively  to  the  self-deter- 
mining power  of  the  converts  ?  Is  this  moral  renova- 
tion accounted  for,  by  saying  that  the  subjects  of  it  hap- 
pen to  decide  as  they  do  ? 

On  the  ground  that  the  means  of  salvation,  when  ac- 
companied with  the  renewing  influence  of  the  Spirit, 
have  a  real  efficacy,  in  turning  the  hearts  of  men  from 
sin  to  holiness,  we  rest  our  confident  expectation  of  the 
final  triumph  of  grace  on  the  earth,  in  the  conversion  of 
the  ivorld  to  God.  It  is  a  reliance  on  his  power  to  sub- 
due the  depraved  will  of  man,  which  has  united  the 
hearts  of  Christians,  in  prayer  and  zeal  for  the  salvation 
of  the  heathen :  which  supports  the  missionary,  in  his 
perilous  labors  among  those  who  are  perishing  in  their 
superstitions  and  iniquities;  which  assures  us  of  the 
fulfillment  of  the  divine  predictions,  that  "  all  the  ends 
of  the  earth  shall  remember  and  turn  unto  the  Lord." 

But  if  the  decisions  of  the  will  are  independent  of 
all  influence  from  without,  what  ground  of  hope  can 
there  be,  that  the  heathen  world  will  yield  their  hearts 
to  the  calls  of  the  gospel.  If  even  the  Spirit  of  God 
can  interpose  no  determining  agency,  to  stay  the  desola- 
ting tide  of  depravity,  without  violating  the  laws  of  ac- 
countable volition,  how  can  we  expect  an  answer  to  our 
prayers  for  the  conversion  of  the  world  ?  If  all  the 
acts  of  the  will  are  contingent ;  if  they  are  equally  liable 
to  be  holy  and  to  be  sinful ;  how  can  we  hope  for  a 
millennial  age  of  universal  and  exalted  piety  ? 

On  this  supposition,  what  security  is  there,  that  dis- 
affection and  revolt  may  not,  at  any  moment,  break  out, 


190 


TESTIMONY     OF     SCRIPTURE. 


among  the  hosts  of  the  redeemed  in  heaven  ?  Are  they 
safe  by  being  confirmed  in  perpetual  obedience  ?  How 
is  it  possible  they  should  be  thus  confirmed,  if  their  wills 
are  so  balanced,  by  the  freedom  to  either  side,  that 
at  every  instant,  there  is  an  even  chance  in  favor  of  and 
against  their  fidelity  ?  It  may  be  said,  that  God  has 
promised  to  secure  them  in  constant  and  endless  obedi- 
ence. He  has  promised,  then,  to  preserve  them  in  that 
state  in  which  their  wills  are  not  evenly  balanced  between 
holiness  and  sin.  If  their  sad  experience  of  the  conse- 
quences of  transgression  on  the  earth,  if  their  blissful 
participation  in  the  glories  of  heaven,  if  their  gratitude 
for  the  mercy  which  has  brought  them  safe  to  the  para- 
dise above,  if  their  view  of  the  terror  and  despair  to 
which  the  impenitent  are  doomed ;  if  these  and  other 
motives,  powerfully  impressed  on  their  minds  by  divine 
influence,  are  sufficient  to  keep  them  from  falling  ;  then 
are  they  sufficient  to  prevent  that  equal  tendency  of  the 
will  to  opposite  directions,  which  seems  to  be  thought 
by  some  to  be  essential  to  responsible  agency.  Must 
we  then  be  driven  to  the  conclusion,  that  as  soon  as  the 
redeemed  are  made  perfect  in  heaven,  they  cease  to  be 
moral  agents;  that  they  no  longer  possess  that  freedom 
to  either  side  which  is  necessary  to  render  them  deserv- 
ing of  praise  or  blame  ?  Confirmation  in  uniform  and 
never  ending  rectitude,  is  inconsistent  with  contingent 
determination.  If  every  volition  is  fortuitous,  and  if 
the  countless  myriads  in  the  heavenly  world,  are  to  put 
forth  acts  of  will  continually,  through  the  ages  of  their 
future  existence ;  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  all  these 
acts  will  chance  to  be  on  the  side  of  holy  obedience. 


* 


OVERDUE.  ===== 


OCT  22   ? 


YB  22670 


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